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In part one of our 2027 global macro outlook, Global Chief Economist Seth Carpenter joins Serena Tang to discuss how AI-driven investment is sustaining growth despite higher oil prices.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Serena Tang: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Serena Tang, Morgan Stanley's Global Cross-Asset Strategist.
Seth Carpenter: And I'm Seth Carpenter, Morgan Stanley's Global Chief Economist and Head of Macro Research.
Serena Tang: Today and tomorrow, a two-part conversation on Morgan Stanley's year ahead outlook.
Today, we'll focus on the global economy after a year of energy shocks and renewed inflation pressure. Tomorrow, we'll be back with our views on investing across asset classes.
It's Monday, November 16th at 10:00 AM in New York.
So Seth, let's start with the big picture. It's been a challenging year to map the global economy with the war in Iran, shifting trade policies, and more recently, US midterms, adding uncertainty even as AI investment supports growth. As you look ahead to 2027, what's a story that ties it all together, and where do you see the global economy heading?
Seth Carpenter: Sure. I mean, the interesting thing I think so far might be a bit of a surprise, to date, about how, dare I use the word that's been overused a little bit, how resilient global growth has been.
We've had a whole series of shocks. We've had the energy price shock. Last year, we had tariffs. We've seen now developed market central banks starting to raise rates, and yet overall growth is holding up. And so we've titled the outlook this time, Powered by AI, Tested by Oil, because there really is this underlying momentum that's going on that is about this whole AI phenomenon.
In the United States, the build-out, the CapEx infrastructure spending is clearly strong, and it's one of the key drivers of US growth. But it's a global theme because Asia, where the world supply chain in many ways is located, is getting a lot of growth by exporting components for this build-out. Europe is actually getting into the game there a little bit as well, and Japan has been part of it.
So this AI phenomenon, that's global, and that's a big part of what's sustaining growth. But oil prices have gone up dramatically since the US invasion of Iran, and so we have to ask ourselves, what is going on with inflation? We've seen, headline inflation globally go up. We know that the spread of refined products over crude is higher than usual, so that risks more inflationary pressure coming through later.
And so we've seen central banks hiking in response. So the question becomes then, can this underlying momentum overcome the adverse shocks that we're seeing? I'd say our view is, yeah, probably. 2027 might see a little bit of a lull, a little bit of a slower pace initially, but that's not because we think we're actually going to have a real slowdown in the global economy.
It's just the growth rate this year is pretty strong. It's gonna be hard to top that regardless of what's going on.
To take that narrative and just to summarize it, to put it in numbers, to make it easier to digest, this year, global real GDP, we think, is tracking at about three and a half percent, so 3.5%. Next year, that little bit of a lull that I talked about would bring it down to something like 3.3% before rebounding in twenty twenty-eight to about 3.4%.
Now, that doesn't sound like a huge swing, and ultimately, we don't think it is. We are constructive about the growth rate of the global economy. But these little swings, especially when you think about it at a global level, can start to matter, and investors are gonna look at the data as they come in.
Serena Tang: So you've given us the picture at the aggregate level. I actually want to dig a little bit more into the regional views. Where do you see faster growth? Where do you see slower growth? And what does inflation look like globally?
Seth Carpenter: Yeah, those are key questions, and I think all of the conversations that I have with investors really touch on that. So I would say, first off, the US is clearly a key driver here, right?
So the AI CapEx build-out is absolutely taking place in the biggest part in the United States. And there we're looking for growth, call it two and a half percent this year. So by US standards, that's really strong growth numbers. Inflation, we think, is gonna stay high here as well.
We've seen the energy price shock feeding through. We know that the statistical agencies often have a little bit of what we call residual seasonality in the inflation data in the beginning of the year. And so we suspect that we're still gonna see a few more months of high inflation data. But if our forecast is right, and this is a critical if, if our forecast is right, Q1 will be the peak of inflation, and then we'll see it start to trend down in the United States because we do think growth remains solid.
But so far, we don't really see overheating going on in the labor market. Now, across the Atlantic in Europe, we're also pretty constructive. So a growth rate of around one point three percent or so this year, of real GDP growth.
It's much less fast than what we're seeing in the United States, but nevertheless, it's holding up. That's being driven by a little bit of extra exports to the US, but fiscal policy clearly in Germany still supporting things, and the periphery is holding up in terms of overall demand.
Inflation there feels a lot like inflation in the United States. However, the economy is much more susceptible to inflation energy price shocks. And so that's why the ECB started hiking before the Fed did.
We think there's probably another hike there. We also expect inflation there to drift down over time, but it's gonna take a while, and the divergence between the headline inflation numbers and the core inflation numbers might actually be a bit bigger in Europe than elsewhere.
Now, Asia. Asia's a really interesting story, and we're used to thinking of China as the other big economy in the world. And that's true, but their growth right now is on the tepid side by Chinese standards. We expect that to continue because they're still working through this debt deflation cycle.
And so four point three percent or so, growth next year is about what we're looking for. We do think that deflation's going to ebb, but not anytime soon. That outcome is in contrast to the rest of Asia, especially take Korea, Taiwan, the real exporting houses for this whole AI CapEx build-out phenomenon.
Again, growth rates are gonna tell you a different story because the spending has been rising so rapidly now. We expect exports to stay very strong there. But in growth rate terms, it might actually come off, not because things are fundamentally weakening, but because you just can't keep that same pace of exporting going.
Serena Tang: So you touched on this earlier already, but as we know, inflation this year has driven a lot of debate around the Fed path. So what are you expecting for 2027?
Seth Carpenter: Yeah, I mean, I think bring it back to the Fed and inflation, that really is the key story. On the growth side of things, things are holding up. We think the labor market is fine but not overheating, and so the whole story driving what the Fed's going to do comes down to inflation, like you said. So look, we expect, like the market does, another hike by the Fed in December.
We're looking for another hike in March. The market's gonna debate are they gonna slip another one in in January. But we don't think so. We think we've got two more hikes from here, December and March, and then that's it. What will it take for that forecast to come true? It's gonna mean that our inflation forecast also has to come true, which is to say firm inflation now, but no clear signs for an acceleration from here.
Because if things really pick up from here, then that January hike that the market's talking about might come true. It also means, though, that our forecast that Q1 is the peak of inflation in the United States and then it's a downward trend after that, that has to come true as well. Otherwise, it's entirely conceivable that the Fed would put in another hike after March, maybe in June, because they really want that assurance that inflation is coming down.
Serena Tang: And how you framed it just now, I think, is the important thing, right? What markets are pricing in versus our expectations. In which case, what is your most out-of-consensus view on the global economy in 2027?
Seth Carpenter: So I would say, you know, overall I don't know that we're wildly out of consensus anywhere. I would say we're probably above consensus in terms of our forecast for US growth. We are building in continued strong aggregate demand, but we're also penciling in an increase in the growth rate of productivity, partly because we do think AI adoption is going on.
So that's one place where we're out of consensus. And then I guess I would come back to our discussion about inflation and what it means for central banks. The market is going to be debating a lot how much central banks are going to hike, how soon inflation's going to abate. Our view is, you know, Q1 is about the peak, and after that things come down, and so central banks won't have to hike more than that.
I would say if we're wrong, there are probably more paths to more rates from central banks and higher inflation than to lower. So I would say that's one place where I think our view maybe has a bit of tension with at least the way the market's trying to price things.
Serena Tang: Now, you've talked a lot about the base case. What are some of the alternate scenarios you see for the global economy?
Seth Carpenter: Yeah, I personally think it's critical to come into any round, forecasting round with a base case. But that only gets you so far. You really have to ask yourself, "How could we be wrong?" And so what we tried to do was to sketch out four alternate scenarios that have some of the key risks that we think are there in the economy and that we're talking to clients about in markets.
So in terms of a faster growth scenario, there really are two key scenarios that we tried to analyze. One demand, demand for CapEx, demand for consumer spending, especially in the United States, where demand overall is just stronger than we think, and that outcome leads to faster growth, but it also leads to much higher inflation.
And so in response to that, the Fed and other developed market central banks are going to have to raise interest rates more and maybe to the same peaks that we saw in the last hiking cycle coming off of the COVID inflation. On the other hand, we're trying to figure out how is AI adoption happening?
How much can productivity pick up? And so we also thought about a faster growth scenario where it's mostly driven by faster aggregate supply, that is, the productivity picks up faster. And the big difference there is that you're able to get faster growth without the same kind of inflationary pressures.
Now, central banks everywhere are going to see that, and the first thing they see is faster growth, Anytime you have faster growth from productivity, anytime the underlying potential growth rate of the economy is faster, it tends to mean that the neutral equilibrium interest rate is actually higher, and so you could get slightly higher interest rates than under the baseline, even though inflation is well-behaved.
Now, We, we are pretty constructive, and we do think there's probably more upside risk than downside risk, but we can't bury our heads in the sand. And so one version of the world is that the oil price shock that we've seen comes back, and we have oil prices going up a lot.
Central banks will see that, and they'll have to react to that. And the way that AI CapEx build-out is driving all of the growth right now, question that we get from clients a lot is: What would happen if that fell short of your expectations?
And I think that's worth thinking about too, because you have a combination of the direct spending, the direct effect of this build-out that's leading to more GDP, more growth, more exports from East Asia. But you also have an indirect effect, which is this whole phenomenon has driven up asset prices, which has given households more wealth, which has allowed strong spending to continue.
And so if those factors both went away, you would have a negative effect on the direct channel of spending and an additional drag on the economy from the indirect wealth channel. And for us, that means a slowdown. Probably not a recession. like I said, we're pretty constructive about what's going on with AI anyway, but one would have to at least consider what would happen if these spending plans fall short of our current forecast.
Serena Tang: And of course, all of those risk scenarios just means The range of outcome for risk assets is unusually wide.
Seth Carpenter: Yeah, I think that's right.
There is a huge amount of uncertainty here. We are in uncharted territory in so many ways. The AI phenomenon all by itself is just a brand-new situation for everybody in markets. But energy prices and everything that's going on in that space, there's still a lot of uncertainty.
We've had a series of these supply shocks and how that may or may not get embedded into inflation psychology in the way that price setters and price takers react to that inflation, that's uncertain as well. So I, I really think it is fair to say there's a very broad range of possible outcome here, and investors around the world are going to have to pay lots of attention.
Serena Tang: And of course, we're going to be talking about that in our next podcast. Seth, thanks for taking the time to talk.
Seth Carpenter: Serena, it is always great to sit down with you and talk through these issues. I'm gonna turn the tables on you tomorrow and ask you about markets.
Serena Tang: Of course. And thanks to our listeners for joining. Please be sure to tune in to the second half of this conversation tomorrow to hear how we're thinking about investment strategy in the year ahead.
If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.
The U.S. midterm results could lead to policy changes that worsen the power bottleneck for U.S. data centers. Meanwhile, the outlook for AI chips remains bullish. Our specialists discuss potential challenges and opportunities in the AI buildout.
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Tom Wigg: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Tom Wigg from Morgan Stanley's TMT Specialty Sales. I'm joined by Joe Moore, U.S. Semiconductors Analyst, and Stephen Byrd, Global Head of Thematic Research.
Today, the disconnect between the AI power gigawatt shortfall, especially post-midterms, and a bullish outlook on AI semiconductors.
It's Friday, November 13th at 10am in New York.
Morgan Stanley already estimated a 30 gigawatt shortfall between now and 2028, and you revised that higher after the midterm. So maybe talk about our estimates, where they've gone now? And how you're thinking about this whole question around, you know, really Texas is kind of the ground zero for this conversation.
But it kinda happened in Ohio and other places as well…
Stephen Byrd: Absolutely. Yeah. I mean, obviously the election caused a lot of investors to focus on the political challenges, but this is not new per se. So, we've been talking about people, power, and politics being real bottlenecks on the ability to build out data centers in the United States.
Now, that creates a lot of incentive elsewhere around the world to build. But in the U.S., we have a lot of challenges in terms of the build-out. The election really underscored the importance of addressing data center concerns. A bunch of voters expressed concerns with data center development.
And to be fair, I think that's warranted in some cases because some of these data centers really are developed in ways that may not work for local communities. So, I understand the concern. Mathematically, what we essentially are looking at is that bottleneck getting larger in 2028 because of a couple of gubernatorial outcomes, Texas and Ohio being specific, where we think it's a delay.
It's not a cancellation. We actually think there's a path to getting these data centers built. It's just going to take a little bit longer because of the processes that those new governors are going to want data center developers to go through. So, we go from kind of 30 gigawatts up into the mid-30s in terms of the shortage.
But then in 2029, the deployment is much, much bigger. So, it is a relief valve, and in some ways – something Joe and I talk a lot about – helpful in some ways because this elongates that growth cycle as well.
Tom Wigg: What are the offsets that we can get? You know, [be]cause some clients will talk about, you know, Louisiana now became the new Texas that everyone…
Stephen Byrd: Yes.
Tom Wigg: … is excited about, you know; still a red state. Some clients are talking about Asia, particularly Malaysia as a region where labor's cheaper, there's no permitting. You know, maybe we can get a lot more gigawatts online.
Stephen Byrd: Mm-hmm. Yeah.
Tom Wigg: Google recently signed a deal there. Behind the meter, still an option. Grid optimization, probably not something I understand. But I know you've been a power exec, so maybe you do.
Stephen Byrd: Sure, sure.
Tom Wigg: Do you think we can kinda cobble together enough power in other ways where maybe your shortfall is too conservative?
Stephen Byrd: Yeah, I think there's a path where the shortfall is less than what we laid out, so let's go through all the options. But where there's a will and lots and lots of money and lots of innovation, there's often a solution.
So, let's go through the categories. So, off grid we like a lot, and we put in a forecast of what we think can be done in the United States. The challenge is time – in the sense that engineering those solutions, getting the labor, getting the permits, all of that takes time.
And an example, my home state of Virginia essentially outlawed on-site gas generation, in sort of anticipation that folks would go down this off-grid path. And they don't want to see those kinds of emissions.
So, we are running into challenges. When we tally that up, it's not as much power as I think many bulls would like. Just – it's not a question of demand, it's a question of all those challenges that I just mentioned. But there could be bigger solutions over time.
We have really good teams around the world that assess incremental demand and deployment. Just as you mentioned, Tom, Malaysia is one of those opportunities, though I would point to India, Thailand, a little bit in Japan, China.
On the other hand, we have issues in other parts of the world. So, Norway now has a moratorium on data centers. We're running into some problems in Australia. We're running into some problems in the United Kingdom, where a big, proposed UK project was terminated because the utility couldn't provide grid access fast enough.
So, it's a lot of puts and takes. When we add all this up, as of now, it's not enough to address the U.S. shortfall. But I would expect over time just more and more emphasis on getting solutions.
Now, one thing I do want to say where I'm not bullish is grid optimization. So, it's a cool idea. But let me just briefly explain why I think there's more hype than reality to this.
The idea is that the U.S. grid is actually only utilized on average, like, 50 percent of the time. Something like that, so there's clearly slack. The problem is that's not how a utility executive would look at the situation. Utilities manage the grid for the worst possible day or the worst possible situation. That would be a six-day winter storm, for example.
During a six-day winter storm, demand is at the peak, and they expect some of their power plants to trip offline because of the cold conditions. So, they're going to manage their system assuming every data center developer is going to want to have power and everybody else will.
So, the idea of being flexible and, and sort of filling in those gaps just doesn't work under the conservative mindset of a utility. So that part unfortunately I don't think is going to work.
Tom Wigg: Got it. And then before I switch to Joe, maybe if you can just put your political hat on for a second. I know you spend a lot of time in D.C., so if you can play pundit. There's a difference between, you know, running for office in an election and actually governing.
Stephen Byrd: Absolutely.
Tom Wigg: So, some of the commentary post-election from the bulls has been, okay, you know, this blue wave happened. But these blue governors are still going to want economic activity in their state. And if the AI companies approach this with, you know, more community-oriented solutions. In terms of, you know, giving back, building a school, building a football stadium in West Texas, paying teachers more. Whatever it is, you know, there's a better way to do this. And that should get a lot of these things through.
Is that your sense? Or is there something more against the data centers?
Stephen Byrd: Yes. No, I think that is my sense, at least in some states. And this is really the genesis of our big buy the drop note; was we think this is a bit of a pause in terms of the pace of data center growth. It is not a cancellation, in terms of what we see, to your point.
What I think we'll see is very smart approaches to developing data centers that work for all the constituents. Louisiana's a great example you mentioned earlier. We see projects where the developers are bankrolling new hospitals, pay raises for teachers and folks in police and fire service.
And when you do it in the right way, I think you can get support and create economic activity. Look at Louisiana. When you look at all of the activity in Louisiana. Not just data centers, but other industrial activity. That magnitude rivals large nations, in terms of the amount of economic activity in the state. And that is so good from a fundamental economic health of the state.
So, I do think there's a path. That's just going to take a little bit of time to work through.
Tom Wigg: Yep. Let's talk to Joe. So, semis have been very controversial. We had this tough summer, another sell-off in October. One of the bear cases is this power shortfall.
How is everything still so tight in semis from a supply demand standpoint when power is getting worse? And are we setting ourselves up for an oversupply situation where there's just no place to put all these chips that we're building?
Joe Moore: Yeah. So, I think for 2027, it's not just staying tight. It's getting tighter. Like, all of the component shortages are severe. You've had multiple CEOs from hyperscalers say memory is their biggest problem, not land power shell in the short term.
That doesn't mean land power shell's not becoming a bigger and bigger focus. So, we have to see what's going to happen with each individual project. I think the nice thing about selling ubiquitous compute is you can have three people that don't have a place to put it and five other people who want the thing that they didn't have a place to put it.
So, I think it's still very strong into 2028. I would kind of argue that what we're hearing is it's very challenging. If you sort of take something in Texas offline, you take something in Ohio offline that we thought we had; we have to really scramble and find another place to put it.
I think there's still the view from the people we talk to is that it's not going to slow us down. We'll find a way. And talking to Stephen, it's sort of hard to see exactly what that way may be. A lot of the international stuff may be an option. We'll have to see what the economy looks like.
In a weaker economy, I think you're much more prone to allow people to build data centers [be]cause it's jobs and things like that. So, we have… There's a lot of unknowns out to [20]28, and any semiconductor analyst talking two years out is hard to say.
But Stephen made this point. This is a duration kind of trade now, and we know it's really good. Other bottlenecks are a big risk that we need to contemplate. And I mean, the interesting thing about memory too is consumers – PC, smartphone, you know, those businesses are very weak.
And every quarter we've gone through this where the PC numbers aren't that good and there's inventory and... But the fulfillment at the data centers is really low, like 50 percent. And so that's the true north in all of this. And what that does to me for memory is it keeps the stocks very range bound. But look at the range.
I mean, we're down 60 percent, 70 percent. And we're trading at like three times earnings. So, any kind of sustainability to some of these stocks and, you know, you'll be able to buy back half the company in two years. So, I'm pretty bullish on all of it.
And I think – and none of that is discounting anything that Stephen is saying.
And I think it does reframe a little bit the competitive dynamic. Because, you know, am I taking my restricted land power shell and using it on something that may or may not work? We'll see. But I think the overall ecosystem is still very good, and I think the kinds of arguments you're hearing now is that [20]27's good.
What about '28? We heard that at the end of [20]24, [20]25. Eventually it'll be right. Eventually there will be a year where you're like, "Okay, it is actually slowing down in that year." It just doesn't feel that way to me. And given that the market is basically saying now that it does, we're being valued as it slows in [20]28. And you know, I think that visibility's going to still be good.
Tom Wigg: So, like you said, you know, the, the stocks are now essentially baking in 2028 rolling over. You think that's too bearish. When does the market appreciate that? Will we get some sort of 2028 visibility in the middle of next year. Kinda like we did this year? Do we need a new AI use case to make people think about, you know, incremental tightening in the supply chain?
Joe Moore: Yeah.
Tom Wigg: Is there more clarity on AI financing? One of the above, all of the above? Like, how do you think about that? And like, you know, when you looked at past cycles, I know this is sort of unprecedented, but like how does that play out?
Joe Moore: Yeah, I think it's very... You know, the worst case is it's just kind of a grind, and we have to prove that [20]28 is good because we have 12-month lead times, and 12 months from now we think [20]28 is good.
And quarter by quarter we continue to feel okay about it. But we are going to learn a lot about how these models are used. We're starting to see, you know, the companies that are going to come public now are the ones who actually… There's actually cost of sales for them. You know, we've seen cloud service providers doing great, but somebody's renting from them.
So, I think getting some visibility into the economics of how AI's actually getting used will be really important. You know, maybe bad, I don't know. But I think that's what will help us get that visibility. Certainly the confidence. I mean, the Silicon Valley… The dissonance between Silicon Valley optimism and Wall Street pessimism has never been this wide.
And it's not even; Wall Street pessimism is the wrong word [be]cause I feel like, you know, 60 percent of the people will be bullish, but they're very easily swayed by a couple people who pitch the -- They know things are falling apart. And so, there's like a not… The conviction isn't there that maybe you'd like to see.
I think that conviction can come back very quickly in the right sort of economic circumstance. I don't think guiding to 2030 is the answer when you're in a duration trade, you know. That just creates risk. It makes it hard for the stocks to move forward because you're already guiding for a 75 percent four-year CAGR.
I need to each and every quarter, you know, validate that. But I think in general, just put up numbers and the world will come around to if it's sustainable or not. I mean, the market's smart and the market will decide.
Tom Wigg: Got it. Stephen, Joe, thanks for speaking with me today. And thanks for listening. If you enjoyed the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen. And share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
Our Asia Energy analyst Mayank Maheshwari discusses how AI, new factories and cooling systems are boosting electricity demand in Asia and reshaping local power structure.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Mayank Maheshwari, Morgan Stanley’s Asia Energy analyst.
Today – why power thematic is moving beyond AI.
It’s Thursday, November 12th, at 10am in Singapore.
Whenever I have a conversation on power, it is mostly thought of as a story about AI. But the electrification super cycle is much broader than just AI. Consensus is underestimating how much power the world will need by the end of the decade.
We think global electricity use could reach nearly 36 trillion units by 2030, 15 percent above current market estimates. Outside China, that could reach 23 trillion units, with Asia’s demand growing 20 percent faster than in the U.S.
For years, the focus was on the electricity needed by data centers and semiconductor factories. That need is still rising, but AI-related demand is only about a quarter of incremental power demand. New industrial projects and air conditioning are now adding to the pressure.
Not surprisingly, AI adoption is a big reason that data center demand keeps making the problem especially acute. A conventional chatbot may answer a question with one request. An AI agent can work through a task by searching for information, using software, and checking its results. That process requires more computing power, even as the cost of each unit of computing falls.
AI agents could drive a 1.6-fold increase in global power consumption by 2030. That raises a practical question: where will the new data centers and semiconductor factories be built, and how will they get the electricity they need? Some of that investment may shift to Asia because the U.S. cannot add power capacity quickly enough.
The shift could be sizable. We estimate that Asia could absorb about 15 gigawatts of additional demand from projects linked to the U.S. Asia may need 84 gigawatts of data center capacity by 2030, roughly four times that of 2025 levels. Thailand has already seen $25 billion in data center investment commitments, while Singapore, India, and Japan are seeing stronger demand coming through for power across various U.S. hyperscalers.
But AI is just the beginning of a global electricity supercycle. Cooling is another major source of demand. Air conditioning could require as much electricity as data centers by 2030. In India, cooling can account for up to 40 percent of peak power use during the summer. Taken together, that raises the bigger question: where will all this electricity come from?
About 60 percent of Asia’s data center capacity currently runs on coal and natural gas. We expect gas generation outside China to increase by around 19 gigawatts between 2025 and 2030, supporting roughly 20 million tonnes a year of LNG imports into Asia.
Renewables and batteries will be part of the answer, but the grid will need to expand as well. Asia could require about $1 trillion of new grid investments through 2030. In some markets, data centers are being encouraged to build their own power because the central grid cannot connect them quickly enough.
The strain is already showing up in power prices. Global power prices rose about 20 percent year-on-year in 2026, and we expect the gap between electricity prices and generation costs to widen by around 15 percent by 2028.
Investors may be underestimating how much electricity Asia will need, and how broadly that demand will spread beyond data centers. That could create more value for the owners of reliable power generation companies as well as grid infrastructure than for the companies that simply supply equipment. We believe the most attractive power markets are India, Malaysia, Australia, and the U.S.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.
Concerns over electricity bills and water use are turning into political action. Our Head of Public Policy Research Ariana Salvatore breaks down what the midterms mean for the data center pipeline, hyperscaler CapEx and investors.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of Public Policy Research at Morgan Stanley.
Today, the U.S. midterm elections and what they could mean for the build-out of AI infrastructure.
It's Wednesday, November 11th at 10am in New York.
Growing concerns around electricity bills, water consumption, and the economic benefits of data centers have translated into meaningful political opposition. And last week's results reinforce just how salient those issues were in voters' decision-making.
But what are the practical implications for the build-out?
We think that the midterms were actually more likely to change where data centers get built, when they come online, and what cost is associated with doing so, rather than whether they get built at all.
We've been flagging political opposition to data centers as a risk for some time, and the election results reinforce our view that this is largely a state-by-state and even project-by-project issue.
Let's take a few examples.
Texas, we think, was the most consequential result. Governor-elect Hinojosa has proposed pausing new data center approvals until stronger protections are in place. In Ohio, Governor-elect Acton has proposed a conditional moratorium. And in Georgia, we see policy action as more incremental, with greater scrutiny of construction approvals and how electricity infrastructure costs are allocated.
So altogether, these developments point to a broader shift in political and community support. The opposition is increasingly bipartisan, but the friction remains primarily local.
At the federal level, we think the government retains an accommodative posture, just given the importance of AI as national security infrastructure and the likelihood of a presidential veto on restrictive legislation.
But what does this mean for the build-out?
My colleague Cameron McVey and his team estimate that approximately five gigawatts of U.S. data center projects, or roughly 20 percent of the 2028 pipeline, will shift into 2029.
We think 2027 construction will likely remain unaffected because projects are generally already permitted or underway. As a result, U.S. data center capacity additions are projected to be roughly flat in 2028 before growing nearly 40 percent in 2029.
That feeds into our tech analyst view led by Brian Nowak that hyperscaler CapEx next year should remain unchanged at approximately $1.6 trillion and [$]1.8 trillion in 2028. So, our base case is a delay, not a fundamental reduction in investment. In fact, we think this could actually extend the duration of the AI investment cycle, and it reinforces an existing constraint – access to electricity.
We've been highlighting the three Ps that are bottlenecks here: people, power, and politics. Stephen Byrd and our Powering AI team now estimate a 44-gigawatt shortfall in U.S. data center power through 2028, representing roughly 38 percent of projected demand. That means that the critical bottleneck is increasingly shifting from computing equipment to power data center facilities.
And that has several investment implications.
First, the largest and best-capitalized hyperscalers are particularly well-positioned. These are the companies that have a line of sight to 25 to 50 percent return on investment. They also have flexibility to redirect their investment, they can absorb higher costs, and they can improve computing efficiency.
Second, we see opportunities in existing power-secured facilities and technologies that help developers access electricity more quickly. But there are also risks to the supply chain. A slower build-out in 2028 could mean weaker equipment orders, inventory accumulation, and pressure on supplier margins, even if the underlying AI demand remains strong
Lastly, as my colleagues in credit like Vishwas Patkar have been highlighting, the financing environment is likely to become more differentiated under the surface. We continue to expect substantial AI-related borrowing in 2027 led by the hyperscalers. But new construction financing will face greater scrutiny around permitting, power availability, and execution. By contrast, existing data centers with stable cash flows could benefit from increased scarcity and stronger lease pricing.
And finally, our equity strategy colleagues see investment opportunities broadening beyond infrastructure to companies actually adopting AI.
So, the through line here is that midterms have introduced real political and execution risk. But we think that these constraints are more likely to reshape and actually prolong the AI investment cycle than derail it. And with the recent market weakness reflecting a more pessimistic outcome, we see selective opportunities across the AI value chain.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.
What do the midterm elections mean for the U.S. economic outlook? Arunima Sinha, from our U.S. and Global Economics teams, examines the potential implications for policy, legislation and the broader economic landscape.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Arunima Sinha: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Arunima Sinha from Morgan Stanley's U.S. and Global Economics teams.
Today, I'll talk about our read-throughs from the midterm elections for the macroeconomic backdrop.
It's Tuesday, November 11th at 10am in New York.
Elections have consequences, but the economic implications are not always immediate or broad. There's no denying that last week's U.S. midterm elections brought sweeping change to the Congress and a number of states. And the correlation isn't causation caveat aside; the market has moved a lot in the wake of the results.
But we still think that the near-term macro impulse is narrower. While Democrats swept the legislative branch at the federal level, the White House is of course unchanged. Because the president has authority over tariffs, immigration, and much of the regulatory agenda; legislative change, if it comes, might be a marginal adjustment to some domestic spending, but not the key policy theme for macro.
For AI, and particularly in Texas and Ohio – where the executive branch turned over to the Democrats, but the legislatures did not – state and local governments matter. Whereas the election was necessarily partisan, some Republicans ran on anti-data center platforms. AI policy in the United States is still evolving. There is a risk that some projects could slip from 2028 to 2029, but we remain constructive on the overall build-out.
The trade readthrough is similar. U.S. AI imports have supported export growth across Asia, which makes Asian trade data an important lead indicator for the investment cycle. The election may slow U.S. capacity additions in some places, but it does not point to a broad reversal of the build-out.
The more likely outcome is a more conditional cycle. Projects proceed where power, permitting and local politics are supportive; and capacity migrates away from places where approval gets harder. That changes the geography of investment more than the direction of demand. Indeed, the shift from microchips to broader Korean exports is likely an early signal that trade flows next year become less concentrated and broader based.
Taiwan and Korea remain central to chips and memory, but Mexico is important for server assembly. Southeast Asia is gaining exposure in networking and optical equipment, and Japan and Europe are increasingly involved in semiconductor equipment, turbines, transformers, and other power infrastructure. At the same time, a larger power shortfall in the U.S. could allow demand to spill over to Asia and EMEA, accelerating a dynamic our equity analysts have already been highlighting.
Fiscal policy is the more direct federal channel. But this is not primarily a deficit story. A Democratic majority could delay or soften the scheduled SNAP and Medicaid cuts, but the growth effect would be small. Even a full rollback of the measures due to take effect in January 2027 would add less than half a percentage point to real spending growth.
Nor do we expect a material change in the deficit. Even with these SNAP and Medicaid cuts fully reversed, we think deficits stay around 6 percent of the GDP. And despite the concern about deficit risks, U.S. debt looks more sustainable on a five-year horizon than it did a year ago, due to upside surprises and nominal growth.
The bottom line is one of scope. The political change may well be meaningful and have implications for AI permitting, fiscal negotiations, and therefore differentiated implications across asset classes. But the near-term aggregate economic channels are narrower than the political headline.
Tariffs, immigration, and much of the deregulatory agenda remain largely under executive authority. So, the election mainly shifts the probability distribution around a limited set of legislative and local policy outcomes.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
Our CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist Mike Wilson examines signs that the current market correction could be nearing an end.
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Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist.
Today on the podcast I’ll be discussing where we are in the bottoming process for this equity market correction.
It's Monday, November 9th at 11:30am in New York.
So, let’s get after it.
There are times when the market spends months worrying about an event, only to discover that by the time it arrives, most of the damage has already been done. I think that is where we are at now. The midterms were the rumor, and the market spent several months selling it.
Semiconductors, data-center beneficiaries, and many early-cycle winners were hit hard before election day, while the S&P 500 finally began catching down to the weak breadth underneath.
That was the missing piece of the correction we identified way back in June: the transition from early to mid-cycle, the peak in the rate of change of earnings revisions, and a Fed that became less accommodative just as investors were most crowded into the momentum of early cycle beneficiaries.
The good news is that this correction looks much closer to the end than the beginning. The S&P 500 has moved toward our 7100-to-7300 support range we identified back in August; while Semiconductors are down roughly 40 percent from their June highs and are approaching the downside targets suggested by our silver-stock analog.
I would not be surprised to see one more test of last week’s lows. Perhaps even a break on lower momentum. That would be the cleanest technical outcome. However, I would not wait for a perfect low since markets rarely send engraved invitations. My preference is to use weakness over the next few weeks to begin adding risk, particularly in quality cyclicals that have de-rated substantially but continue to show strong earnings revisions.
That is an important evolution in the quality call we made back in June. Quality has worked, and I still want to own it. But the rotation is now well understood. The better opportunity may be in quality cyclicals which are less defensive and where expectations have fallen faster than the fundamentals. Industrials stand out in this regard.
Relative earnings revisions have remained durable, ISM backlog data are broadening, and freight volumes have turned positive for the first time in nearly four years. Those are not the signals of a cycle rolling over. They suggest parts of the economy are still moving forward even as the market discounts something worse.
The provocative point is that investors may be preparing for an economic slowdown just as the market is finishing its own recession beneath the surface.
The election also removed one layer of uncertainty around the AI buildout. Our capex mapping suggests data-center spending in 2027 represents about 5 percent of consensus S&P 500 revenue, with a slightly higher but still mid-single-digit contribution in 2028.
Even if some capacity is delayed, the impact on aggregate earnings should be manageable. And much of the risk has already been reflected in valuations, with the S&P 500 trading at just 18x forward earnings.
At the same time, the adoption story keeps improving. More companies are quantifying real benefits from AI, and the discussion is moving beyond productivity toward measurable cost savings and revenue generation. That is why AI adoption remains one of my highest-conviction themes into 2027, even as I stay selective around capital spending beneficiaries in areas like semiconductors.
There are other potential positives coming out of the election. Oil has fallen sharply on hopes for progress with Iran, or at least not a re-escalation. Some SNAP and Medicaid cuts could also be reversed, helping the consumer, while businesses may pull forward investment and M&A ahead of the 2028 presidential election.
Remember, markets tend to trade poorly into midterms and much better afterward. That does not mean the next few weeks will be smooth. Positioning and sentiment are closer to capitulation levels, but not quite there, and a more hawkish Fed could stretch the bottoming process into December. Equity volatility finally caught up with bond volatility last week, a constructive sign that the correction is ending. This is not the moment to get bearish.
Bottom line: buy the rumor and sell the news – but in reverse. The market sold the fear ahead of the events that are now happening. Midterms, AI capex funding supply and a Fed that is tightening. The headlines are the clearing mechanism. We may still need one final retest, but the market has already done most of the work. I want to use that weakness to add quality cyclicals and AI adopters rather than waiting for certainty. By the time the headlines feel safe, the best part of the opportunity will probably be gone.
Thanks for tuning in; I hope you found it informative and useful. Let us know what you think by leaving us a review. And if you find Thoughts on the Market worthwhile, tell a friend or colleague to try it out!
For investors, the U.S. election was only one part of a much bigger equation. Our Global Head of Fixed Income Andrew Sheets discusses the balance of risks after the midterm results.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley.
Today, what a blue wave means for fixed income.
It's Friday, November 6th at 2pm in London.
If the last decade has taught us anything, it's that financial professionals should approach political predictions and their market impact with a great deal of caution.
With that caveat in mind, let's talk about Tuesday's U.S. midterms and what they might mean for fixed income.
The word surprise has lost some meaning in investing over the years, but the U.S. election results qualify. Democrats won far more seats in both the House and the Senate than almost anyone expected. Key statewide races, such as Texas governor, also flipped unexpectedly. Democrats enjoyed the largest vote share of any party in almost 50 years.
Speaking to investors over the last month, this so-called blue wave, I think, was generally seen as the more market negative outcome. And indeed, in the first hours after U.S. polls closed, that was the market reaction.
But with the results behind us and in the cold light of day, I think there are a number of reasons why fixed income markets over time have grown more comfortable with the result.
First, markets hate uncertainty, and a variety of measures suggest that investors had reduced exposure into Tuesday, whether as a direct function of the vote or due to broader volatility from everything from technology to Brazil. Uncertainty is now lower. After all, we know the result, and investors should have some room to add if they want to.
Second, one factor that has been weighing on fixed income markets this year has been inflation. It's been too high, with both tariffs and energy prices contributing to upward pressure. To the extent that the market sees these results reflecting the unpopularity of tariffs or certain foreign policy, investors could assume that these policies are more likely to change down the road. And that could help to push down long-term bond yields. And much more immediately, unrelated to the election, I note that our economists expect that the next U.S. inflation number this month is going to show a notable step down.
Another factor that's weighed on fixed income this year has been AI spending, which has generated record amounts of bond issuance, pushing up both spreads and yields. Our analysts don't think that the midterms change the big picture on AI. But to the extent that some changes in statewide power result in more regulation and a more elongated build-out – well, that could help ease some of the concerns around supply pressure and potential mismatches between supply and demand.
But maybe the reason not to fret too much about the midterms is even more simple. Following the last 11 midterm elections from 1982 to 2022, the S&P 500 was higher one year later after all of them, regardless of the party that won.
Now, it's possible that going 11 for 11 is just a coincidence; and this is hardly a sophisticated analysis. But I think it speaks to the fact that while elections matter a great deal to the country in question, they don't always mean as much to markets.
Thank you, as always, for your time. If you find Thoughts on the Market useful, let us know by leaving a review wherever you listen. And also tell a friend or colleague about us today
The AI investment boom is reshaping capital markets, creating opportunities and raising questions about leverage and risk. Vishy Tirupattur and Dan Toscano discuss what this means for the credit cycle and the broader financial system.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Vishy Tirupattur: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I am Vishy Tirupattur, Morgan Stanley's Chief Fixed Income Strategist.
Today, a special conversation with one of the most seasoned professionals in credit at Morgan Stanley, Dan Toscano, on AI, credit, and the interplay between them.
It's Thursday, November 5th at 11am in New York.
Dan, last time we chatted here, you were very constructive on the potential for AI to be transformative in the economy and markets, and even more constructive on the role that credit markets will play in enabling that transformation.
So, any way we cut it, we are talking about trillions of dollars of CapEx involved in the context of AI buildout. How are you thinking about the AI thesis, AI CapEx thesis and the role that the credit markets are playing?
Dan Toscano: And every time I talk to you, the numbers go up. These numbers continue to expand. The opportunity set continues to expand for our clients. And I would say that nothing surprised me of what we've seen over the course of 2026.
This is not simple, and this is not easy. And there are, as our CEO likes to say, known unknowns. And they factor heavily in the sentiment of investors. And when you're deploying trillions of dollars of capital in a way that has never been deployed in our lifetimes, there are bound to be air pockets.
And so yeah, it's gone as I thought it might. And it just keeps getting bigger and bigger. And it's interesting to me that a lot of the discussion out in the marketplace these days has moved a little bit away from ‘what is this and how does it work’ to ‘what's the value proposition?’ And I think ultimately, that's the biggest question.
And credit investors are asking that question in the form of trying to understand what can go wrong. It's the essence of a credit investor. And equity investors, although that's not my area of expertise, are asking, "What's the upside? And how should I value it today when a lot of these companies are going public for the first time?"
Vishy Tirupattur: The markets are really questioning the return on the invested capital. How soon the returns will get realized? And monetization is the key word here.
But at the back of this, we see that the level of rates have increased pretty meaningfully. Spreads have widened. So, overall borrowing costs for issuers here are clearly higher.
So, on the back of this, do you see this as really a structural supply concern? The markets having to absorb a lot of supply. Or do you see this as being something larger than that? Is it a sign of a larger challenge within the credit markets?
Dan Toscano: Yeah. I mean, there's a lot to unpack there. But look, I would say this. On the topic of, you know, what is the return? What is the value proposition? I've heard, really, two schools of thought from the marketplace. One is we think the return value proposition is high. And you've done some work on the early stages of this to value it.
So, I hear people saying there's almost unlimited upside here, and I hear people saying, "I don't know what the value proposition quite is." I haven't really heard anyone say I think this is a stinker. And I think that's, you know, somewhat emblematic of the world we live in.
But in terms of the cost of capital, I don't think we're seeing any of that in… Obviously underlying rates behave independently, and they're a function of a lot of factors, many of which are positive. And I keep reminding people that the backdrop that we conveniently pass by when we talk about this is an economy that is strong. Issuer earnings have been into the double digits quarter after quarter.
And that's not something I would take for granted. And that can change. And it's done that despite energy instability, all the other things that are impacting the consumer. And yet, you know, we're producing earnings growth and cash flow that are significant.
But back to your question about spreads, in particular. I mean, look at where spreads are today. They are, in my opinion, tight. I think we were at the all-time tights over the course of this year. And so, it's hard for me to sit here and say all this AI-related financing is driving up the cost of capital.
We don't see it in spreads. And, you know, I think the debate around the impact of the trillions of dollars that need to be raised in all markets has yet to play out in the marketplace. People are talking about it, right? It's understanding that volume is coming in scale really hasn't happened, when you think about it. But the market I spend the most time in, non-investment grade credit markets, it's been quiet now for months.
Vishy Tirupattur: In all my years of talking to you and learning from you, the one thing that's always stood out for me is: details matter. And especially when we talk about leveraged credit. So, in the context of AI financing in the leveraged credit market or the broader credit market, what type of details matter?
Dan Toscano: Look, I think that it's evolving. We've talked, I think the last time we were here, we talked about the documents. You know, the documents matter. Investors are always complaining that the terms are too loose. But in the case of what is essentially project finance, I would say details matter in all caps. And put as many exclamation points after that as Elaine Benes would allow, if you remember the Seinfeld reference.
Vishy Tirupattur: Indeed, I do.
Dan Toscano: And so, you know, understanding the details of the lease. And to me, the fundamental question that underpins details matter is: what can go wrong? And if something goes wrong, what happens? And who's taking what risk?
And you'll find that in the documents if you read them closely – in project financing – toll roads and power plants going back decades.
You know, project finance and structured credit is not a new phenomenon. How and when does cash get disbursed? And who controls those decisions?
So, you can protect yourself [so] that if something's going wrong, you don't have cash hemorrhaging out of the system uncontrollably. Things like that, they really matter.
Vishy Tirupattur: You know, one other thing that I keep thinking about is whether the constraint is people or power availability, cost of capital or, you know, potential policy constraints. You know, some sort of a slowdown in AI CapEx is viewed rather cautiously by the equity markets.
How do you think credit markets will handle, you know, a slowdown for any number of reasons in the pace of CapEx spend?
Dan Toscano: Yeah. Well, I mean, I think the pace of CapEx spend gets measured against [a] company's ambitions. Not anything else. It's – We see an opportunity, we would like to take advantage of that opportunity. And in order to do so, we need to build capacity, right?
So, what happens? Client says, "I want this thing built yesterday, not in a week." Okay. So, if it slows down relative to someone's ambitions, it doesn't really create a problem in my mind. All it means is gratification delayed.
So, I think this can speed up, I think it can slow down, as fast as people are comfortable. And when I say people, I mean investors putting capital behind management teams. But I also think management teams feeling comfortable that they can control what they're doing and when they're building capacity… If they're buying chips or selling chips or trafficking in compute, they can speed up or slow down based on the environment around them without consequence.
I think people get worried. And here's one element of timing that does matter, is, you know, once you put a shovel in the ground. And by shovel, I mean dollars, right? Time is money. And there's a lot of work being done around managing the cash flows, leading up to the construction of a data center, throughout the construction itself, which can take 12 to 24 months. And that assumes an environment that is friendly and conducive toward building data centers.
And that's where it really matters.
Vishy Tirupattur: So last question for you, Dan. I know you're a big UConn basketball fan. Other than the UConn basketball team prospects, what keeps you up at night in the context of AI financing?
Dan Toscano: Yeah. Look, I mean, AI keeps a lot of people up at night. It doesn't keep me up at night. What keeps me up at night is UI.
Vishy Tirupattur: U of I, University of Illinois, Fighting Illini, ranked number three ahead of UConn, may I remind you.
Dan Toscano: December 4th, United Center, Chicago, Illinois, I will see you there.
Vishy Tirupattur: I'll see you in Chicago, Dan. Thanks for taking the time to talk to us.
Dan Toscano: My pleasure, Vish. Great to see you.
Vishy Tirupattur: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
Dan Toscano is a member of Morgan Stanley’s Investment Banking Division and is not a member of Morgan Stanley’s Research Department. Unless otherwise indicated, his views are his own and may differ from the views of the Morgan Stanley Research Department and from the views of others within Morgan Stanley.
Democrats delivered a stronger-than-expected performance in the midterms. Our Head of Public Policy Research Ariana Salvatore examines what the results could mean for Washington’s policy priorities, the balance of political power and the investment landscape.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Ariana Salvatore, Head of Public Policy Research at Morgan Stanley.
Today, I'll be talking about the results of the U.S. midterm elections: what the Democratic party's stronger than expected performance means for Washington, and how investors should be thinking about the implications.
It's Wednesday, November 4th, at 10am in New York.
Yesterday's elections delivered a much stronger result for Democrats than most had anticipated. Beyond the headline outcomes, Democrats expanded their margins in traditionally Republican areas and demonstrated a level of competitiveness in places that would've seemed unlikely just a few months ago.
But for investors, the more important question is what these results actually change from a policy perspective. We see three main takeaways.
First, the near-term market reaction has been somewhat complicated, particularly around the AI trade. Our U.S. equity strategists have flagged the midterms as a clearing event, although a larger Dem sweep than what was expected could introduce a little bit of volatility.
Now last night, we saw a fairly clear risk-off response. Treasury yields moved lower, the dollar weakened, and equity futures declined. One of the biggest areas in focus was Texas, where the governor's flip raised questions around potential restrictions on data center development and what it could mean for the broader AI trade.
That's an important issue given how central access to power, permitting, and geography have become to the AI investment thesis.
But we think it's important to distinguish between political ambitions and the ability to actually implement them. In Texas, for example, the incoming Democratic governor would still face a Republican-controlled state legislature.
That, in essence, limits the scope for some of the more ambitious changes that require legislation pertaining to tax policy or empowering local communities to negotiate. Of course, that doesn't eliminate the policy risk, particularly through executive and regulatory channels. But it does suggest that some of the more aggressive scenarios that investors initially contemplated may be difficult to implement.
Second, we don't think the election fundamentally changes the direction of several executive-led policy areas, including deregulation. We've been expecting a pull forward in M&A activity early next year, and that remains our view.
Politics are, of course, not the only factor. Economic conditions, the rates backdrop, and CEO confidence all matter. But the Trump administration continues to be perceived as favorable toward deal-making, and the agencies responsible for reviewing transactions remain central to that process.
The difference is likely to be a greater degree of congressional oversight. That can create headlines and add some additional uncertainty, but it's worth distinguishing between congressional scrutiny via things like investigations and hearings and actual regulatory authority. Ultimately, the agencies still drive merger approvals and financial sector deregulation, and we don't think the election meaningfully reverses that trend.
Third, the legislative implications are likely to be more limited than the political rhetoric might suggest. We've been anchoring investors to what we call our cohesive Democratic majority scenario.
Under that framework, the most consequential potential legislative change is a delay in the implementation of the SNAP and Medicaid spending reductions under the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. We think that could present a modest upside risk to our growth forecast to the extent that maintaining those benefits supports household spending.
Beyond that, we think the next two years will be characterized by considerably more political noise than substantive legislative change. And remember, the president is the story for markets. Executive-led authorities around tariffs, geopolitics, deregulation, and export controls have all been the key factors for markets.
So, what's the bottom line for investors?
We think the election delivered a more substantial political shift than anticipated, but the market and policy implications are more nuanced. For AI, the focus should remain on the distinction between state-level political constraints and the broader national imperative to support infrastructure development.
For Financials and M&A, we think more oversight is to come, but relatively limited changes to the trajectory. And on fiscal policy, delaying certain spending reductions can create a modest upside risk to growth.
Finally, we'd caution against extrapolating these results directly to the 2028 presidential race. There's still a significant amount of time between now and then, the political environment can change considerably, and issues don't carry over cleanly from one election to the next.
For now, our view is that investors should distinguish between a meaningful change in the political landscape and much more limited change in the policies that ultimately drive market outcomes.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
Our analysts Andrew Percoco and David Arcaro break down how AI’s surging energy demand could reshape the way we produce, store and use power.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Andrew Percoco: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Percoco, Morgan Stanley's U.S. Autos and Shared Mobility analyst.
David Arcaro: And I'm Dave Arcaro, Morgan Stanley's U.S. Power, Utilities, and Clean Tech analyst.
Andrew Percoco: Today, why the AI power crunch could transform how we generate, store, and consume electricity.
It's Tuesday, November 3rd, at 10am in New York.
Andrew Percoco: So Dave, the whole AI power shortfall and, you know, how data centers [are] creating a power crunch is not necessarily a new topic. I think we've had many conversations, many people listening have probably heard this is, kind of, being a bottleneck for AI deployment.
But I'm curious, how have your views around the role of distributed power changed in terms of its role in solving some of the shortfalls in the market? I think there's a lot of debate in the industry around whether or not these solutions are "bridge." Or whether they're structural and they can be truly long-term sources of supply to the market.
So maybe just help us think about, you know, how our views have really changed, as it relates to distributed power specifically.
David Arcaro: One of the things that we have seen is that the shortfall has grown in our estimates over the last several iterations. We're now looking at upwards of an 80 gigawatt shortfall by 2029.
And how do we solve that? Well, I'd say we've leaned more into on-site power, bringing your own power. What is that? You know, if you are still waiting for years for a grid connection from the utility, what can you do as an alternative? You can bring your own power. You could bring small scale power equipment to get the high reliability in a much faster timeframe than you would waiting for the grid in comparison.
And so we're seeing that increasing extremely rapidly in popularity among hyperscalers and data center developers. And we're seeing them much more, being willing to consider it on a long-term basis.
What used to be, "Hey, I need to cover a few years just to bridge until I have line of sight to getting a connection to my utility…" Now we're seeing actually 15, 18, 20-year contracts for these, you know, what used to be considered just smaller scale, less attractive solutions.
They're now long-term, with what looks like much more permanent considerations for highly reliable data center AI power.
Andrew Percoco: I think there's a preconceived notion in the market that the grid's going to catch up; and that we won't need these solutions longer term. Or that we're building too much of it and there's too much manufacturing capacity coming to the market.
So maybe we can segment those into two separate questions.
Like one, what is actually the bottleneck? I think everyone thinks of it as a power generation bottleneck. But I think you've done some interesting work around how there's also transmission and distribution bottlenecks that don't get solved as quickly as the power generation. So maybe you can talk to that.
But then secondly, when we think about the long-term, you know, case for distributed power. Are there certain types of technologies that maybe screen better or more favorably? Or certain characteristics of certain technologies that screen more favorably when you think about this being a structural source of power rather than maybe a short-term fix?
David Arcaro: Yeah. The bottleneck is very often in the utility space. Utilities are seeing such an unprecedented demand for electricity from the data center industry. They're scrambling to keep up with it. They're not used to growing this fast, and it's often their electric transmission network that is falling behind.
It's the long distance power lines and substation equipment that the utilities are really trying to react [to] – and to grow alongside the data center industry. But we expect them to fall short; and pretty meaningfully short. You know, this is large scale infrastructure that takes years to develop and build.
So, then when it comes to onsite power, as you're growing alongside that constraint or trying to avoid that constraint. We're seeing that data centers, they're very much prioritizing speed. The quicker they can get the power the better.
But you know, more and more we're seeing other factors come into play. How supportive is the community for different applications? You know, what's the air emissions profile, the water use, the noise consideration? What are the overall emissions that you're considering here? And then also what are the operational characteristics of that equipment?
So, we've looked carefully at those. And we come down to these technologies, fuel cells, engines, turbines. The industry's really pursuing all of them in this chase for quick time to power, and to get around that bottleneck.
Andrew Percoco: And to that point, it seems like what matters to maybe the developers is changing. It used to just be cost, then it was cost plus time. And now it's cost plus time plus noise and emissions, [be]cause obviously there's always a lot of political pushback.
Take that maybe one step further and say it's not just the data center market that is looking at these technologies now. It's also commercial and industrial applications where obviously, you know, there's a big trend to onshore manufacturing; a re-industrialization of the U.S. And our teams have collaboratively estimated I think 10 gigawatts a year of incremental demand for power just from industrialization of – or reshoring of the U.S.
But one technology we haven't talked about yet is energy storage. And this is part of the... When I think about the auto industry, this is obviously where they play a somewhat critical role, which I'll talk about in a second.
But Dave, just help us understand: where is energy storage being used? And how big is that market for data centers specifically?
David Arcaro: Yeah. Storage has a number of applications out there, and one of the fastest growing applications is going to be with data centers. You know, they consume power in such a new way that data centers are ramping up and down instantaneously.
Massive quantities of electricity load, going up and down instantaneously, which is not what the grid is capable of handling, and even some of this on-site power equipment isn't ready to accommodate such quick changes in load. And so we're seeing battery storage as the solution in a growing proportion of data centers around the country.
We're expecting even by 2030, it's such a fast-growing end market, a fast-growing TAM, that we would expect the data center demand for battery storage in 2030 to even exceed the grid demand for battery storage in that year in terms of the incremental, new projects that are added in that year.
So it absolutely – a very fast-growing opportunity for lithium-ion battery storage being added to data centers.
Andrew Percoco: Yeah, I mean, that makes a lot of sense, and I think that corroborates what we're hearing and seeing in the auto industry. Where you are seeing a number of companies explore energy storage as a new end market to essentially reutilize their low-utilized capacity or underutilized capacity as it relates to EVs – just given the lower than expected demand there.
Obviously Tesla, a very obvious player in the market that has a very large energy storage business in the U.S. Ford is now building an energy storage business in the U.S. and has started to build a rather large backlog.
So, I think there's some obvious ways in which the auto industry is essentially, you know, taking the opportunity where EV demand has been lower to reutilize that in the energy storage market, which is faster growth. And in potentially some cases, you know, higher margin than they've seen in the EV industry.
So, that – to me – is like the most obvious opportunity for the auto industry in terms of how they can participate in the growth in AI power infrastructure.
The second derivative would be, you know, power generation itself. And we've seen some suppliers, auto suppliers essentially; take their automotive grade technology and repurpose it into turbine generators, into energy storage systems, into microgrid inverters to essentially serve this market with existing technology that they manufacture today for vehicles. Just repurposing it for the data center industry.
So, you know, it's an auto industry that hasn't really seen much growth over the last five years, so it's a very interesting opportunity for these companies to, with very little incremental capital investment, find areas of growth outside of their traditional sub-sectors.
David Arcaro: And as we're looking for new creative sources of power, electric vehicles are an area that some are exploring to become a source of power rather than just consuming it. I guess, how meaningful could vehicle-to-grid technology become for the broader energy system?
Andrew Percoco: I think over time it could be fairly significant. I mean, today if you look at California, there's some existing vehicle-to-grid or home-to-grid systems or programs in place. And they dispatch between 500 to 1,000 megawatts of power to the California grid during peak periods of time.
So, it is fairly significant. It's fairly isolated to California 'cause there's a very high degree of EV penetration and also residential solar with battery storage. So [it] makes it a somewhat of a unique market to be able to provide that.
But over time, as we start thinking about, you know, 20, 30, 40 percent of annual EV sales or annual vehicle sales being EVs across the U.S., that's when that could start to become a much more significant contribution to the overall power supply.
So it's probably more of a 2030 plus conversation, if I'm going to be honest in terms of when it starts to move the needle. But in places like California, you are already starting to see it, you know, contribute fairly significantly during peak periods of time.
Andrew Percoco: All right. Well, I think we can wrap it there. So Dave, thanks for taking the time to talk.
David Arcaro: Great speaking with you, Andrew.
Andrew Percoco: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.
Stephen Grambling explains how changes in booking habits could redirect billions in travel industry spending.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Stephen Grambling, Morgan Stanley’s U.S. Gaming, Lodging, and Leisure analyst.
Today: how AI could transform hotel bookings and reshape the economics of the travel industry.
It's Monday, November 2nd, at 10am in New York.
So, we all love dreaming about and going on vacations, right? But you know what we don’t love as much? Scrolling through dozens of hotel listings, comparing prices across websites, contemplating where and how much we can use our rewards or maximize points or wondering if we’re getting the best deal for the right experience.
So, imagine the relief of having an AI assistant understand you and your families’ preferences, all of your status and loyalty points, aggregated details and reviews of all the hotels you’ve ever travelled to and might want to travel to – and all you need to do is evaluate locations? Then it finds the right hotel and books it for you.
That future is coming into focus, and it could reshape the economics associated with the marketing and distribution behind the $640 billion global hotel industry.
We estimate that every year the lodging industry spends between $22 to $55 billion on marketing. Add roughly $30 billion in fees collected by online travel agencies, or OTAs, and we're talking about $55 to $85 billion in spending that AI could influence.
Today, when you book through a third-party travel website, hotels typically pay commissions of 10 to 20 percent if it’s a branded hotel, or 20 to 30 percent if it’s independent. Booking directly through a hotel's website costs the brand closer to only 5 percent. That difference can have a meaningful impact on profitability for their owners.
As AI agents increasingly help travelers find hotels, compare options, and potentially book on their behalf we could see a major pivot in brand preference and booking channel. In our analysis of hotel searches across eight U.S. destinations, traditional search engines directed travelers to official hotel websites just 13 percent of the time. With AI-powered searches, that jumped to 97 percent.
But perhaps the most interesting finding involves loyalty programs. When we told the AI agent that a traveler belonged to a hotel loyalty program, 100 percent of the resulting links pointed to official hotel websites. When we specified a membership in an online travel agency's loyalty program, the results shifted entirely to that third-party booking platform. That means the AI agent is already factoring in your rewards, memberships and loyalty preferences into travel recommendations.
We saw similar effects in Europe.
For major hotel brands, this creates a significant opportunity. Their large loyalty programs and established customer relationships could help drive more direct bookings at a lower cost. And even small shifts add up. We estimate that moving just 1 percent of bookings from third-party platforms to hotel websites could boost hotel owners' EBITDA by roughly 0.1 percent to 0.5 percent.
Looking ahead, we expect hotel margins to start benefiting from these savings in the second half of 2027, with further gains in 2028.
Independent and boutique hotels could also profit as AI gets better at matching travelers with unique properties that fit their preferences. Meanwhile, online travel agencies aren't going away. Their extensive hotel inventories, loyalty programs, and scale in payments and fulfillment remain important competitive advantages.
For now, AI-driven referrals still account for only a small fraction of travel website traffic. But as AI platforms develop their own advertising and commission models, the economics could change.
So, what does this mean for the travel industry?
AI could help hotels attract guests at a lower cost while making it easier for travelers to find the right stay. Hotel brands have an edge with their loyalty programs; whereas online travel agencies can leverage unique inventory, boosting independent hotels. It's too early to declare an outright winner but expect more from us as this battle evolves.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
It appears that credit investors have gotten most of what they’ve wished for over the last decade. Our Global Head of Fixed Income Research Andrew Sheets considers whether there could be unintended consequences.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley.
Today, how spooked should we be about the credit markets?
It's Friday, October 30th, at 2pm in London.
I grew up watching The Simpsons, and I've always had a soft spot for their Halloween episodes. One in particular that's burrowed pretty deep in my memory involves a cursed monkey's paw.
It technically granted wishes to whoever held it, but with unintended consequences. For example, Lisa wishes for world peace, the entire planet disarms; and then aliens invade and take over. That sort of thing.
Keep that monkey's paw in mind.
Credit markets are going through their own jittery episode. After a long period of support, central banks are raising rates and shrinking their balance sheets. Thanks in part to this shift, global yields have risen. And since bond prices move inversely to yields, they've driven negative total returns.
Then there's the AI boom, maybe the defining economic story of 2026. Morgan Stanley estimates that close to $900 billion of CapEx will happen this year, roughly double what we saw last year and triple the levels of 2024. And we think this growth continues, with hyperscaler capital expenditures reaching about $1.5 trillion next year – almost the size of the entire U.S. defense budget.
All that spending requires financing, and credit markets have been a key source of it. Heavy supply from this relatively new sector – technology – has pushed up both yields and spreads, especially because these issuers have often been willing to price their debt pretty cheaply, relative to the rating.
These higher yields haven't slowed down the largest tech companies, given their considerable financial resources. But it has caused ripples further down the chain. Lower-rated credits with more leverage and slower growth are being more impacted by these higher borrowing costs. And the presence of these new technologies has increased fears of disruption to existing business models, especially in sectors like telecom. And as a result, the dispersion between credits has increased.
Scary stuff. Or is it?
If you'd spoken to a credit investor over the last 10 to 15 years, you would have heard a litany of wishes. If only central banks stopped intervening in markets, compressing credit risk premiums. If only yields weren't so low. If only the growth backdrop was better.
These investors wish that the technology sector would finally issue bonds, given its extremely low weight in credit markets, which are heavily skewed towards slower-growing sectors like banks, utilities, and telecom. They wished for new bonds that were highly rated, yet also would have high spreads. They wished for a new issue premium, which had compressed sharply.
And maybe, just maybe, in their wildest dreams, they hoped they could get it all. New bonds that were highly rated in a fast-growing sector issued at a large new issue premium. And hopefully a lot of it.
They also from a business sense wanted dispersion. The case for active credit management relies on the idea that there are differences in credit performance that a skilled analyst can capture. If everything just moves together, well, just buy the index.
We got our wish. Yields are high, with investment-grade credit yielding close to 6 percent in the U.S. and over 4 percent in Europe. Spreads have widened, and there's no central bank intervention to distort this. The AI boom is resulting in record levels of highly rated bond supply in a new sector, often at a significant discount for the rating. And all of this, and more, is driving significant dispersion.
Granted, like the monkey's paw, the reality of this wish may feel different from what investors imagined. But unlike it, we don't think this is a Halloween tale.
The fact that current conditions check so many boxes of what investors were looking for and address so many underlying needs is a good, healthy thing in our view. The path is hardly straightforward.
But for now, we're less frightened of this story.
Thank you, as always, for your time. If you find Thoughts on the Market useful, let us know by leaving a review wherever you listen. And also tell a friend or colleague about us today.
And of course, Happy Halloween.
Our Head of Digital Asset Strategy Amy Oldenburg joins Global Digital Asset Strategist Felix Stratmann discuss how tokenization, regulation, and the convergence of traditional and digital finance could reshape global markets.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Felix Stratmann: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Felix Stratmann, Global Digital Asset Strategist with Morgan Stanley Research.
Amy Oldenburg: And I'm Amy Oldenburg, Head of Digital Asset Strategy.
Felix Stratmann: Today, we're looking beyond crypto prices to explore how digital assets could transform the way financial markets operate.
It's Thursday, October 29th at 2pm in London.
Amy Oldenburg: And 10am in New York.
Felix Stratmann: So, we're used to being able to send money, shop, and access information anytime, anywhere online, right? But much of the financial system still operates on infrastructure built decades ago, with limited trading hours and transactions that can take days to settle.
Digital assets could fundamentally change that. Amy, your work focuses on how financial institutions put digital asset technology to use. When people hear digital assets, they still mainly think of Bitcoin. But what bigger shift in financial infrastructure are they missing?
Amy Oldenburg: One thing I would focus on is – while Bitcoin may have showcased the technology for us, there's a much bigger innovation story here that we need to focus on, and this is really what's going to create the future of efficiencies and new products for our clients. We've seen many other industries get disrupted by innovation and technology. And now it's coming for financial services. And we're really dealing with this in many different ways today.
Felix Stratmann: Yeah, and I guess as that infrastructure changes so could the competitive landscape, right? So which parts of the existing financial systems stand to benefit the most, and which could face the greatest disruption from your perspective?
Amy Oldenburg: Yeah, I think it's good to look at some of the different points we've seen in history. Even if we think about some of the parallels to the internet era. While many of those early activities were simpler in terms of what happened, just digitizing company information for the first time.
We're also seeing that simpler product design happening within digital assets. We're tokenizing equities and we're tokenizing treasuries. And that's simply to get them in digital form. It's really the future of programmability, really embedded in some of these products that will be the powerful force that we'll see in the future.
So I think areas where you have high friction and even a heavier administrative burden, that's areas where we may see some of the biggest transformations happen in this space.
So Felix, I'm looking at this sector from the strategy side. Curious from your research perspective, where are you seeing the clearest signs of tokenization moving from concept to real market activity today?
Felix Stratmann: So I mean, look, we are early in the tokenization game. You know tokenized real world assets are about [$] 30 to 40 billion today. But they're growing quickly. That number was essentially nothing just a couple of years ago. And recently we put out a forecast saying we expect them to reach [$] 2.3 trillion by 2030.
What’s driving that? A couple things I would say. Really it comes down to where traditional financial infrastructure has the most friction. One of those areas being collateral management. Getting your collateral where it needs to go, whether that be 24/7 or internationally, this is a big opportunity for tokenized assets.
And we're seeing growing interest in and demand for related products like tokenized money market funds or government securities, which are one of the fastest growing areas of tokenization. And again, these can potentially move more easily between institutions or be used as collateral. And this is especially important, I would say, as markets move towards 24/7, right?
One thing related to that where we're seeing increasing activity is tokenized stocks. You know, I would say they're not necessarily representing a more efficient state of the equity market yet, but they're an important step towards testing and demonstrating, you know, the benefits of tokenized assets in global distribution and also enhanced utility, right?
And then elsewhere, I think, we need to look at digital money as well. So, we've talked about the assets, but the cash side of the equation is equally as important. And that's also starting to operate at a larger scale. Still largely crypto focused, but stable coins are increasingly being used in real payment activity, right?
So, we see that growing, and approaching [$] 100 billion or so a month right now. And yeah, maybe changing gears here just a bit. This progress we've been discussing is happening against a backdrop of a bit of regulatory uncertainty, right? The CLARITY Act hasn't advanced as proponents had hoped. How do institutions balance that uncertainty against the need to keep investing in new infrastructure?
Amy Oldenburg: Felix, I have to say regulatory topics have been just the theme of 2026 this year. It's not only [the] CLARITY Act. You had highlighted digital money, which is also wrapped up in the Genius Act, which will go in force in January of 2027. And then we've seen innovation exemptions also come to market in the last few weeks.
You know, the future requires new tech, and how we're focused on this. We're not picking blockchain winners or even standards at this stage. We're really focused on building out the core infrastructures, because beyond regulation, there are certain non-negotiables that we just have to be ready for a future of 24/7 trading, real-time data, and the world ahead of us, which all of the regulations are really pointing towards a future of.
And Felix, I'll turn it back on you as we talk about regulatory uncertainty. It doesn't necessarily affect every part of the market the same way. Where do you think it could hold back adoption? And where do you see progress that may continue even under the existing frameworks?
Felix Stratmann: Yeah, so look, CLARITY specifically was primarily a crypto market infrastructure build, right. And it could have provided a framework for how crypto trading is regulated. And also what regulations are relevant to decentralized financial applications. But, really that’s only one part of this digital assets theme, right.
Tokenization, for example, you know, that could continue to progress because tokenizing existing security – that does not fundamentally change what that security is, right. Stock remains a stock; security is a security. Unit ownership is recorded in the blockchain.
So, there’s already scope to develop, you know, things like tokenized funds, payment infrastructure, and institutional settlement under existing legal frameworks. I would say that, you know, firms are still looking for clarification from regulators. But that’s rather than wholesale new regulation being necessary.
And look, to that point, we've already seen the SEC and CFTC very engaged in proposing rules and guidance post CLARITY. And then you also have the Genius Act, and the associated rulemaking from the relevant regulators. And that's paving a path for stablecoin usage and adoption.
So look, yes, progress can definitely continue, particularly for the financial use cases of digital asset technology, even without comprehensive legislation.
But you know, maybe let's think about what that means in practice, right? Even with the regulatory uncertainty, firms are still making decisions about when to modernize.
So Amy, from your perspective, what can previous shifts in financial technology, like electronic trading, maybe, teach us about the risks of waiting too long to invest?
Amy Oldenburg: Felix, I love your example of electronic trading, and there's so many periods in history where we lived through some of these transformations and impacts to financial services. Where we can take some of the lessons learned and really make sure we keep those in mind.
But I think there's another one that we really need to also keep in mind, and that's really on the execution and managing the internal culture and workforce shifts that we'll also see with some of this innovation that takes place.
These are critical because, you know, with many of these eras of transformation, you don't just flip a light switch to turn much of this on. We're living through many years of transformation, and I see digital assets being a multi-year transformation, just as we saw some of those other periods in history take many years to actually deploy over time.
Felix Stratmann: Yeah that modernization, kind of, brings us to another important theme. The convergence of traditional finance and digital assets. What does that actually mean in practice? Are we heading towards two financial systems operating side by side? Or one increasingly integrated system?
Amy Oldenburg: Oh, yeah. That's a really tough question, and I think one of the things we always love to try to determine a black-and-white outcome. But I think that one of the things that's pretty clear to us today is that for a number of years, we'll be living in and supporting a hybrid world as we work through the transformation that I even just talked about earlier.
There's definitely operational efficiencies and, and strong product design that we really need to stay focused on. And that will be hard for our clients and even our firms to ignore going forward. So I think just like, AI is gonna impact our future, we have to think about how this integration comes together.
And I think we may see not only integration or a unified system going forward. But we may even see financial services products distributed in different ways.
And Felix, I'm going to turn it back over to you. What is your research show in terms of the clearest evidence for traditional and digital finance coming together? Do you see established financial institutions adopting blockchain faster than maybe many people realize?
Felix Stratmann: Yeah absolutely, I mean we are early in the adoption of this technology. But the momentum is very much real, right. I looked through press releases from global financial companies and I found that roughly quarter by count, and some 60 percent by market cap, you know, had announced, piloted or launched digital assets initiatives.
So, institutions are seriously behind this. And then you also see opportunity in 24x7 follow-the-sun type of Treasury management, you know, that digital money enables. And that could be highly relevant, you know, for corporate treasuries.
So, yeah, I think absolutely firms are adopting this technology. And I think convergence is increasingly what we're seeing because these products are being issued on public blockchains. And firms are experimenting how to incorporate them into decentralized financial protocols. And yeah, I mean, it's very much a case of financial institutions using the technology while crypto native platforms are trying to figure out how to better cater towards regulatory compliance and privacy needs, right?
And while it's early, look, it’s not like the early days of crypto, entirely, right, which was very much trying to replace the financial system. Now I think we're increasingly seeing this convergence with the existing system to make it more efficient.
But maybe let's look ahead now. What needs to happen before digital assets become an everyday part of how financial markets operate?
Amy Oldenburg: To your point that you brought up earlier on building out blockchains, the entire industry right now is really trying to invest and build this infrastructure. But it's not only the infrastructure, it's redesigning workflows, it's upgrading policies, looking at the governance impacts of this future.
And that is a lot of work for many of our firms to take on, especially with so many competing innovation topics in the news right now. It may slow some of that adoption in the near term, I think what we'll see is suddenly – as much of this work is done and it starts to come to market, slowly, we will transition from not talking about the future of finance. But really that this will just become finance. And that's a path that we feel we're clearly on at this stage.
Felix Stratmann: Well, look Amy, I know we could sit here talking about this for hours. But I think that'll wrap us up for today. Amy, thanks very much for joining me.
Amy Oldenburg: Thanks, Felix.
Felix Stratmann: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.
Amy Oldenburg is a member of Morgan Stanley Firm Management. She is not a member of Morgan Stanley’s Research Department. Unless otherwise indicated, her views are her own and may differ from the views of the Morgan Stanley Research Department and from the views of others within Morgan Stanley.
Digital assets, sometimes known as cryptocurrency, are a digital representation of a value that function as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, or a store of value, but generally do not have legal tender status. Digital assets have no intrinsic value and there is no investment underlying digital assets. The value of digital assets is derived by market forces of supply and demand, and is therefore more volatile than traditional currencies’ value. Investing in digital assets is risky, and transacting in digital assets carries various risks, including but not limited to fraud, theft, market volatility, market manipulation, and cybersecurity failures—such as the risk of hacking, theft, programming bugs, and accidental loss. Additionally, there is no guarantee that any entity that currently accepts digital assets as payment will do so in the future. The volatility and unpredictability of the price of digital assets may lead to significant and immediate losses. It may not be possible to liquidate a digital assets position in a timely manner at a reasonable price.
Regulation of digital assets continues to develop globally and, as such, federal, state, or foreign governments may restrict the use and exchange of any or all digital assets, further contributing to their volatility. Digital assets stored online are not insured and do not have the same protections or safeguards of bank deposits in the US or other jurisdictions. Digital assets can be exchanged for US dollars or other currencies, but are not generally backed nor supported by any government or central bank.
Before purchasing, investors should note that risks applicable to one digital asset may not be the same risks applicable to other forms of digital assets. Markets and exchanges for digital assets are not currently regulated in the same manner and do not provide the customer protections available in equities, fixed income, options, futures, commodities or foreign exchange markets.
Morgan Stanley and its affiliates do business that may relate to some of the digital assets or other related products discussed in Morgan Stanley Research. These could include market making, providing liquidity, fund management, commercial banking, extension of credit, investment services and investment banking.
With Election Day a week away, our Head of U.S. Public Policy Research Ariana Salvatore and Wealth Management's Monica Guerra explain why the aftermath of the midterms may matter more to markets than who wins.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of U.S. Public Policy Research at Morgan Stanley.
Monica Guerra: And I'm Monica Guerra, Head of Policy and Geopolitical Strategy for Morgan Stanley Wealth Management.
Ariana Salvatore: Today we're going to be talking about the upcoming midterm elections and what investors should be watching from both an institutional and individual investor perspective.
It's Wednesday, October 28th, at 10am in New York.
Well, Election Day is just about a week away. Investors are obviously increasingly focused on what a potential change in congressional control could mean for markets. And Monica, you and I are kind of grappling with this question through slightly different lenses. And that's why I thought it'd make sense to bring you in today.
We both agree that what happens after the election is probably more important than the outcome itself. But let's start with the election backdrop. Your team has developed a Midterm Signal Monitor. What are the indicators telling us?
Monica Guerra: Well, Ariana, affordability has really emerged as the defining issue for voters this cycle. Our monitor tracks four indicators positively correlated with midterm election outcomes: the generic congressional ballot, presidential approval, consumer sentiment, and gasoline prices.
Democrats lead the generic ballot by about eight points, and presidential approval is 38.8 percent, just below the 40 percent historical reference point when the opposition political party tends to gain momentum.
Now, consumer sentiment in October is the lowest of any October before a midterm election in the University of Michigan survey's entire history. And gasoline prices in September were up 37.6 percent from a year ago.
So taken together, these signals point to a challenging environment for the incumbent party, really driven by affordability. Persistent inflation, elevated borrowing costs, and renewed energy price pressures tied to the conflict with Iran are all weighing on household purchasing power. But importantly, these are directional indicators, not necessarily a forecast of the election outcome itself.
Now, Ariana, when you're looking at the potential outcomes from your perspective, how much do you actually expect to change?
Ariana Salvatore: Well, I think that's the key question, right? Because our view has been that the midterms are unlikely to fundamentally change the direction of U.S. policy. And that's because a lot of the uncertainty that markets have dealt with since the beginning of 2025 has come from the executive branch rather than Congress.
So, regardless of the outcome, we think things like tariffs, deregulation, immigration, geopolitics, export controls – all of those variables will remain important sources of policy uncertainty. Where congressional control matters more is on fiscal policy.
So, a divided government would make new legislation harder to pass, and that could mean more contentious negotiations over things like government funding, the debt limit, and defense spending.
So, for institutional investors, it's a little bit less about which party wins and more about what the composition of Congress means for the policy agenda going forward. As well as leadership's ability to really organize and corral different members of the caucus to effectively use their leverage around some of these negotiations.
So, Monica, I imagine the questions that you're getting from individual investors may be a little bit different. Talk us through some of those.
Monica Guerra: Yeah, they are. I think the biggest question is what the election can mean for an individual's portfolio. And history does offer us some interesting perspective here.
So, the S&P 500 has averaged about a 14 percent return in the calendar year following a midterm election, compared with roughly just 3 percent in the midterm year itself. And this year, as we all know, the index has already outperformed that typical second-year trajectory, which could heighten risks and opportunities for sectors sensitive to policy decisions.
For example, recent strength in technology and energy combined with the narrow market breadth could amplify policy-related volatility, particularly in industries facing heightened scrutiny under the new Congress.
Of course, that's not a forecast, and we caution against making portfolio decisions based on historical election patterns or political headlines alone; as the business cycle, corporate earnings, inflation, interest rates, and the AI investment cycle are likely to matter much, much more over the long run.
But one area where I do think our perspectives really intersect is the growing focus on electricity costs and data centers.
Ariana Salvatore: That's right, and it's actually one of the policy themes that we've been highlighting the most into the election. Our view is that the AI infrastructure build-out is unlikely to face broad federal prohibition, and that's regardless of who controls Congress.
There's a bipartisan recognition right now in D.C. – of AI as a strategic priority, particularly given competition with China. But at the same time, we are seeing growing political resistance at the state and local levels, where concerns around electricity prices, water usage, and infrastructure costs are becoming increasingly important.
So, where that all nets out, what we've been describing is a base case of a conditional build-out. The investment cycle continues, but both the pace and the geographic distribution of new projects could become more dependent on local policy decisions. And that distinction matters for investors exposed to utilities, power generation, and the broader AI infrastructure supply chain.
So, Monica, how are you thinking about that issue specifically for wealth management clients?
Monica Guerra: I think it's a really good example of how a national political issue can have very local investment implications. For individuals, the concern often begins at home with the electricity bill. But it can also have implications for local issuers and the municipal bond market – dependent on whether a community and local government captures the benefits of new investment or absorbs the infrastructure costs.
And that's why we've been emphasizing the importance of following what state and local governments are actually doing rather than just reacting to every move out of Washington. The same applies for taxes, which is another area where we're getting a lot of questions.
Ariana Salvatore: Yeah, let's talk about that because taxes are probably the clearest example of how the near-term and longer-term implications can differ. [Of] course, at the federal level, we don't expect a change in congressional composition to meaningfully reverse the tax policies enacted last year through the OBBA.
The president will remain in the Oval Office for the next two years. That means that he retains veto authority, which from a mechanical perspective just creates a significant hurdle to major legislative changes. But at the same time, the midterms could start to lay the groundwork for a different tax debate heading into 2028 and [20]29, specifically around AI and the build-out.
For markets, expectations can start changing well before legislation actually arrives.
Monica Guerra: Exactly. And for individual investors, there's also a very important state level dimension. We're watching proposals involving wealth taxes, property taxes, and state income taxes, all of which could have implications for household financial planning and the muni[cipal] bond market.
So even if federal tax policy remains relatively stable – which we think it will – investors still need to be attentive to potential changes that are closer to home.
And I want to come back to that broader market implications for a moment and really dig into that with you, Ariana. Are there particular areas where you think investors could be underestimating the impact of the election?
Ariana Salvatore: I think the biggest risk is actually assuming that [a] divided government automatically means less policy volatility. Typically, the blueprint here is divided government means gridlock. That constraint is actually clarity for markets, which can be a good thing. But in this case, of course, even if a change in congressional control occurs, you might see additional oversight investigations and political scrutiny – but executive action can continue.
And that could matter at the margin for sectors like technology and energy, which we've highlighted in terms of both the antitrust angle and deregulation more broadly. But I'd also distinguish between headline risk and actual changes to earnings or the macro-outlook.
Not every political development is going to translate to a meaningful market impact, which is why we see this election as more of a micro than a macro catalyst.
Monica Guerra: I agree, and from the wealth management perspective, that's why we really emphasize discipline. And lean into the idea that negative policy headlines often doesn't equal negative fundamentals.
Election outcomes can change the policy backdrop and create sector-specific opportunities or risks. That individual investors should be careful about allowing short-term political developments to drive long-term asset allocation decisions.
Ariana Salvatore: So maybe to wrap up, Monica, what's one thing that you'd encourage individual investors to watch after November 3rd?
Monica Guerra: Yeah. I'd focus on the policy decisions that actually affect households and portfolios, especially energy costs and state and local developments. And I'd encourage investors to work with their advisors distinguishing meaningful policy change from that political noise.
How about you?
Ariana Salvatore: Well, from my perspective, I think there's a lot to watch in this lame duck period. Of course, the fiscal calendar, so government funding, potentially addressing the debt limit. We've got the NDAA, that's the bill that funds the Pentagon, coming due in December. You've got potential U.S.-China meetings.
So, plenty to watch, I'd say, between now and the end of the year.
But maybe just to kind of put a through line through all this, our broader takeaway is that the midterms probably won't alter fundamentally the direction of U.S. policy. But they could change where risks emerge and how quickly certain priorities can move forward.
So, for investors, the important question isn't just who wins in November, it's actually what changes as a result.
Monica, thanks for joining me.
Monica Guerra: Thanks, Ariana. Great speaking with you.
Ariana Salvatore: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
Monica Guerra is a member of Morgan Stanley’s Wealth Management Division. She is not a member of Morgan Stanley’s Research Department. Unless otherwise indicated, her views are her own and may differ from the views of the Morgan Stanley Research Department and from the views of others within Morgan Stanley.
Our Global Head of Macro Strategy Matthew Hornbach and Chief U.S. Economist Michael Gapen look at what could speed up tightening, what’s next for Treasury yields, and how the Fed can skip a hike now while signaling that more are coming.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Matthew Hornbach: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Matthew Hornbach, Global Head of Macro Strategy at Morgan Stanley.
Michael Gapen: And I'm Michael Gapen, Chief U.S. Economist.
Matthew Hornbach: Today, the challenge facing the Fed: to not hike rates while still convincing investors that you think rate hikes are coming.
It's Tuesday, October 27th at 11am in New York.
So Mike, how do you think the Fed and Chairman Warsh in particular is going to deal with this challenge?
Michael Gapen: Well, I think the way that he can do it is to say, ‘Obviously we already did hike. So, we've started a process. You know we're serious about bringing inflation down in a timelier fashion. So essentially the question is: Do we want to raise rates at every meeting or do we want to take an action, assess incoming data and take a different action?’
So I do think the message here can be balanced in a way that says, ‘We didn't hike rates today. We didn't feel a tremendous sense of urgency to raise rates today. But we think more work is needed.’
So I'm not sure that there's urgency to raise rates every meeting. But you can still suggest that rates are going to go higher.
You can see I'm having trouble articulating the story as well. Warsh may have some of the same difficulty, but I think that's the basic message is – taking an action, assessing its effect, deciding to take another action.
Matthew Hornbach: At the Jackson Hole Symposium in August, Chairman Warsh gave a speech, and in the speech, he invoked this imagery of going on a hike around the mountains of Jackson Hole.
And he told us that there were, in essence, two types of hikes that one could go on around Jackson Hole. A more leisurely hike and a more aggressive hike around the mountains. Presumably because we don't think the Fed will hike rates at this meeting. Presumably the idea that he has in his head today is to go on a leisurely hike.
But if that's the case, how long does a leisurely hike last? How…
Michael Gapen: They can both be the same.
Matthew Hornbach: … long will the hike be.
Michael Gapen: Yes. So I think that I would interpret the leisurely hike also as the difference between, I think, what economists euphemistically call a recalibration of the policy stance – as opposed to a more aggressive tightening cycle.
So one's kind of leaning against the wind while the other one is trying to change the course of the economy. So I think you're right. And he called the leisurely hike the Ben Bernanke hike and as opposed to the Don Kohn aggressive hike. That's inside Fed speak if you know your former Fed staff.
And I think what the data is telling the Fed, on one hand growth is certainly resilient, and inflation is sticky. But the labor market doesn't look like it's overheating. We're only adding about 50,000 jobs a month. The unemployment rate is low, that's true. But wage growth is actually decelerating.
So from my perspective, and I think their perspective, even with the AI investment boom, there's not a lot of evidence the broader economy is overheating. And that's where I think the urgency story fits in. Are they behind? Do they need to get on top of something?
I think the answer to that is no. So you end up with this measured recalibration: Hey, we cut 75 basis points last year to support the labor market, should probably reverse those. That's what we should be thinking. We're not thinking we need to go all the way back to 2023 highs, which would be the more aggressive tightening cycle.
That's the way I split it out.
Matthew Hornbach: So what would have to happen with the weather in Jackson Hole to change the mind of the committee to go on a more aggressive hike? Maybe to get back into the lodge before the weather really turns inclement? What would have to happen in the economic data, do you think, to change their mind?
Michael Gapen: Well, I think that the most likely story there. I mean, what macro data would make them do that sooner than later would just be inflation has a lot more momentum than they think. Rather than being flat or decelerating slowly, it actually starts to firm.
So, the actual data that they have in hand, they wouldn't even have to decide where it's coming from. But if inflation's firming, they have to get on top of it. That could certainly shift them to hikes every meeting. So, I'll put that down as the most likely.
The other would be just what I said about the labor market. You would need evidence that says, "Wow, look at that labor market. Employment growth is picking up, the unemployment rate's moving lower, and wage growth is turning and starting to firm."
So that would tell you what was kind of a narrow business spending story is now a broad-based overheating story. That's likely to be a much-more-slower-moving train. But certainly that could get the Fed to more rate hikes in 2027 than we're thinking.
Matthew Hornbach: On the inflation point that you're raising here. One of the statistical quirks in how the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis put together the inflation data is that in the first month or two of the year, you typically have seen the seasonally adjusted inflation data come in much stronger. And then in the final couple of months of the year, you've tended to see inflation data come in lower than what you might otherwise expect – because these statistical agencies have had difficulty properly seasonally adjusting the data.
So presumably, because this has been going on for a couple of decades, we'll see this “residual seasonality" again in 2027. Of course, we may not. But if we do, how do you think the Fed will deal with that? Because that could very well show us that inflation is picking back up…
Michael Gapen: That residual seasonality, you're correct, it's still present in the data. There are many firms in different industries that raise their prices once a year. It varies over time. That's why the seasonal adjustment process doesn't capture it.
So we get big, kind of, one-off annual increases in January and February. The Fed knows this, you know this, I know this. But the point is to decide either to stop raising rates, or maybe even at some point to cut rates, you have to ascertain where the underlying trend is. So this makes it harder for them to know what the underlying trend is.
So in our view, it actually means you still get one additional rate hike in March, then after that, it only starts to become clear that inflation is decelerating and the Fed stops hiking.
So in my view, I think the way that they deal with it is they have to wait and get more data to decide that inflation's either going in the direction they want or it's not going in the direction they want.
So Matt, I'd like to turn it back to you if I can. We've seen a lot of volatility in the Treasury market. As you know, for many months yields were backing up. The 10-year Treasury yield peaked above 5.25. It's now back down to about 5 percent. How do you read what's happening in the Treasury market today?
Matthew Hornbach: So the biggest explanatory factor in the sell-off in the Treasury market since, really since the beginning of March, has been a combination of what has happened with energy prices. Both outside of the country and within the country. And then, how the central bank ended up shifting its perspective on rate policy as a result of the effects of these higher energy prices on underlying inflation.
And so, as the Fed transitioned from easing monetary policy in 2025 to now tightening monetary policy in 2026, and on your forecasts into 2027, the bond market had to reprice. And this is a typical behavioral response to a big change in monetary policy expectations.
The more recent price action in the Treasury market, where the 10-year yield went from 5 percent up to 5.25 percent, we think was driven much more by technical flows related to a very large fixed income marketplace that includes more than just U.S. Treasury securities.
Of course, we have agency mortgage-backed securities. There's a huge corporate bond market as well. And so, we see the last 25 basis points as more of a technical dynamic that was driving yields to those peak levels. And once those technical flows stopped, then we saw yields settle back down to a level that was more aligned with fair value, given how the Fed is expected to behave with monetary policy.
But what that means, though, is that as the data come in over the course of the next several quarters, how the market thinks about the path of Fed policy over the course of 2027 will become an increasingly important factor in the Treasury market once again.
So if the investor base decides that maybe the Fed, after having delivered these rate hikes that you're expecting, is comfortable keeping rate policy where it is. And as the disinflationary process resumes, might even consider reversing some of these rate hikes that they have put into place, I would expect 10-year Treasury yields to fall alongside – of those expectations for monetary policy.
So ultimately, we have had a big move in the U.S. Treasury market this year. It has been very much aligned with how investors have thought about the changing narrative around Fed policy. And so 2027 will likely hold more of the same.
As we make our mind up about where the Fed is heading with monetary policy, we will very likely see the bond market move in sympathy with that. And I guess we'll keep an eye on inflation, the labor market, as well as the Treasury market as we look forward towards the next FOMC meeting in early December. And considering the question again: hike or no hike?
Thanks for this, Mike.
Michael Gapen: Thanks for having me on, Matt.
Matthew Hornbach: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.
Is the end of the correction in sight? Our CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist Mike Wilson looks at what could bring this pullback to an end.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist.
Is the end of this equity market correction in sight? Today on the podcast, I’ll share what I think could turn the tide.
It's Monday, October 26th at 11:30 am in New York.
So, let’s get after it
The correction that began in June is now well advanced beneath the surface. But I believe the high-quality S&P 500 index may still have some unfinished business. Until that plays out, I don’t think we can say the adjustment is complete.
The real question to ask: how bad does it have to get before it gets better?
We have described this correction as a classic mid-cycle transition. The peak rate of change in earnings revisions arrived right on schedule, about a year after the recession troughed. And the market responded the way that it usually does: early-cycle leaders with more operating and financial leverage started to underperform, while higher-quality, asset-light, services-oriented businesses moved to the front.
This quality rotation is now well understood though, and positioning has followed it. Ironically, the final step is usually a convergence between the resilient high quality S&P 500 index and the weaker breadth beneath. We may already be seeing the beginning of that meeting in the middle. If the index does move lower, I believe 7100-7200 on the S&P 500 is where the correction should find material support.
The reason I believe we will ultimately have a positive resolution to this transition is that a lot of damage has already occurred. Roughly 60 percent of Russell 3000 stocks are down more than 20 percent since June. And the hit has been even more severe in early-cycle areas like Semiconductors, Autos, Consumer Cyclicals, and Capital Goods.
At the same time, hedge-fund positioning has come down meaningfully leaving us near the lows for the past 12 months. That is encouraging, but sentiment overall is not yet at the kind of extreme that typically marks a durable low. I think we are close but we’re not quite there.
So, what gets us there? I see three clearing events ahead.
The first is AI. Investors are questioning the eventual return on capital, the cost of capital, and whether credit markets can fund all the spending that has been promised. Over the next few weeks, the market will need to absorb more supply, and lower-quality players may continue to see wider spreads and even lower stock prices.
I view the supply as the event itself. Once it clears, the risk should begin to fade. Semiconductors remain at the center of this concern, and may offer a good benchmark to monitor for the broader market correction. Specifically, I see another 10 to 15 percent lower for the Semiconductor index into mid-November.
The second clearing event is the midterm elections. Markets dislike uncertainty, and this election has plenty. A blue wave is not a surprise anymore though. The larger overhang is what may happen after the vote, including the possibility of a renewed military escalation in Iran.
I have no special edge in forecasting geopolitics. But I do know that these kinds of shocks often create very good buying opportunities. Historically, post-midterm returns have been very strong, so I would be ready to embrace a sharp downdraft in stocks in the days and weeks around election day.
The third, and most important, clearing event is liquidity. Financial conditions have tightened sharply through a combination of higher rates, slower balance-sheet growth, stronger demand for capital, and higher energy prices.
The tightening is beginning to resemble 2018, and it is not far from what we experienced in 2022 despite very modest tightening from the Fed so far. In fact, the market may be doing the Fed’s tightening for it; and if that tightening begins to create funding stress or destabilizes credit markets, the Fed and Treasury have tools to respond. The question is whether conditions need to deteriorate further before they act.
Bottom line, I think the correction in equity markets that began in June is in the final stages, but the final stage can be very uncomfortable. We may still need one more index-level drawdown and bout of volatility. Or one more moment when investors conclude that something has broken. That may be exactly what clears the path for the Fed to pivot and the next leg higher for stocks.
For now, I want to stay with quality stocks that have already corrected more than the index in areas like capital goods. More importantly, if these clearing events create a sharp downdraft, I would view it less as a reason to run from risk and more as the opportunity we have been waiting for to buy. So be ready.
Thanks for tuning in; I hope you found it informative and useful. Let us know what you think by leaving us a review. And if you find Thoughts on the Market worthwhile, tell a friend or colleague to try it out!
The energy shock is global, but the policy response isn’t uniform. In the second of our two-part roundtable, our economists unpack the forces shaping interest rates across the U.S., Europe and Asia.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Seth Carpenter: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Seth Carpenter, Morgan Stanley's Global Chief Economist and Head of Macro Research.
Michael Gapen: I'm Michael Gapen, Chief U.S. Economist.
Jens Eisenschmidt: I'm Jens Eisenschmidt, Chief Europe Economist.
Chetan Ahya: And I’m Chetan Ahya, Chief Asia Economist.
Seth Carpenter: Yesterday, we talked about why global growth is continuing to power on, why investment is playing a larger role, and how that investment cycle is spreading across regions.
Today, we're going to take a deeper dive and think about monetary policy and what's going on.
It's Friday, October 23rd, at 10am New York.
Jens Eisenschmidt: 4pm in Frankfurt.
Chetan Ahya: And 10pm in Hong Kong.
Seth Carpenter: When I look around the world and think about especially developed market central banks, well, they're kind of all tightening at the same time – but maybe for somewhat different reasons.
Let's start with just a really broad policy question. Why are the Fed, the ECB, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan all tightening policy when their economies look so different?
Mike, I'm going to start with you back here in the U.S. with the Fed. How are you thinking about what the Fed is doing right now?
Are they just recalibrating the stance of policy? Or is this a fundamental change where they're trying to rein in growth in the economy?
Michael Gapen: The way I look at it is this is a story about persistent inflation, and I would look at it as a recalibration of policy. I think the majority of participants on the FOMC know the Fed can't pump more oil or get, you know, oil through the Strait of Hormuz. So, it's about leaning against second-round effects.
Inflation is gradually moving lower. They've characterized this as dissatisfaction with the speed of convergence to the target.
So, I think the Fed is tightening based on persistent inflation, and it appears to me to be more about a recalibration than it is about meaningfully tightening policy and leaning into demand.
Seth Carpenter: All right, Jens. Same question coming to you, and I have to say the energy shock is a global shock. So how do you think about what's going on with the tightening of the ECB and the Bank of England?
Jens Eisenschmidt: Yeah. No, I mean, first of all, if you sort of talk about both central banks – and here again, I guess the Fed comparison also matters. The starting point is important. The ECB was the only central bank that got inflation back to target, and so was already well advanced in its sort of rate normalization cycle, had cut back rates to 2 percent – which by most measures is sort of neutral, maybe leaning a little bit towards expansionary side of things.
And so, it was probably easiest for that central bank, when the supply shock came to tighten again, simply by getting a little bit towards the restrictive end of the neutral range, say. I think that is probably what has happened here, more than anything else.
And for the Bank of England, of course, the discussion is a different one. They were running for a long time a relatively restrictive monetary policy. And so there was more scope to wait it out, essentially. A little bit like the Fed, essentially. This is where the similarities come in.
Now, if you look ahead, essentially, it becomes a question of how strong is your economy holding up? And, you know, the strength of that holding up in the face of a certain given energy shock will determine how much of the inflation that you experience today will be inflation of tomorrow, carried to the next period through stronger wage agreements.
I think that's basically the policy problem facing both central banks here. And I guess that in the end results in essentially a resolve to at least gradually further tighten the stance. I think that has to be the expectation. And so, from that perspective, this is where we arrive at essentially a current positioning that is not super hawkish, if you think about it.
So, it's not like we have to gung ho every sequential meeting increase rates. But we see a gradual increase in rates. And so, for instance, for the ECB, we have a meeting around the corner next week. We don't think there will be an increase. But the risks have sort of stacked up and are really to the upside for inflation.
So, it will be very hard to avoid a tightening for the ECB in the December meeting. So that's the gradual pace I was just referring to.
Seth Carpenter: Got it. Ok, Chetan, the developed market central bank in Asia that most people are staring at is the Bank of Japan. So big change there. 25 years of essentially stagnant nominal in GDP growth to now we're on a clear hiking path.
How far do you think the Bank of Japan is likely to go? What's driving it? And how important is this global energy shock to the Bank of Japan's plans?
Chetan Ahya: We expect the BOJ to hike its policy rate twice, first in December and then again in March next year. This compares with market pricing of three more rate hikes. So, what explains our dovish forecast? Well, we think that Japan's inflation has been largely driven by FX weakness and higher commodity prices and not due to demand-side pressures. To elaborate, Japan's real consumption is still one percent below pre-COVID levels. Hence, we think BoJ will avoid taking up more aggressive policy tightening.
Seth Carpenter: So, Mike, let me come back to you for the U.S. We have seen globally a rise in interest rates. The long end of the curve has sold off everywhere. Some of that is being driven by energy prices. We've seen credit spreads in the U.S. start to widen.
Some of that's being driven by hyperscaler debt issuance, among other factors. But I guess what's important is when Chair Warsh first took over the helm of the Fed, his characterization of how restrictive monetary policy and financial conditions were – was not particularly forceful, right? He said it's hard-pressed to say that it's uniformly restrictive.
But the world feels a little bit different now than it did when Chair Warsh took over. So how does the Fed need to react to the fact that longer-term interest rates have sold off and that credit spreads are starting to widen?
Michael Gapen: Financial conditions have tightened. We would characterize financial conditions as, let's call it moderately restrictive.
So, I think the Fed needs to look at that and then ask itself essentially, "Where is this inflation coming from? What inflation are we trying to stop?" I don't think there's a tremendous amount of evidence that points to an overheating labor market. Rates have risen, but long-run inflation expectations remain stable.
So, I still think the right answer is to lean against potential second-round effects from the energy price shock. And here, I think that would show up in airfares, apparel, new and used cars, motor vehicles and parts.
We got some evidence in the September inflation report that these other goods prices were firm. We'll see if that continues, and this is an early sign of energy pass-through into other parts of core. But with financial conditions already moderately restrictive, it doesn't suggest they have a tremendous amount of work to do unless there's evidence that AI spending is broadening out to greater labor demand and higher wages. Then it would be a different story.
For now, I think a few more rate hikes – we have two more rate hikes penciled in, and 75 basis points of rate hikes in total – is probably where we think the Fed will be going by March of next year.
Seth Carpenter: Jens, let me turn that to you as well because rates in Europe have also gone up. And importantly, we've seen spreads for French sovereign debt over German debt widen a lot. So, OAT spreads are pretty high. How much has the tightening in financial conditions done the work of the ECB for it?
And as a result, is that a reason to maybe expect less in the way of rate hiking than what the market has priced in?
Jens Eisenschmidt: I think that's exactly the debate that I would expect to be raging in the governing council next week. We have already seen indications in the accounts in September that it was brought up.
Since then, it hasn't gotten better. So, there is tightening. We had seen Philip Lane coming out essentially saying in very simplistic ways, ‘Well, this is AI. This is good for the U.S. It's not so clear it's as good for Europe. But, you know, rates have increased here too, and so we need to be super careful.’ That this is not representing us with much more tightening than we actually can stomach.
So, to your point, indeed, I think the market is pricing too many rate hikes. We have one more at this stage in December, and that's it.
We have to acknowledge that since we made that change in call, we have seen more inflation and probably also more resiliency than we had thought. So that would push us at the margin to maybe one more in March.
But then again, we have seen the tightening at the long end. If that continues, we may very well end up being right with that call without any need to change it. Again, that has to be closely watched. It will very likely depend on the growth outlook in the end.
But yeah, long story short, the market currently prices 3/25. I still think this is too much from the ECB here.
Seth Carpenter: So, Chetan, maybe I’ll wrap up with you because we focused on some of the bigger central banks of the bigger economies. But there are different outcomes across different central banks. Here in the Americas, for example, down south, the Brazilian Central Bank, the BCB, is still easing, albeit gradually. Banxico in Mexico is holding rates, not hiking.
So, when you think about other central banks, across Asia, like say maybe Korea and India, where we're still seeing some strong domestic growth. Are they conforming to the same stories we've talked about for these major DM central banks?
Chetan Ahya: Yeah, the situation in Asia is somewhat different. They don't have a big inflation problem, but we are seeing strength in growth coming in because of exports. And so, for most central banks, we are expecting them to take up rate hikes. But those will be more countercyclical in nature.
As such, core inflation, except for Australia and Korea is pretty much in the central bank's comfort zone. And so, we don't expect them to react to higher inflation. But to the extent to which, you know, U.S. rates are going up, growth is strong, most central banks will take up countercyclical rate hikes in the coming quarters.
Seth Carpenter: That's super helpful, and that helps make, I guess, a key observation or theme about what's going on. Inflation is a global phenomenon. We are seeing somewhat resilient growth, and major central banks generally are tightening. But it is not a uniform story in every single place. And so, there are some interesting nuances in all of the details here.
That point also means that the endpoint for hiking cycles at different central banks might not be fully synchronized either. And it will depend, I suspect, in different jurisdictions on the specific evidence that each central bank is looking at – be it inflation itself, wage dynamics, what's going on in labor markets, domestic demand, foreign demand, external demand for exports, depending on the economy. And of course, as we touched on a bit, what's going on in financial conditions.
Well, Mike, Jens, Chetan, thank you so much for helping us connect all of those dots. And to the listener, thank you for listening. And if you enjoy this show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or a colleague today.
In the first of a two-part discussion, our roundtable explores how AI investment, trade and consumer spending are sustaining global growth, and what could put that resilience at risk.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Seth Carpenter: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Seth Carpenter, Morgan Stanley's Global Chief Economist and Head of Macro Research.
Michael Gapen: I'm Michael Gapen, Chief U.S. Economist.
Jens Eisenschmidt: I'm Jens Eisenschmidt, Chief Europe Economist.
Chetan Ahya: And I'm Chetan Ahya, Chief Asia Economist.
Seth Carpenter: And today, our fourth quarterly economic roundtable discussion is going to try to take a wide-angle view on the global economy – and it has held up despite higher interest rates, higher energy prices, geopolitical uncertainty, you name it.
It's Thursday, October 22nd at 10am in New York.
Jens Eisenschmidt: And 4pm in Frankfurt.
Chetan Ahya: And 10 pm in Hong Kong.
Seth Carpenter: All right then. Let me start with that big question Why has global growth held up better than maybe would have been expected given everything that we've seen ?
Mike, maybe I'll start from the U.S. perspective with you. What do you think has mattered most? What is driving – if I dare use an overused word – the resilience of the economy?
Michael Gapen: Most of us believe AI-related spending is interest rate insensitive and geopolitically insensitive. And certainly, I think the data has borne that out. And in the direct translation of AI hypercaler Capex spending to growth, we find that AI is accounting for 4/10 to 6/10 contribution to growth in any given quarter. You could nudge that a little higher if you think it’s creating productivity, which we do.
And that spending is underpinning asset market appreciation – or certainly has for the past several years. And that is underpinning resilient spending by upper income households.
So, I think in the U.S. the clear answer is AI-related spending, but also its linkage to asset markets and upper-income households.
Seth Carpenter: Jens, let me come to you for the European view. I mean the AI story has been a little bit different in Europe. I think consumer behavior sometimes can differ in Europe than in the United States.
What would you say is the story behind the resilience of economic growth there in Europe?
Jens Eisenschmidt: It’s similar in the sense that there is a clear element of also of AI-related external demand. That even in Europe now the phones are ringing, given that we are more typically seen as on the more higher cost end of the spectrum.
So, I think there was clearly in the second quarter data, export-led growth elements related to AI or delivery into that. There was also an element of geopolitical tensions helping some of those producers – say, chemical industry in Germany comes to mind – that would deliver products that would previously be delivered out of the Strait [of Hormuz].
So, that is another element. And then, yeah, the consumer held up better than had expected. Or that you could have expected given the rise in energy prices. So all in all, that got us a relatively solid second quarter print. And we expect this to be more or less repeated also in the third.
Seth Carpenter: Chetan, the export story is pretty important. You've been writing about a big CapEx cycle and big industrial cycle in Asia. So, when you think about the Asia story and why the economic growth held up in spite of the global shocks, how would you characterize that?
Chetan Ahya: Yeah. So, Asia is benefiting from a strong pickup in CapEx, which initially was led by the tech sector, but is now broadening out to energy, defense, and broader industrial investments. Exports are strong, and showing some signs of broadening out from tech to non-tech goods too.
This has meant that the region has faced positive terms of trade situation despite higher oil prices. Higher export prices have boosted corporate profits and in turn government tax revenues, offsetting the fiscal pressures from higher fuel subsidies.
And when you're thinking about higher interest rates that you are seeing globally and also in Asia, what is different in this cycle is that the macro stability indicators are in a good place. Current account surpluses in the region have widened quite significantly. In fact, it is $1.6 trillion or 4.2 percent of GDP.
Also what we have is the private sector balance sheets outside of China are quite healthy.
So, all in all, both higher oil prices and interest rates have not disturbed the CapEx and growth cycle in the region.
Seth Carpenter: Is there a lot of dispersion across sectors, across countries for this cycle that you’re talking about? Can you go a little deeper there?
Chetan Ahya: Yeah. So let me start first with the story on investment versus consumption So initially, the growth story in the region started with a pickup in exports and CapEx. But what we have seen is that this has now broadened out into a dynamic where we see an improvement in the labor market and therefore consumption growth.
So, we have this recovery broadening out from exports to CapEx to consumption.
And within the region, when you're thinking about different economies. Initially, we saw very strong growth in Korea and Taiwan. But now we have seen growth being strong in all parts of the region, especially in economies like India, Japan, and also some of the Southeast Asian economies like Malaysia and Singapore.
Seth Carpenter: I want to stay on this broadening theme, Michael.
Is all of the CapEx spending, all the investment spending, by business in the United States, is it just an AI story? Are we seeing any broadening of the investment story in the U.S. beyond AI? Or should we just resign ourselves that the rest of the economy is going to stagnant?
Michael Gapen: No, I do think we are seeing evidence of some broadening out. It is most clear in manufacturing.
So, I do think it points to some broadening out in the AI story beyond the narrow AI story into something that is broader that both Chetan and Jens have referenced about in a multipolar world needing to build out redundancies in supply chain.
Maybe there's some incentive to do some reshoring. So, whether it's a spillover effect from AI or a spillover effect from geopolitics writ large, I do think there's some evidence that we're seeing the broadening out.
I would just caution and say, just remember, manufacturing in the U.S. is relatively small. It's only about 10 percent of output and maybe 10 percent of employment. But nonetheless, it's there. So, it's not just an AI story. I think you can characterize it as a bit broader.
Seth Carpenter: Let me come to you, Jens, on this. We've seen an investment story play out for a while in Europe. There was a lot of discussion about defense especially in Germany –infrastructure especially in Germany.
Is that still an important part of spending in Europe, the investment side of things? And how important is investment relative to household?
Jens Eisenschmidt: Yeah. No, I mean, I think in, in terms of the shares; and GDP shares in spending, you're talking about 50 percent versus 20 percent. So, consumption is the more important one…
If you talk about relative expectations, so I think there your question really points at a key component of the forecast. If anything, you could expect maybe some more dampening from here, given that energy prices have increased further, and at some point the consumer will just capitulate. Or at least, need to show some signs of retracement. While investment has so far, in the aggregate at least, not shown any signs of a big revival.
And if anything, this is what we would expect more investment from here – be it related to, you know, a progressive AI build out.
Or be it because we anyway expect some more positive investment dynamics given where we are in the cycle and given that the ECB has decreased rates last year. And at some point, this typically shows up in investment demand.
So, long story short, the relative importance as a growth driver should increase of investments, vis-a-vis consumption. I think that is that is relatively clear. The question is just the magnitude here.
Seth Carpenter: How much do you worry then that not only is investment going to become bigger share of growth? That consumption could weaken even more because energy prices chip away at purchasing power of households? Is that a relevant factor for Europe?
Jens Eisenschmidt: I think that has to be the number one growth worry going forward So essentially, you come down in terms of wage increases from very high level that were reflective of past inflation.
So, the European wage setting process always lags inflation, and so basically today's wage agreements are reflective of yesterday's inflation.
But now we are going above 4 percent, very likely on our forecast. Not an awful lot above 4 percent, but still above.
Then it becomes a question of how long this is going to persist. If you just believe the future curves in energy markets – not long. But then if you look at more details in terms of, for instance, where diesel prices are likely heading, you can become more pessimistic, and ultimately, this is what matters for the consumer. So long story short, big risks here, of course.
Seth Carpenter: All right. So, a consumer that's not exactly pulling its weight leads me back to China. Key economy in the world, one of the biggest economies going. But when it comes to demand, aggregate demand, China has been in this deflationary cycle for a while. The household sector has been pretty soft in terms of its demand.
What are we looking at there in terms of the consumer in China, the demand side of things in China? is that likely to change anytime soon? And can the global economy look to China as a source of extra demand to keep this expansion going?
Chetan Ahya: Unfortunately, I think the short answer to your question is no. We are still very cautious on China's consumption outlook. And what we have been characterizing the China growth story as it's going through a K-shaped recovery.
On one side, you have the strength in exports and AI CapEx. And on the other hand, we have a very weak consumer.
Now, why is the consumption growth weak in China? So firstly, the property sector has still not completed the adjustment cycle.
So, from consumer standpoint, they have still a weak labor market and wage income growth. On top of that, they have seen this massive decline in asset prices. And, so they are actually, de-leveraging at a very rapid pace. The outstanding debt for consumers is contracting at the rate of 1.5 percent. 1.5 percent is not a big number, but just to see that contraction is quite surprising.
And so therefore, all in all, China's consumption growth continues to remain weak. We do think that there is a possibility that the policymakers respond to this weak growth and provide some support. But we're not expecting that support to be big fiscal expansion in a way that you get a major surprise on the consumption outlook for China.
Seth Carpenter: But as we started off saying, things are holding up, and so that fact brings up a question in my mind. Where are the risks? Where are the downside risks? And so, Mike, maybe I'll start with you.
What do you think would lead to a downturn in the U.S.? Where's the biggest vulnerability? What do we have to look out for?
Michael Gapen: Well, I think in the, the near term, I do think higher rates pose a vulnerability. So, I would say if the central bank has to shift to a much more dramatic tightening cycle and interest rates go a lot higher, that would be a near-term vulnerability. But I think if we look further out, if the resiliency of the economy is driven by the AI investment cycle, then I think a potential over-investment cycle is the greater risk.
Seth Carpenter: Alright. Jens, what about in, in Europe?
Jens Eisenschmidt: Clearly we have a discussion among European, in particular monetary policymakers, as evidenced by the latest accounts of the ECB about the degree to which long rates have increased. Maybe, too much and, you know, present a significant tightening of financial conditions.
And juggling that in a good way will certainly be a risk and reason to be cautious.
So, I would say, here the three risks. Again, consumption because of energy prices, interest rates, or a too tight monetary policy stance. And of course, the investment cycle overall.
Seth Carpenter: Chetan, you get the last word in Asia
Chetan Ahya: So, I would say, Seth, two risks. One is higher oil prices and the second one is, if you see a contraction in AI investments in the U.S. and therefore in Asia as well.
So, on oil prices, I would say a threshold of $130 to $150 of oil would be a problem for the region. It would make the governments finally do resort to higher oil prices for the consumers.
And if you get a combination of higher oil prices and lower AI investments, that would be quite a big shock to the region's growth outlook.
Seth Carpenter: Super helpful. And I think that's probably a good place for us to stop for today.
We talked about global growth. It's been holding up really well. Sources of that resilience probably differ a bit across regions, but investment is important and becoming probably more important over time. And that investment boom is spreading through trade. Domestic demand in parts for Asia. Europe has got its own story going on. And obviously, the consumer around the world matters a lot.
That current outlook though, of a reasonably strong economy with this shock from energy that's driving up inflation, means that the policy side of things, especially monetary policy, is now becoming kind of complicated.
So, what should a central bank do? When we come back tomorrow, we're going to ask questions about the Fed, the ECB, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan. How they're thinking about what's going on, the tightening that needs to be done, whether or not this is going to be a fully synchronized hiking cycle.
And I guess most of all, what's going to tell us when the policy hiking has gone far?
Mike, Jens, Chetan, thanks so much for joining today. And to the listener, thank you for listening, and be sure to tune in tomorrow for part two of our conversation.
And if you enjoy this show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or a colleague today.
Can markets absorb this much new debt? Our panel examines strong demand for investment-grade bonds, stress in high-yield debt and the macro risks that could shape the next six to twelve months in credit markets.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley.
Anish Shah: I'm Anish Shah, Global Head of Debt Capital Markets.
Rehan Latif: I am Rehan Latif, Global Head of Credit Trading.
Samer Oweida: And I'm Samer Oweida, Global Head of Foreign Exchange and Emerging Markets.
Andrew Sheets: Today, a discussion of historical levels of bond issuance and how it could affect the broader markets.
It's Wednesday, October 21st at 9am in New York.
Gentlemen, it's great to talk with you. I think what we're talking about is an issue that really cuts across all parts of Morgan Stanley's businesses, from issuance to credit trading to macro markets and beyond.
And I'd like to get into it, but just quickly to kind of frame where we are. Anish, we are in the midst of a historic investment cycle in AI CapEx. We're in the midst of a very large pickup in M&A activity that I also want to make sure we get into.
But you sit at the intersection of our capital markets businesses. Talk a little bit about what we're seeing in the bond issuance space.
Anish Shah: Sure, Andrew. I look after all of our new issue capital markets business in credit, and that's across the credit spectrum and across geographies. And I'm constantly looking to Rehan for the latest in investor sentiment and how we can deliver the right product for our issuing clients. And to Samer on macro views that impact our clients every day.
We are in the midst of a significant decommoditization of new issue credit markets and a decompression in credit. It's really driven by four important factors.
One is, as you note, unprecedented levels of issuance. Investment grade debt volumes are up almost 25 percent on the year. That's driven by the AI CapEx theme and a resurgence in M&A.
Number two is the rate backdrop has been, to date, pretty constructive for credit. We've seen $100 billion of new cash come into investment grade credit. We've seen new pools of investors drive tremendous new capacity into credit markets, whether it be insurance, capital fueled by annuity investments or other private credit.
We're also seeing an increase in complexity, and that's driven by the AI CapEx cycle and the interconnectedness between hyperscalers, the chip makers, the neo clouds, the data centers, and that's requiring an unprecedented level of innovation in structuring new solutions for issuers.
And the last is the market is grappling with supply-demand dynamics and winners and losers in the AI thematic.
Andrew Sheets: Rehan, that's actually a great place to turn to you because you're on the other side of this. You're focused on can markets absorb all of this supply? And I often kind of hear two narratives.
You know, one is everything is great. You've got record issuance and record supply into the credit markets. And the other is cracks are forming. You're seeing widening of CCC spreads. You're seeing some headlines around some issuers running into more trouble. From your perch, how do you see things?
Rehan Latif: So, Andrew, instead of two, I'll give you three narratives within public credit trading.
One, I agree with Anish. I think first of all, I've got to thank Anish because it's never been busier on the public credit side because of the amount of issuance coming through. But there are, really, three different themes coming through.
One, investment grade has been incredibly strong. The higher quality part of the credit market is benefiting from all this new investor money coming through at these higher rate levels. For the longest period of my 20-year career, 20-plus year career, we were in a zero-rate environment. At current yield levels, investment grade has never looked like a more attractive proposition.
You add in growth in the U.S. and across the rest of the world, the reality is that investment grade looks like a very interesting investment thesis. And I think spreads continue to be appropriately priced for the risk.
On the CCC side of the market, that's where we're seeing real dispersion.
Where we're seeing investors from the distressed community, from the high yield community, really have to figure out how to refinance some of these names. And that's been where the real challenge has been from a credit perspective.
And then obviously, you've got the hyperscalers that have come through in significant wave across many different parts of the capital market.
So, one thing Anish mentioned was the number of different financings that are available to the hyperscalers. So, I do think that given the cash flows that these hyperscalers actually have, you've managed to be able to attract a new investor base to our market as well.
Andrew Sheets: Samar, we just heard that, you know, Anish has never been busier. Rehan has never been busier. There's clearly a very credit-specific story here. But, you know, this is something that I imagine is also top of mind in the macro markets.
You've got all of this supply. You've got AI that's kind of driving the market, but you've also got all these other broader issues around energy and deficits. How do you see the historic wave of credit supply fitting into the macro piece?
Samer Oweida: Well, maybe I'll start by also thanking Anish because our corporate derivative business, where we hedge exposure, whether it's on a deal basis or on a normal course basis for these issuers, has never been busier. And part of that is because of the historic issuance that's been discussed.
But part of that, Andrew, is also about the uncertainty that you mentioned in these markets. And so, this epic wave that we're seeing around hyperscalers and AI is happening at a time where energy prices are high, inflation is sticky, fiscal concerns abound, and there's a lot of uncertainty in the forward.
And so, what we've seen from a behavioral standpoint is clients having much more appetite to engage on these discussions because of the uncertainty and hedge that exposure.
What we've also seen is a lot of re-racking of traditional macro models and how do we think about what is the rate level that the economy can handle? What does that rate level mean for winners and losers by jurisdiction or by sector, as Rehan mentioned earlier?
And we've seen that manifest itself in a lot of the invested decisions that our clients have made over the course of the year, where we've seen capital and engagement go up with names both corporate and sovereign. Where there's a positive commodity story and there's a positive AI hyperscaler story.
And we've seen less investment around the jurisdictions and the names where that story is not the case. And so we're seeing some amount of divergence, but I think also given that the economic background globally, and particularly in the U.S., continues to be strong. We've just seen very high levels of activity coming out of our corporate and sponsors-based businesses.
Andrew Sheets: So, Anish, that brings me to a question I wanted to ask you about – which is, you know, Samer, you mentioned this, really important macro question is: at what point do higher rates slow down activity?
And yet, so far, activity's still been very solid, and it's not just AI. We've also seen a lot of strategic activity, a lot of M&A activity. I would love for you to take us inside the conversations that you're having with these companies – and how they're thinking about the environment. How much these current levels of interest rates are impacting their decision-making?
Anish Shah: Andrew, you could probably break that question down into two pieces.
One is in the AI ecosystem, where, you know, certainly there's a lot of optimism on the return on these investments. And so, sitting in the shoes of a hyperscaler or a data center developer or a chip maker, there's a lot of optimism that – notwithstanding the current higher rate environment, that the long-term return on these investments is going to be very, very attractive.
And so, we're seeing a relative level of insensitivity on rates from the issuer's perspective in accessing capital. The first wave of all of the AI CapEx has predominantly been in the investment-grade bond market. That's the deepest, most liquid, fastest way to raise capital and speed.
Now you're seeing some of these companies diversify into different currencies and different products, and that's been a really healthy technical for the markets. From an M&A context, I think a lot of the resurgence in activity is driven by the fact that there's a meeting of the minds in terms of valuation.
So, for the first time in many years, we're seeing large-scaled sponsor private equity-owned assets come to market and be acquired by an investment-grade corporate strategic. Yes, they are borrowing at higher rates than they would have a few years ago. But the view is that they're able to acquire these assets at an appropriate valuation, and it makes long-term strategic sense, and we're seeing just a big pickup in that activity.
I think that also has another implication for credit markets, which is some of these assets that have been long held by private equity sponsors had multi-billion dollar debt complexes that are going to be repaid as part of these transactions.
That's a recycling of credit. That's going to free up some capacity in the leverage finance markets as well.
Andrew Sheets: And yeah, Rehan, how do you think about that? Because, you know, again, we have these big macro forces of AI CapEx, and then these very micro company-specific stories around M&A. How do you see that impacting your backdrop?
Rehan Latif: Within credit, the biggest driver is always growth. You pay the rate that you pay simply because there's an expectation towards growth. When Anish talks about some of these developments that are happening within the market, these are all, you know, big paradigm shift in growth.
And, AI investment the reality is that we are at the forefront of creating the capital for that. And the reality is that the yield that is being paid; or the coupon that is being paid is essentially the price for that investment.
Investors are seeing that across all these different markets. I think we have to be very deliberate about the difference between investment-grade, investments in newer sectors, and what is actually happening within the more distressed part of the credit market.
Simply because that market has been challenged for a long time. That market was held together to a certain degree by a zero-rate environment. And that has changed quite dramatically as rates went higher and as the global economy has evolved as well.
So, from my perspective, this is all very healthy.
Rehan Latif: Samar, I'll let you have the last word here. You know, Anish and Rehan have talked about these historic waves of credit issuance. Part of that's coming from AI, but part of it's coming from M&A and strategic transactions. You know, we're sitting here on the eve of our Morgan Stanley Credit Symposium in New York. It's tomorrow. We have over 1,000 investors attending. I think that indicates just the amount of interest and focus on this space.
And yet, as you hear Anish talk about kind of the almost insensitivity of rates for some of these key borrowers, how does this impact how you're thinking about macro markets and how they could trade over the next six to twelve months?
Samer Oweida: I think it speaks to what both Anish and Rehan said in that between the growth and the higher level of rates, there are going to be winners and losers.
And what we can't predict is what energy markets or political developments or fiscal developments might have in store. But generally speaking, macro markets are responsive to underlying growth, inflation, and policy discipline. And I think as we go into the depths of what is one of the most consequential CapEx cycles in post-Industrial Revolution history, the governments, the jurisdictions, and the corporates that have discipline and capacity around this growth will be the winners.
We think so. We see that as on the go forward. And those that don't have a clear policy will suffer the consequences. I think that is still a very early innings discussion to be had. Lots of data still has to come through.
I think what we know is what is on the docket for the next year or two in terms of how much capital needs to be raised and debt issued. But what we don't know is how does that affect underlying economic activity.
And I think as that data manifests in conjunction with policy initiatives globally, there's a lot to be excited about. And there's a lot to be quite concerned about. And looking at how policy mistakes one way or the other might affect a lot of the behavioral patterns in credit markets and from an issuer standpoint.
Andrew Sheets: Gentlemen, thank you for taking the time to talk, and see you tomorrow at the conference. And thank you for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts the Market, please take a moment to rate and review us wherever you listen and tell a friend or colleague about us today.
Anish Shah is a member of Morgan Stanley’s Global Capital Markets Division. Rehan Latif and Samer Oweida are members of Morgan Stanley’s Fixed Income Division. They are not members of Morgan Stanley’s Research Department. Unless otherwise indicated, their views are their own and may differ from the views of the Morgan Stanley Research Department and from the views of others within Morgan Stanley.
With AI startups scaling at record speed, our analysts Sabrina Hao, Adam Wood and Brian Nowak share takeaways from Morgan Stanley's Spark Conference on AI returns, competitive moats and implications for public markets.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Sabrina Hao: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Sabrina Hao, Morgan Stanley's AI and Tech Thematic Equity Strategist.
Adam Wood: And I'm Adam Wood, Head of U.S. Software Research at Morgan Stanley.
Brian Nowak: And I'm Brian Nowak, Head of U.S. Internet Research.
Sabrina Hao: Today, what private companies are telling us about the AI opportunity and what it means for public markets.
It's Tuesday, October 20th, at 10am in New York.
Last week, we were at our Spark Private Company conference in California, bringing together more than a hundred startups across software, robotics, AI infrastructure, and beyond. There was even a company helping to manufacture pharmaceuticals in space.
It was a really interesting week to be at the conference given everything that was happening in the market. But really, we came away feeling even more positive about the AI cycle.
While public market investors are waiting for returns to justify trillions of dollars in AI spending, we're already seeing that pay off in private markets. AI demand is real, companies are delivering tangible returns for customers, and startups are scaling faster than ever.
Adam, let's start with growth. We heard from startups scaling at extraordinary speeds. One was approaching [$] 4 billion in annual recurring revenue in two years, another reaching a billion in under a year.
What really stood out to you about the pace of AI adoption, and why aren't we necessarily seeing that same growth at established software companies?
Adam Wood: So yeah, absolutely, the pace was remarkable. And clearly one of the standouts from the conference when we used to discuss how quickly a company could get to a $1 billion so-called unicorn valuation. And now we're discussing how quickly they can get to a unicorn revenue run rate of a billion dollars, which for me is quite incredible.
But I think I wouldn't make the debate simply about private versus public companies. I'd make the distinction between two different types of software.
I think we have to make a distinction between largely coding and inference tools. There were a number of coding and inference software companies at the conference, and application software. And I think there's a big difference in terms of time and complexity to bring these products to market.
I think the coding and inference, which tends to be the building blocks, as I would call them, underneath the application layer, they can be constructed much more quickly. And I think because we can adopt when we're still building bespoke, which I think is a lot of the phase we're in today, we're still building bespoke software rather than buying off the shelf. They can be adopted earlier as well.
So, we've got faster time to build and faster time to adopt by companies. So, I think it's natural you can see very fast growth in those types of businesses very quickly.
I think in the application landscape, it's a little bit different because those applications have to deliver complete business solutions for customers. In finance and customer service, that means integrating data, understanding workflows, and putting controls in place.
There's much more to build and much more to implement, and generally, the adoption of those tools takes place a little bit later. After we've gone from the bespoke phase where companies are building themselves, we go to a phase where companies see that there are off-the-shelf packages that are available, that companies have built out.
So, I think it's both a complexity of build debate and also, a time in terms of where we are in the software adoption cycle.
The second thing I'd say is, you know, in public software companies that have a big incumbent existing business, sometimes there can be that big incumbent business that's not growing very quickly. And a very fast-growing AI business in there as well. And that very fast AI growth business can be hidden a little bit by that large public software company that exists.
So, I don't think it's as straightforward as just saying, you know, private's growing very quickly, public not. I think there's a couple of layers of complexity in there in terms of what type of software you're dealing with. And then how big the existing kind of business is in a software company and what is kind of existing software growing a little bit less quickly. And then the AI bit that could potentially be growing very fast.
Sabrina Hao: Absolutely. It makes a ton of sense. Maybe on this theme of full stack solutions, you know, Brian, we heard about the shift from AI assistants to agents that can actually execute work. You've done a lot of work on this, both across consumer and enterprise.
What did you learn about how quickly agents are advancing? And how does it shape the outlook for the internet names that you cover?
Brian Nowak: This is a very exciting time for agentic adoption on both the consumer side and the enterprise side. You know, we've sized potential addressable markets of $30 to $40 trillion of spend on both the consumer side and the enterprise side that we think can be addressed by agentic tools. On the consumer side, people are shopping, they are planning their travel, they're planning their holiday shopping. On the enterprise side, we're seeing both vertical specific agents start to emerge. So, agents within the legal area or agents within the healthcare area. And then we're also seeing broad-based agents from some of the larger private companies also start to bud through.
So, there is a smattering of agents that are popping through. On the consumer side, Muse is your early leader, and we do expect more to come in 2027. And then I think on the enterprise side, they're both vertical specific as well as broader based agents expected to grow.
Sabrina Hao: Agents really raise an important question around disruption. Maybe for Adam, you've written about the moat and the journey in software. It's not just about if a company has a competitive advantage, but how it navigates that transition to an AI-driven world.
Did Spark change your thinking about which software incumbents are best positioned to defend their businesses or capture new growth?
Adam Wood: So, I think Spark really confirmed a lot of our views on that moat and journey framework that we've put forward. The moat protecting the existing business that you have and the journey turning AI into new growth opportunities. And in some ways, the deeper the moat for businesses, the longer that journey can be.
An incumbent embedded in complex mission-critical workflows is hard to replace because of the data integrations and customer trust it has by definition. But those same requirements can make introducing AI into its platform more demanding. You can't compromise the reliability of that work.
So that's why we've separated the durability of the business from the speed of its AI transition.
For some of the coding inference businesses we heard from – again, these incredibly fast run rate, fast growth businesses, the monetization has obviously moved very, very quickly. And I think there the investor debate's going to be a little bit the opposite way around. How durable and how big a competitive advantage have these companies built on that very fast-growing revenue base?
And that's not to say these businesses can't have moats. They can. You know, performance, model customization, and integration can create real differentiation. But I think there is a big difference to be made between rapid growth and defensibility.
And, you know, to give a couple of examples here in terms of the moat that some of these AI native vertical and business software companies are leveraging. You know, there's a legal AI company that's hiring former lawyers to become forward deployed lawyers.
We had forward deployed engineers, now we've got forward deployed lawyers. But the reason there is they bring that understanding of legal workflows to the product and its implementation.
So, the value isn't just access to the model. It's making the model and the technology work in the customer's business and understanding in depth those business workflows.
Sabrina Hao: And we've talked about this theme of AI adopters, and really what we need to get this trade to work are those quantifiable benefits from AI. So open weights are a key part of that.
Maybe to pull on another thread, and you, kind of, alluded to this, the models themselves are increasingly becoming table stakes rather than moats. And the value is shifting to everything around the model – whether that's your data, your workflows, the tools that make AI useful.
So where did you see this most clearly at Spark? And does it change your view on where durable value will accrue in software?
Adam Wood: So again, I mean, I think I'd come back to the growing importance of open weight models. I mean, it was a recurring theme at the conference. Almost every company spoke to us and spoke to, you know, the implementation. And again, it reinforces that view of a multi-model world.
You’ve got the inference companies talking about bringing down the costs of using the models. Again, that diffusion concept we talk about. At the application layer, a legal software company said it benchmarks 18 models across 200 criteria to decide which model should run the task. So, you know, you're getting incredible gains in efficiency.
I think there are two implications for public software vendors. I think, you know, first of all, there's an opportunity here for software companies to help their customers with orchestration. So, there's going to be a layer around how do we get the right task to the right model at the right price. And I think a lot of the public software companies, you know, at the hyperscaler level, they can help at a broader enterprise adoption level.
And then down at the application layer, whether we're talking about CRM, ERP, HR, there's an opportunity for software companies to help with orchestration at that layer as well.
I think the second thing, which is probably a little bit less talked about, is maybe there is a gross margin opportunity here. I think in software, all we've discussed so far is the pressure that's going to come on gross margins from having to include the cost of running tokens in a software business model and offer that to customers as part of the package.
If we can bring down inference costs dramatically, and you can hold on to some of the pricing as a software company – maybe there could be a little talked about bull case in the medium term. That maybe software margins are not going to be as pressured as people think. And we can maybe see gross margins hold in a lot better than people think.
Sabrina Hao: Brian, I want to end with something that may seem counterintuitive. In a world where software's becoming easier to build, some of the strongest competitive advantages may actually be in the physical world.
The conference had many companies, whether that was logistics, manufacturing, real-world operations. You know, why is that intersection of the digital and physical world so defensible? And how does it influence your view of who ultimately wins in an agentic world?
Brian Nowak: I think it's important for people to remember that AI is not just software. AI is going to get physical through new types of robots that impact the entire globe. We're seeing it in multiple industries already. We're seeing it on the defense side with drones and other types of mechanisms that are going to change the way that we build out our overall defense tools. We're seeing it on the industrial side, in warehouses, on delivery. We're seeing it on the agriculture side, the way that we're going to the future of farming.
And so over the long term, while I think we will have humanoids and we will have robots in our homes, I think it's important for people to keep in mind there are going to be a lot of physical and robotic implementations of AI over the next two, three, five years that are going to really change the way we do a lot of business.
Sabrina Hao: Absolutely. Lots of exciting things happening. Adam, Brian, thanks for joining me. And thank you for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.
Higher rates can take time to filter through the economy, making their full impact difficult to judge. Arunima Sinha from our U.S. and Global Economics teams considers where the pressure may emerge next and how policymakers could navigate the competing risks.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Arunima Sinha, from the Morgan Stanley’s U.S. and Global Economics teams.
Today, I'll talk about what rising rates mean for economic activity, inflation, and the policy path.
It’s Monday, October 19th, at 10am in New York.
The FOMC raised rates in September. But expectations for future hikes remain volatile. Within hours of the latest CPI print, markets round-tripped, pushing the probability to even for an October hike before retreating.
Now, consistent with our baseline forecast, the market assigns December the highest likelihood for the next hike. But moves further along the U.S. curve matter even more; notably the 10-year yield shifted.
One question that arises, taking a step back is – how much we should worry that broad-based inflation upside means tighter policy is required to push down inflation and, therefore, growth? Or have financial conditions tightened enough on their own that the central bank has less, not more work to do?
The calibration of monetary policy has always been difficult, and now it is becoming urgent.
Economists try to put the level of interest rates into the context of where they stand relative to the economy's natural rate. Stronger productivity growth and investment demand should mean a higher natural rate, so a given level of rates is less restrictive.
The rise in long-term treasury yields alongside still firm growth and earnings expectations is an indication that the neutral rate may indeed be higher. When yields rise because growth prospects are improving, expected returns rise and the demand for capital strengthens. In that setting, higher rates are not necessarily contractionary.
But there is a less benign alternative.
Yields have also risen because inflation has been hot, fiscal concerns are intensifying, and investors are demanding more compensation for holding duration. The question that Chair Warsh has posed – are financial conditions restrictive – is starting to get a different answer.
Calibration will be key to how the economy evolves. For the U.S. so far, even the most recent upside inflation surprise pointed to resilient demand rather than energy-driven stagflation. The simple explanation is that many firms still see returns well above their cost of capital. Recent work from our U.S. economics team supports such a view.
Where there may be a contrast is at the sector level, and that seems to be becoming more apparent. If activity is concentrated in sectors driven by innovation, productivity, and strategic investment, the economy may be less rate sensitive than in past cycles.
Calibrating policy amid these opposing forces is no easy task. The fact that we're seeing the biggest spread widening in the lowest quality part of the credit spectrum and the fact that housing activity is at recessionary levels are some tells in the U.S. that policy and financial conditions are restrictive.
The signs of tighter financial conditions are somewhat more visible in Europe, in part because the AI CapEx spend is less of a factor. Growth has been resilient, but not sufficiently so to offset rising fiscal concerns from higher rates.
The French OAT sell-off shows how quickly the balance of risks shifts. Globally, financial conditions are introducing tougher questions to the macro landscape.
Until recently, the economy's message had been clear.
Higher rates were restraining some sectors, but without meaningfully altering the expansion's trajectory. As long as expected returns rise alongside borrowing costs, then yields can remain high – without becoming decisively restrictive. But as our rate strategy colleagues have noted, inflationary pressures have pushed up real rates, not break evens.
So, the market is telling us that policy is getting tighter to restrain growth and eventually pull-down inflation. The latest inflation print in the U.S. reinforces this debate. Are financial conditions restrictive?
With several catalysts ahead, Q3 earnings, hyperscaler CapEx credit spread widening, and U.S. elections, the Fed meeting coming up, markets will need to shift to assessing growth risks as central banks try to recalibrate.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
Our ABS Strategist Carolyn Campbell explains how rising borrowing costs are slowing the AI data center boom and what could drive a rebound in financing.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Carolyn Campbell: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Carolyn Campbell, Morgan Stanley's Asset-Backed Securities Strategist.
Today, why the AI boom is running into an unexpected obstacle: the cost of borrowing money.
It's Friday, October 16th, at 10am in New York.
Demand for data center facilities is booming. Yet even as companies race to build more capacity, the financing for them is becoming increasingly expensive. And that tension is creating an interesting story in credit markets.
Since January, five-year Treasury rates have climbed more than one percentage point, and spreads for data center assets have also gone wider. At the beginning of 2026, the highest-rated data center bonds offered yields below 5 percent. Today, similar bonds are yielding closer to 7 percent, and that increase matters enormously for companies trying to finance multi-billion-dollar facilities.
Many operators turn to the securitized credit markets to raise money. Essentially, they issue bonds backed by the income generated by their data centers. By the time these bonds are issued, construction on the data center is complete, the power is secured, and the rent is already being paid.
So, on the one hand, cash flows are stabilized – but there is a catch. These facilities often sign long-term leases well before they seek financing in the securitized credit market.
By the time they're ready to issue these bonds, rental income is already locked in. And so, when interest rates rise quickly, as we've seen this year, and these borrowing costs increase, revenues aren't necessarily keeping pace.
Our analysis suggests that when borrowing costs approach 8 percent, issuing these bonds becomes significantly more challenging under these current financing terms. And we're already seeing the effects in the market.
So far in 2026, data center operators have issued around [$] 15 billion in ABS and another [$] 7 billion in the CMBS markets. That's roughly in line with last year's pace, but it's below what we'd expect given the extraordinary growth in data center demand this year. Still, we believe the slowdown in supply is temporary.
Our forecast suggests that U.S. data center power capacity could grow from roughly 60 gigawatts today to 150 gigawatts by 2028; although there are some constraints on power availability that could leave capacity 30 percent to 40 percent below these projections.
Regardless, much of the lease capacity that comes online will require debt financing, and these operators have ambitious growth plans. So, they have some options to navigate these higher rate environments.
They might borrow less against their properties. They might accept lower investment returns in the near term. Or they can turn to different credit channels that offer more flexible financing structures.
So, where does this leave the market? To take into account the higher rate environment, we've lowered our forecast slightly for 2026 and 2027 for securitized credit data center issuance. But the amount of lease capacity that's set to come online in 2028 is so high that we've actually held those numbers steady.
All told, we now expect around a [$] 120 to a [$] 150 billion of supply over the next couple of years. That's substantial financing activity, even with the higher interest rates creating near-term challenges.
The higher cost of borrowing may slow the pace of data center financing for now, but the scale of the build-out ahead suggests that this market still has plenty of room to grow. And there are pockets within the market that we do like.
We've talked a lot about the hyperscaler data centers, which are big campuses leased to one or two hyperscaler tenants, often with 10- or 15-year leases.
But the other part of the market, the colocation data center market, is where we see a lot of value today. These campuses have many different types of tenants, many different industries represented, and they often have shorter leases.
Given the sharp increase in data center rental rates and vacancy rates around 1 percent, these data center operators are more quickly able to monetize the changes that we're seeing in the industry.
That flexibility could prove particularly valuable when borrowing costs remain elevated.
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Our Chief Latin America Equity Strategist Nikolaj Lippmann explains why Brazil’s election, the cost of capital, AI investment and geopolitics could help unlock a new era of growth across Latin America.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Nikolaj Lippmann, Morgan Stanley's Chief Latin America Equity Strategist.
Today – why Brazil could be the missing piece of what we call LatAm Spring, and what AI has to do with it.
It’s Thursday, October 15th, at 10am in New York.
Brazilian equities rallied sharply last week after a surprising first-round presidential election result. Flávio Bolsonaro finished ahead of President Lula, setting up a runoff later this month. The outcome remains uncertain. But for investors, I think there’s a bigger question. Can Brazil approach a policy shift that unlocks something the country has lacked for years: investment.
We've long argued that Latin America is moving from a consumption-led economy towards an investment-led cycle, thanks to: 1. Changing geopolitics; 2. investment-friendly policies; and 3. The potential for lower interest rates. What's more, this fits into the framework of the AI CapEx cycle, driving the global and especially the U.S. economy that has moved from consumption to CapEx, as argued by Mike Gapen, our U.S. economist. We're already seeing signs of this LatAm Spring in Argentina, Chile, Peru and Colombia. Brazil could be the largest missing piece. And there are three reasons why.
First, the cost of capital. Brazil remains one of the world's most expensive places to invest. High government debt and elevated interest rates have made fixed income investment more attractive than equities or entrepreneurial risk-taking. But credible fiscal reform could change that equation. Lower government spending could reduce borrowing costs, strengthen the currency, and encourage private investment. Which means capital could shift from sitting in fixed-income assets toward funding growth.
Second, AI. AI might seem unrelated to Brazilian politics, but we see an important connection. Our global framework suggests that annual capital spending could rise from roughly $2.5 trillion to about $5 trillion - $6 trillion as companies build out global AI infrastructure. And Latin America has a critical role to play.
Data centers need electricity. Electricity requires energy infrastructure. And the infrastructure requires copper, lithium, and other critical minerals. Latin America as a whole supplies roughly 10 percent of the world's energy, holds about 20 percent of global energy reserves, about 30 percent of global copper, and approximately 60 percent of the world's lithium resources.
So, we've argued that Brazil and Argentina look increasingly like Texas, with exports of energy and of agriculture. And one other area around politics where Brazilians could perhaps learn or be inspired from peer Latin American countries and gather some inspiration from Texas could be around deregulation.
For Brazil, lower interest rates and greater policy credibility could make participating in this investment boom considerably easier.
And that brings me to the third factor: geopolitics. Brazil has strengthened its economic ties with the East, while remaining deeply connected to Western capital markets and U.S. technology. A more balanced relationship could improve access to capital markets and support long-term investments. Of course, an election result alone doesn't guarantee change. Fiscal discipline, policy execution, and global financing conditions remain critical. Higher U.S. Treasury yields are an especially important risk for a region carrying substantial debt.
But consider what's already happening elsewhere. Mexico contributes hardware to the AI supply chain. Chile is rebuilding its investment pipeline. And Peru is benefiting from mining activity. Argentina is attracting capital after significant policy changes.
As Latin America's largest economy, Brazil could have substantial regional implications if it moves in the same direction. That's ultimately our LatAm Spring thesis: a shift away from consumption toward investment, entrepreneurship, and capital formation.
There's still a long road ahead, but Brazil could be the most important test of whether that spring truly takes hold.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen to podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
The UK budget arrives later this month amid competing predictions about growth, inflation and public finances. Andrew Sheets and Bruna Skarica examine how the country’s economy defies expectations.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley.
Bruna Skarica: And I'm Bruna Skarica, Morgan Stanley's Chief UK Economist.
Andrew Sheets: Today, the UK makes a budget. Why it matters? And more generally, what we've gotten right and wrong about the country.
It's Wednesday, October 14th, at 2pm in London.
Bruna, it's great to be here talking with you, and I'd like to get into a bigger discussion on the UK and what we've gotten right and wrong about the direction of the country this year. But more immediately, it has a very big event coming up.
What is the budget, and why is there so much focus on it?
Bruna Skarica: The budget is the UK's key fiscal event. It is the time of year when the Chancellor receives a refresh of economic forecasts and decides whether he needs to respond to these, whether there's any spending cuts or increases that are required, and whether there's any tax hikes or potentially tax cuts that are required too. All with the view of ensuring fiscal consolidation and executing on what is a self-imposed fiscal framework.
Here in the UK, the main target for the Treasury is to achieve current budget balance in year three of the forecast. The fiscal watchdog forecasts five years of economic variables, and the idea is, by the third year, we ought to be spending outside of investment expenditure as much as we're receiving in tax receipts.
So, all of that happens once a year in the budget.
Andrew Sheets: Now, I might just stop you there [be]cause in the context of these other budget pictures that we see around the world – the U.S. is running a large budget deficit, France is running a large budget deficit, Japan's increasing its budget deficit. That actually seems like a quite ambitious goal within the next three years; to balance that outside of the interest expenses.
Can you just talk maybe a little bit more about that process and the thinking behind it?
Bruna Skarica: Yeah, sure. The idea really is to ensure that over the next five years, not only do we get the current budget balanced while allowing for borrowing for investment, which is, of course, a favorable way to borrow because it boosts growth.
But also, that within the five-year period, we're able to get debt-to-GDP ratio down. In order for that to happen, we need to be running a primary surplus around 1.5 percent of GDP.
Now, very often in UK macro, we tend to look at three-year forecasts, five-year forecasts. We talk about medium-term headrooms. But I think it's important here to take stock of where we are at this moment in time.
We think that in this fiscal year, [20]26-[20]27, primary deficit – our entire expenditure outside debt servicing costs minus tax receipts – we see that at just under 1 percent of GDP. The IMF is a little bit above 1 percent of GDP for UK. But for example, the IMF sees French primary deficit at 2.9 percent this year, with the U.S. measure forecast at 4.9 percent.
So already, UK has actually made a lot of progress in its consolidation path.
Andrew Sheets: And Bruna, talking about this announcement specifically, could you maybe talk about just one or two items that you'd be on the watch for as potential surprises? Or decisions that the market is really focused on?
Bruna Skarica: Sure. So, we do know that the Treasury is looking at ways of alleviating some of the pressures stemming from higher inflation, higher energy inflation in particular. So, the scale of support that will be provided to households and the scale of reduction in headline inflation, I do think will be in focus on the day.
We're expecting a relatively low-key budget, so the scale of measures at around £10 billion, which is much more moderate than what we saw in October 2024 and in November 2025.
However, we do think there is scope for some, let's say, higher level announcements. For example, Prime Minister Burnham is particularly focused on devolution in the UK, decentralization. And there might be a roadmap ahead for how different mayors and different regions in the UK get to keep their portion of income tax revenues and what they might do with it in order to boost regional growth.
UK does stand out as the country in G7 space that has the most centralized fiscal system, and this might start to be changed from this fiscal event onwards.
Andrew Sheets: Okay, so now I'd like to take a step back and do a little marking to market.
You know, you and I on this program, a couple of different times this year, have been talking about the UK, and those conversations have generally been upbeat. I think both of us were of the view that the UK could actually be a bit better of a story than expected. And maybe we start with the good news.
What do you think has been going right?
Bruna Skarica: So, for one, growth has outperformed in the first half of the year. In line with our long-standing thesis that UK ought to be a beneficiary of the global AI boom, the main driver of the upside surprise has been the tech sector. It's running at 8 percent year-on-year, this year.
We have also seen a bit stronger consumer spending growth than anticipated. And again, this reflects, we think, our long-standing thesis on fairly clean household. But also corporate balance sheets, I should mention, that tend to provide a fairly big buffer in one of energy shocks.
UK consumers have elevated savings, also elevated savings stocks, and so in energy shocks such as the one we've seen in the first half of the year, perhaps there is some reduction in desired level of savings, which allows consumers to support their spending habits.
All of this means that this year we see UK growth at 1.3 percent. Now, our U.S. colleagues are looking for 2.3 percent. Still, U.S. growth looks relatively stronger than any European country, including the UK.
However, I would say that 1.3 percent is about 30 basis points higher than where we were a couple of months ago when the energy shock started, so it is important to take that into account.
Andrew Sheets: And I'd also note that UK stocks are up about 10 percent this year, and its currency, the pound, is materially outperformed the euro or the Japanese yen.
But Bruna, I think it's pretty safe to say that sentiment towards the UK feels pretty downbeat. I think it's probably gotten worse as the year has gone on.
So, what's gone wrong and what's been worse than we were expecting?
Bruna Skarica: Yeah. So, while I do think that in the U.S. there is a lot of focus on the benefits from the AI boom and the AI build-out, in Europe, we're still waiting to see the sentiment shift towards how much growth and potential growth in particular can benefit from adopting AI.
We're more constructive, I would say, than probably the average forecaster here. We're pointing to healthy productivity growth performance in the UK private sector, printing productivity growth at 1.8 percent; whereas in the U.S. this figure is a bit above 2 percent over the second quarter this year. So, not too different, I would say.
So, I think the pessimism around potential GDP growth is really what's driving the view that whenever an external energy shock tends to hit, such as the one we've seen this year with higher oil and natural gas prices, it'll be embedded in the economy for a longer period of time. Because ultimately a spare capacity is very tight. And so businesses and consumers will try and preserve their real purchasing power, and inflation will remain elevated for a longer period of time.
Again, we tend to be a bit more constructive on this. We think the economy has enough spare capacity for this energy shock to come and go without material adjustments in the bank rate. We're expecting two hikes. But the market is still pricing four hikes. And certainly in conversations with investors, we are more and more talking about the scenarios in which these could be delivered.
So that, of course, means higher gilt yields, which means higher debt servicing costs, and that overall, I do think tends to dampen sentiment.
Andrew Sheets: Well, Bruna, a lot to watch in the days and weeks ahead. And thank you so much for taking the time.
Bruna Skarica: Thank you, Andrew.
Andrew Sheets: And thank you as always for listening. If you find Thoughts on the Market useful, let us know by leaving a review wherever you hear us. And also tell a friend or colleague about us today.
Our Head of Asia Credit Strategy Kelvin Pang explains why investors would benefit from a broader fixed income market in Asia, with opportunities across more countries, local-currency credit and dollar-denominated bonds.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Kelvin Pang, Head of Asia Credit Strategy [at] Morgan Stanley.
Today – why the challenge in Asia fixed income may not be the region at all, but the way investors have traditionally looked at it.
It’s Tuesday, October 13th at 8am in Hong Kong.
Picture this. You’re shopping in a supermarket. As you walk down the aisles, you notice half of them are off limits. It’s unexpected.
Something similar has happened in Asia fixed income. The region’s fundamentals remain supportive, but the traditional investment universe has become increasingly constrained.
The pressure began in early 2023, when U.S. policy rates rose above those in much of Asia for the first time since before the Global Financial Crisis. The environment that had supported Asian bond markets for years turned upside down.
Consider Asia-dollar credit. Issuers have increasingly turned to cheaper local-currency financing, which is shrinking dollar-bond supply. Asia-dollar credit is now on track for a fifth straight year of negative net supply. At the same time, investment-grade spreads have tightened to 55 basis points. That makes Asia investment-grade credit the most tightly valued major credit market globally.
And investors have taken notice of this. Assets in dedicated Asia credit and high-yield funds have fallen 62 percent from their 2021 peak – from roughly $75 billion USD to around $29 billion USD.
But we feel Asia itself is not the problem. In fact, Asia Pacific nominal GDP could rise from $41 trillion USD in 2025 to [$]54 trillion by 2031. That would account [for] roughly one-third of global nominal GDP growth over that period.
And most importantly investment is also accelerating. Asia’s capital spending could rise from $11 trillion to [$]16 trillion by 2030. That would mark the strongest industrial cycle since the mid-2000s. And we think this extends well beyond AI, with energy, defense, and broader industrial investment all playing major roles.
The key issue here is how investors have traditionally looked at Asia. They basically need a bigger map.
That broader map is what we call APAC fixed income. Traditional Asia fixed income has largely focused on U.S.-dollar credit and local-currency government bonds across emerging Asia. APAC fixed income adds convertible bonds and local-currency corporate credit. It also brings Japan and Australia into the mix.
So, what’s the advantage of this broader map? You see, each of these pieces behaves differently. Convertible bonds let investors participate in regional growth through their equity link. APAC dollar credit plays a more defensive role, with a mostly investment-grade, U.S.-dollar-denominated profile. Local-currency rates provide exposure to interest rates, currencies and the economic cycle. At the same time, local-currency corporate credit broadens credit and sector exposure.
Together, they create a more flexible mix of risks across changing economic conditions. For example, when growth and inflation rise together, convertible bonds can benefit from their equity link. In a recession, currency-hedged local bonds can benefit from falling rates while limiting foreign-exchange risk. During stagflation, dollar credit can offer more defensive characteristics.
Our portfolio analysis since 2023 suggests a diversified APAC fixed-income portfolio could target a 7.5 percent return with a vol[atility] of roughly 4 percent, depending on allocation constraints. Investors also increasingly need to manage currency exposure as the dollar cycle shifts.
For years, investors could navigate Asian bonds with a relatively narrow toolkit. Today’s market demands more flexibility. The opportunity in Asia has not disappeared. The better question may be whether investors are looking at enough of it.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
Energy costs are a key election issue and AI data centers are adding to the debate. Our Head of Public Policy Research Ariana Salvatore looks at policy discussions in Washington that could determine how the U.S. powers its next technological boom.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of Public Policy Research at Morgan Stanley.
Today, I'll discuss the growing energy demands of AI and what the government can do in response.
It's Monday, October 12th at 10am in New York.
Markets and policymakers are preparing for a potentially important debate following the November elections. The future of American energy infrastructure. And at the center of that debate is an increasingly urgent question: How can the U.S. build enough power infrastructure to support the AI investment cycle – without passing the costs on to everyday electricity consumers?
Late last month, lawmakers in Congress introduced the bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act. That legislation represents a significant effort to reform federal permitting. But importantly, it also includes provisions that require data centers to cover the transmission costs associated with their projects.
We think that's a notable development, particularly as we think about the legislative agenda after the November elections. Of course, the path forward still remains uncertain given substantial policy differences and a limited legislative calendar after the elections.
But why might this matter for markets?
Well, first, it's worth considering the scale of the energy challenge. My colleague Stephen Byrd and his team recently updated their projections for the U.S. data center power shortfall. They now see a potential 57-gigawatt gap through 2028, and that's before accounting for new solutions that could accelerate access to power. That's up from their previous estimate of 38-gigawatts.
And that's why the permitting proposal is so important. There are two elements that I'd highlight.
First is the effort to accelerate infrastructure development. The bill would reform federal environmental reviews and provide greater certainty for projects that have already received approvals. We think that can help reduce delays and uncertainty around new energy projects, although permitting reform alone won't resolve constraints involving equipment, labor, or grid capacity.
The second element is the growing focus on who pays for the infrastructure, and here the proposal actually builds on an existing policy initiative. Earlier this year, a number of hyperscalers signed on to the Ratepayer Protection Pledge.
That's a voluntary agreement under which companies commit to securing the electricity needed for their data centers and pay for associated power infrastructure upgrades rather than passing the costs on to residential consumers. The pledge was subsequently expanded to include a broader group of utilities, developers, and state participants.
Now, what's different about the permitting reform bill is its potential shift from voluntary commitments toward federal requirements. In particular, the proposal would require data centers to cover their associated transmission costs.
That's an area where we think policymakers from both parties appear to share concerns about electricity affordability, even though they may disagree over the broader approach to energy policy.
Looking beyond the elections, we think that creates two related policy catalysts for investors to watch.
The first is whether Congress can reach an agreement on permitting reform that helps accelerate the construction of energy infrastructure. And second, whether lawmakers move to establish a more formal cost-sharing requirement for data centers.
The eventual policy mix, we think, could influence both the timing and the economics of new projects. Faster approvals could make some investments more attractive. But requiring developers to absorb additional transmission costs could also change where projects are built and which power solutions they pursue. A changing policy framework could also reinforce the importance of alternatives.
Of course, legislation is far from guaranteed. The elections will shape the political environment in which these negotiations continue, and any final agreement could differ substantially from the current proposal.
But stepping back, I think there's a broader takeaway.
For much of the AI investment cycle, the focus has been on the pace of technological innovation and capital spending. Increasingly, though, policy decisions around electricity infrastructure, permitting, and affordability could become just as important in determining how quickly that investment translates into operational capacity.
The permitting bill is an early indication of how D.C. may approach those challenges after the elections. And for investors, the central question may be less about how much companies are willing to spend on AI and more about how quickly and at what cost they can secure the power needed to support it.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
Markets have remained resilient despite the prospect of higher-for-longer rates. Our Global Head of Fixed Income Research Andrew Sheets considers the risks building beneath the surface.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley.
Today, exploring further the question that seems to be on everyone's mind: At what point do higher rates become a problem for markets?
It's Friday, October 9th, at 2pm in London.
We recently hosted Morgan Stanley's ninth annual European Credit Conference here in London. Fifty companies, over a thousand investors, and to some extent, one dominating question.
The market has been impressively resilient this year – but as yields rise, at what point does this change?
I think a good place to start with this question is whether the current level of interest rates are obviously wrong. And I don't think it's clear that they are. Growth in the U.S., Europe, and Asia remains surprisingly robust and has for a lot of this year. Meanwhile, inflation across regions is still generally above central bank targets.
Too high, and a sign that conditions are more likely too hot than too cold. That's the opposite of what the wrong level of rates would imply – as rates that were too high would be curtailing activity and pushing inflation down below target.
Thanks in part to the scale of AI spending and how insensitive the spending has been to the level of interest rates; we're just not seeing this.
I think the yield curve is also confirming this message that the level of rates for now is okay. In an environment where the market thinks that central banks have raised rates too much, it will often so-call invert the yield curve. Pushing short-term interest rates above longer-term ones on the belief that rates that are too high today will need to be lowered when conditions weaken in the future.
We're not seeing that, and that is, I think, a pretty important indicator.
At the risk of being pedantic, I think there's also the premise of the question around resilience. At one level, without a doubt, markets have been impressively solid given the large rise in yields this year. U.S. and European stocks have been posting double-digit gains. Credit spreads, a measure of risk premium, sit near multi-decade lows.
But under the surface, that resilience isn't so apparent. Spreads on the lowest-rated credits, so-called triple CCCs, have increased significantly this year across both the U.S. and Europe. Publicly traded BDCs, which contain portfolios of lower-rated private credit, have traded at widening discounts to their book value.
And even in the mighty U.S. stock market, my colleague Mike Wilson and our U.S. equity strategy team note that over half of the 3000 largest stocks have seen a drawdown of at least 20 percent since June, which happens to be the month that yields started to rise.
2026 may be showing that global growth overall is just less sensitive to higher rates than was initially expected. Large government deficits in the U.S., Europe, and Asia, and large spending on AI may be two reasons why. With growth strong and inflation still too high, rates may be simply seeking out a level that they think will keep things in balance.
But the interest rate that helps balance – this technology and spending boom – are not the same rates that keep a smaller, weaker, or a more indebted company happy. If higher rates are needed to balance things overall, the weaker tails of the market can still suffer.
We've seen this in the past, particularly 2005. Back then, a large U.S. government deficit, booming China CapEx, and significant U.S. housing wealth all helped push up rates. The overall econom y held up for several more years. But weaker parts of the credit market were challenged by those rates more quickly.
We think the same may be true today and therefore favor an upper quality bias. We favor high-yield bonds over loans and decompression across credit indices.
Thank you as always for your time. If you find Thoughts on the Market useful, let us know by leaving a review wherever you listen. And also tell a friend or colleague about us today.
U.S. mortgage rates are hovering around their highest levels in three years. Morgan Stanley Co-Heads of Securitized Products Research Jay Bacow and James Egan examine the forces keeping homeowners locked in and buyers priced out of the housing market.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Jay Bacow: Jim, [we’re] getting a lot of questions about mortgage rates. We've been flying across the country talking to people. Are your arms tired?
James Egan: I'm hoping that all the extra flapping will give them just a little bit more definition so we can show them off as we talk about adjustable-rate mortgages.
Jay Bacow: And that is the definition of an ARM. Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Jay Bacow, co-head of Securitized Products Research at Morgan Stanley.
James Egan: And I'm Jim Egan, the other co-head of Securitized Products Research at Morgan Stanley
Jay Bacow: Today, we're here to talk about mortgage rates: how quickly they've moved, why they're here, where they might go, and what it means for the mortgage and housing market.
It's Thursday, October 8th, at 9am in New York.
Jim, as of this recording, the 10-year is over 5.3 percent. Rates haven't closed this high since 2002. The 30-year mortgage rate is around 7.5 percent. It’s about 150 basis points up since the beginning of February.
James Egan: Right. There have been quick moves in rates that has led to quick moves in mortgage rates. There are a lot of implications to that – from affordability, the housing market, mortgage market.
But when we think about the relationship between mortgage rates and interest rates, Jay, there's also a feedback mechanism there. Convexity hedging is what it's typically called.
Can you discuss the role that that might have played in this current episode? And what we should expect going forward?
Jay Bacow: Sure. So, the biggest driver of mortgage rates is Treasury rates. And Treasury rates are driven by a number of factors, and right now most people would point to inflation expectations and geopolitical concerns.
However, as Treasury rates go higher, homeowners that currently have a mortgage are less likely to move. And because they're less likely to move, that means that the average life of those mortgages that investors own gets longer.
And because mortgage investors typically want to keep their duration profile constant – as the average life of those mortgages gets longer, they are then going to need to either sell those mortgages or sell Treasuries, which will cause yields to go even higher.
And there's a bit of a feedback loop on that, which can pressure yields and mortgage rates even higher.
But what we would say is, at this point, we don't think there's a huge mechanism of that going through at this rate level. The average mortgage rate that homeowners have in America is almost exactly 4.5 percent. Obviously, they're less likely to move as rates go up. But they're 300 basis points out of the money.
So, from that point, it matters. But it didn't matter as much as when rates were a little lower. However, Jim, 7.5 percent mortgage rate – what does this do for housing affordability? Can you put that in context?
James Egan: Yeah. So, if we just think about this in terms of what a 7.5 percent mortgage rate implies for the monthly payment on the median-priced home, we are now up over $325 dollars if we use that 7.5 percent – assuming home prices are where they are today, incomes are where they are today.
That monthly payment's up over $325 from where we are at local lows in February; or where we were at local lows in February. That's a 17 percent increase, in terms of that monthly payment over just a seven-month period.
Jay Bacow: Alright, so, 17 percent increase over a seven-month period, that's kind of scary.
But as you and I have talked about in the past, given the fixed rate nature of the U.S. mortgage market, it's a tad misleading for the average homeowner in America.
So, what does this do to sales? Obviously, it's scary for new homeowners, though.
James Egan: Right. Look, you brought up the implications from a duration perspective, a convexity hedging perspective. All of this is just how the lock-in effect continues to have material implications for the housing market, for mortgage markets.
But yes, these affordability issues – not that bad for homeowners who have an average rate below 4.5 percent. That's not changing. Over 90 percent of the balance or count of mortgages, depending on how you want to look at it, in the United States remains fixed rate. Their payments aren't changing, right?
But the marginal home buyer, things are getting less affordable. I don't like to use the term demand destruction. I think that sounds a little bit too over the top here. But like we are seeing some of our higher frequency or more leading indicator demand metrics show a little bit of softening here.
Pending home sales, past two months, 3 to 5 percent down year-over-year. Purchase applications, which had been very strong, in September, they were down about 10 percent year-over-year. So, look, we were seeing a little bit of demand increases this year. We were up about 2 percent year-to-date through July.
It's a small increase off of a very, very low base. But we think you're going to see with rates at these levels, if we maintain these levels, is effectively the probability or any real ability of the market to escape to the upside from an activity perspective? That probability keeps coming down. And we're going to be stuck in this turnover, very range-bound, lowest level of sales as a percentage of the housing market in 40 years.
Jay Bacow: So really low activity, what does that do to prices? Is there some flow through? Is there relief coming?
James Egan: Look, as demand softens, the kind of first-order expectation or the heuristic should be that prices should soften as well. But again, lock-in effect; what we've actually seen is the rate of growth for existing listings at these levels has slowed. And it's slowed pretty materially.
That's actually led to home price appreciation accelerating over the past few months. We've gone from just 0.7 or 0.8 percent four months ago to 1.9 percent for the data that we just received. We think that that level is kind of sustainable here, and we're going to be between like roughly 2 percent, give or take, for the remainder of this year.
Now, you and I have both been mentioning the lock-in effect throughout the course of this. Yes, an overwhelming majority of the market is fixed rate right now. But the media, our conversations with clients, there's been a lot of discussion of potentially a growing share of adjustable-rate mortgages to kind of help the marginal homeowner with affordability.
What are we seeing in ARMs right now?
Jay Bacow: Okay. Yeah, so great question, and we are seeing a pickup in ARM issuance. If we look at the percentage of mortgages that were ARMs through the first half of this year and compare them to the percentage of ARMs in the first half of last year, it's increased by about 1 percent on aggregate issuance. It's went from about a little over 15 percent to a little over 16 percent.
And so, 1 percent increase is not a huge number by itself, but when we're talking about a little over $2 trillion of expected issuance in the course of the year across the entire mortgage market, this does help on the margin. And we do think, as we said in the past, that more uptake of ARMs would likely be a little bit of a positive solution to some of the affordability challenges.
But Jim, if people take out more ARMs, recognizing that most people only have two arms, should we be worrying about a repeat of the financial crisis and lending standards?
James Egan: So, this is a question that we get a lot when we start talking about moving away from fixed-rate mortgages. And the point that I want to stress; that we want to stress here, is not all ARMs are created equal…
Jay Bacow: Mine are stronger than yours?
James Egan: Sure, we'll go with that. But also, if we control for borrower characteristics, right? Credit scores, loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-income ratios, right? And then we compare performance of adjustable-rate mortgages to fixed-rate mortgages, 7-1 ARMs, 10-1 ARMs, they perform very much like fixed-rate mortgages.
It's really the short-reset ARMs, what we'll call affordability products. So, they only have 24-month or 36-month fixed periods. Those are what have historically showed a much higher rate of default and something that would get us a little bit more concerned about lending standards if those were the products we're talking about.
Thankfully, they're not right now. The ARM growth that we're seeing is in the 5-1, 7-1, 10-1 space. Those have historically, again, controlling for borrower performance, performed like fixed-rate mortgages. And so, we think that you can expand mortgage product into ARMs and do it responsibly.
Jay Bacow: All right. Jim, always a pleasure speaking with you.
James Egan: And always great speaking to you too, Jay. And to all of our regular listeners out there, thank you for adding us to your playlist. Let us know what you think wherever you get this podcast, and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
Jay Bacow: Go smash that subscribe button.
The AI investment boom has been a defining force in markets. Our Head of Public Policy Research Ariana Salvatore looks at whether the U.S. midterm elections could change the spending and policies behind it.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of Public Policy Research at Morgan Stanley.
Today, what the midterms could mean for the AI investment cycle.
It's Wednesday, October 7th at 10am in New York.
I've spoken on this podcast before about the broader implications of the midterm elections.
This time, I want to go a little deeper on what they could mean specifically for AI sentiment.
We think about that through two separate channels. The first is data center opposition, where we do think the elections can be an important catalyst. The second is broader AI safety and regulation, where we think the election outcome matters much less.
And that distinction is important. It suggests that the midterms are more likely to influence investor confidence in the pace and the durability of AI infrastructure spending, rather than fundamentally rewriting the rules governing AI.
Let's start with data centers. Our base case is still a conditional build-out. We still expect substantial AI infrastructure investment, but increasingly subject to conditions around things like power costs, grid investment, siting, permitting, water use, and community impact. We don't expect a broad federal pause on data center development.
AI compute is increasingly being viewed in Washington as strategic infrastructure, particularly when you consider competition with China. So, we think that national security framing should remain supportive of the build-out.
But here's the important point for these elections. Many of the policy levers that can actually delay a project sit well below the federal level. Think about things like interconnection approvals, large load electricity tariffs, zoning, water permits, and tax abatements. Those are all generally controlled by states, utility commissions, and local governments.
So, when it comes to AI infrastructure, we actually think governors, state legislatures, and public utility commissions may ultimately matter more than control of any one Senate seat in particular.
And that brings us to sentiment.
At the federal level, we think a Republican sweep would likely be the most constructive outcome for AI infrastructure sentiment. Now, that's because investors would likely expect fewer regulatory constraints ahead. As well as a greater likelihood of active support for permitting reform, additional power generation, and development on federal land.
A divided government outcome, we think, looks closer to the status quo. It would preserve questions about the durability of the build-out, but the gridlock in D.C. would also leave many of the substantive decisions at the state and local level.
And lastly, we think a Democratic sweep would be the least constructive outcome for sentiment. Now, importantly, that doesn't mean that we expect a nationwide data center moratorium, as I said. Rather, investors could interpret Democratic outperformance as increasing the probability of tighter local restrictions in the near term, and potentially much more federal scrutiny after the next 2028 elections.
So that's the infrastructure side. What about AI regulation more broadly? Here, we think the midterms are actually much less consequential. Our expectation remains for incremental and fragmented regulation rather than a sweeping new federal regime.
AI safety, data governance, and frontier model oversight, we think can certainly see targeted action. But we just don't think congressional composition by itself is likely to trigger comprehensive legislation – unless there's a sufficiently high-profile safety or security incident. Executive agencies are also likely to remain the more important actors on tech restrictions and model access.
And that gets us to the main takeaway for investors. The midterms probably won't determine whether the AI investment cycle continues. We think the strategic case for expanding U.S. compute capacity remains intact.
What they can influence, however, is the friction around that build-out. Where the projects get built, how quickly they receive approval? Who bears the cost? And ultimately, how confident investors are in the durability of AI CapEx?
So, when we think about what happens in November through an AI lens, we'll be watching D.C. But in many cases, the more important signals can come from governors' races, utility commissions, and local elections – because that's where the politics of AI are increasingly meeting the physical constraints of actually building it.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
Our Japan Financials Analyst Mia Nagasaka explains why a once-in-30-year investment cycle could transform corporate financing and open a new chapter for Japanese banks.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Mia Nagasaka, Head of Japan Financials Research at Morgan Stanley MUFG Securities.
Today – a once-in-30-year investment cycle is changing how investors think about Japanese banks.
It’s Tuesday, October 6th, at 10am in Tokyo.
For decades, Japanese companies had more cash than investment opportunities. But now it's changing.
This marks a new chapter for Japanese banks. The first stage of recovery was largely about interest rates. As Japan moved away from negative rates, higher lending yields helped bank margins and earnings.
This next stage is about growth in the banking business itself, driven by companies investing more and needing more external capital.
In fact, we think Japan is entering its first meaningful capex cycle in nearly three decades. Investment needs are broadening, from labor-saving technology to the replacement of aging equipment. Companies are also becoming more active in reallocating capital toward businesses where they see stronger returns.
For banks, the most direct opportunity is lending. We expect Japan’s domestic loan market to grow from about 588 trillion yen, or roughly 3.7 trillion U.S. dollars, in the fiscal year ending March 2026 to roughly 712 trillion yen, or about 4.5 trillion dollars, by March 2031. Loan growth could run at around 5 percent annually early in the investment cycle, then settle at about 3 to 4 percent.
And the financing opportunity extends beyond loans. Take Japan’s debt capital markets, where companies raise money by issuing bonds. We expect them to grow from about 52 trillion yen, or roughly 331billion dollars, to 63 trillion yen, or about 401 billion dollars, by March 2031. We also forecast the M&A market to rise from 23 trillion yen, or roughly 146 billion dollars, to 32 trillion yen, or about 204 billion dollars, over the same period. Large projects often need several forms of financing, so lending can open the door to underwriting and advisory fees as well.
This gives banks more ways to generate earnings. In the early phase, banks can benefit mainly from lending and project finance. As projects mature, fee-based businesses such as capital markets and M&A can contribute more. This makes the opportunity look less like a short-lived lending boom and more like a multi-stage financing cycle.
The key measure to watch is return on equity, which shows how effectively a bank turns shareholder capital into profit. Japan’s megabanks are currently generating ROEs of roughly 10 to 11 percent. We see a path toward around 15 percent over the medium term. Structural growth in corporate financing demand alone could add about 1 to 1.5 percentage points.
So, the bigger story is not simply that rates have risen. Japan may be moving from an economy defined by excess savings and underinvestment toward one where companies need capital to grow. If that transition continues, banks could have substantially more productive opportunities to deploy their balance sheets.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
Recent headlines about Canada have focused on trade uncertainty and weak productivity. But our Global Economist Arunima Sinha explains why the country may be on the cusp of a stronger, investment-led growth cycle.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Arunima Sinha: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Arunima Sinha from Morgan Stanley's Global and U.S. Economics teams.
Today, why Canada's economy may be closer to a new growth phase.
It's Monday, October 5th at 10am in New York.
Canada has been in the news recently. There have been lots of headlines related to trade, around population growth, around weak productivity, years of underinvestment. And those are real constraints, and they have weighed on the near-term outlook.
At Morgan Stanley, we are more constructive on the medium-term outlook for Canada. And we recently wrote a report around this along with our strategists titled, “Canada: The Next Acceleration.” And, from our perspective, we think that the near-term uncertainty around trade is actually clouding the opportunity for global investors.
There are three points that we make in the report.
We estimate that the growth model in Canada over the next three to four years can actually pivot from the export-led growth story that we've seen over the past few years into one that emphasizes capital deepening and greater technological diffusion across the economy.
So, it really is about the domestic build-out and the opportunity in shifting away from trade and export-led growth into a more productive economy – that's not just larger over time but can actually grow at a much faster pace as well. And so, by our estimates, we think that potential growth in Canada could feasibly rise from about 1.5 percent to closer to 1.75 percent.
The way that we see it, this really doesn't require things to start from scratch. There are already large capital pipelines that are in place. But one of the things that we do note is that a lot of these pipelines are actually concentrated in a few sectors.
So, about half of these are in utilities and oil and gas, transportation. These sectors together combine about 13 to 14 percent of the gross value add for the economy. But they actually account for more than half of the announced capital pipelines. And so, for the money that's going into the economy – and a lot of this is going into structures – it's not going as much into machinery and equipment.
And so, while the capital build-out is going to support the widening, we also need to think about crowding in private investment into other sectors. And some of these other sectors that we've identified in the note, such as finance, information services, that have historically had much greater gains in productivity – they would need to see bigger capital intentions as well.
The other opportunity that we identify for the Canadian growth model is – although the near-term population growth has been slowing, it doesn't actually change the longer run demographic picture. We looked at what the numbers would be for the working age population growth for Canada, taking 2025 as a starting point. And what we see is that Canadian working age population is going to rise by about 3 percent by 2035, by 5 percent by 2040, and 6 percent by 2045.
Meanwhile, most of the developed economy peers are going to see shrinkage in their working age populations. And so that is really going to give Canada a window into the rest of the 2030s to continue to accelerate its growth model.
From our perspective, the test for the next few years is going to be whether the investment that's being undertaken in a few sectors spreads beyond the big projects. And it really lifts productivity across the economy. Construction, manufacturing, agriculture, and wholesale will be especially important because they are machinery intensive, technology adoption remains low, and recent productivity gaps are large.
If those sectors begin to improve, Canada could enter the 2030s with a much stronger growth engine than it has today. And in our perspective, Canada's potential growth could actually pivot from being about 1.5 percent today to entering the 2030s with close to 2 percent in potential output growth.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share our Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
Our Global Head of Fixed Income Research Andrew Sheets examines what rising rates could mean for equity valuations, earnings and investor appetite.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley.
Today, thinking about equity resilience in the face of rising bond yields.
It's Friday, October 2nd at 2pm in London.
The benchmark U.S. 10-year Treasury yield has risen about 100 basis points this year. Global equities, at the same time, are up about 13 percent. And those two facts sit in an uncomfortable tension.
After all, higher bond yields give investors better return options elsewhere, and they also make future corporate profits worth less today, which in theory should push stock prices lower.
But there's a wrinkle here.
That valuation theory actually has two moving parts. What we're referring to here is what we would call a dividend discount model or a Gordon Growth Model, where the value of a company today is worth the value of its dividends divided by the difference of its required rate of return and its growth rate.
The higher the required rate of return, which interest rates push up, hurts a stock valuation. It increases the denominator. But a higher growth rate, well, that works in the opposite direction. That decreases the denominator. It makes the company worth more.
Hopefully, this is intuitive. if a company has to meet a higher return hurdle, it will be worth less today. If a company's growing faster, all else equal, it's worth more. And that, we think, goes a long way to actually explain what's going on in markets today. Because corporate profits are growing quickly.
Over the last year, profits for the S&P 500 are up about 30 percent, and the earnings growth for the median company, well, that's still up in the mid-teens. Growth in Europe, Asia, and emerging markets have also been historically strong.
Indeed, if you'd told me on January 1st that the S&P 500 would be up about 13 percent, and at the same time, U.S. Treasury yields would be up about 100 basis points, I probably would have told you with reasonable confidence that stocks would look more expensive relative to bonds.
But they don't. The valuation of the equity market, the P/E ratio, has fallen significantly as yields have risen. But because earnings have risen so much more, stocks are still higher. And the so-called equity risk premium, the difference between the earnings yield and the bond yield, it's pretty stable year to date.
Now there's another way that higher yields could hurt the stock market. They could simply cause people to sell their stocks and buy those higher yielding bonds. But so far, we're not seeing evidence of that. The flows that we track continue to show money flowing into both stocks and bonds.
And the two markets are moving in the same direction day to day. They're showing positive correlation, which is not the outcome you'd expect if people were shifting money from one to the other.
There's also an interesting way that companies have a say in this debate. Investors every day look at the market and decide if these yields are high enough that they want to buy them. But companies look at the same yield and say, "Is this low enough that we would want to sell?" And so especially for the companies that are funding the AI build-out – these large technology companies with so much AI spending to do. Many of them, even at these higher yields, are still saying these are attractive levels to issue at. And are more attractive than, say, issuing more stock.
The other factor that's always important to keep in mind whenever we're debating long-term valuation questions between stocks and bonds, or really any asset class, is that valuation is a slow-moving force. It is often not terribly predictive of the next six or even 12 months. Indeed, if we think about the difference between the earnings yield on the equity market, the inverse of the P/E ratio, and what the bond market yields, that difference. Well, that difference only explains about 10 percent of returns between stocks and bonds over the next month.
Now, valuation is more powerful the longer you give it. And so, extend that horizon out over the next three years and that valuation gap between bonds and equities, well, explains about half the three-year outcome.
Markets are not equations that are solved once a quarter. They are ongoing arguments about the future. And when growth is strong, investors are simply more willing to give growth and that future potential the benefit of the doubt.
We think this goes a long way to helping to explain the equity market's resilience despite Treasury yields moving well above five percent. But it's also raising the bar.
Higher yields simply leave less room for earnings disappointment. Those profits need to keep growing quickly.
Thank you, as always, for your time. If you find Thoughts on the Market useful, let us know by leaving a review wherever you listen. And also tell a friend or colleague about us today.
Betsy Graseck and Michael Cyprys explore how AI could expand advisor capacity and tokenized assets could grow into a $2.3 trillion market by 2030.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Betsy Graseck: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Betsy Graseck, Morgan Stanley's Global Head of Banks and Diversified Finance Research.
Michael Cyprys: And I'm Mike Cyprys, Head of U.S. Brokers, Asset Managers, and Exchanges Research at Morgan Stanley.
Betsy Graseck: Today, we're looking at the next phase of growth across asset and wealth management – and how tokenization, AI, and changing investor flows could reshape the industry.
It's Thursday, October 1st at 9am in New York City.
Assets under management, or AUM, are near record highs across the globe, with a lot changing beneath the surface. Now, much of the recent AUM growth has come from markets rather than from net new client flows. And meanwhile, fees do remain under pressure.
At the same time, technologies like AI and tokenization are creating new opportunities for both asset and wealth managers. Our base case has tokenized real world assets growing from roughly [$]40 billion today to about [$]2.3 trillion by 2030.
Mike, let's start with tokenization. What are the use cases that matter most near term?
Michael Cyprys: So, as we think about it, there's a number of use cases that we see. The most compelling ones really are around cash treasuries and collateral. Take for example, earning yield. Some tokenized funds allow you to earn interest by the minute or the second that is invested rather than having to remain invested by that 4pm cutoff that is the case today.
Another benefit is allowing collateral to move around a lot more easily, and this can help support a shift toward 24/7 markets. So, if securities can trade 24/7 – or derivatives – you may also need the cash leg of that transaction to keep pace. Right now, there are certain futures contracts that do trade over a weekend, but those positions do need to be pre-funded on Friday.
So that's going to limit perhaps the full uptake for that of 24/7 until you can get the movement of the collateral to keep pace. And that's where tokenization can come in to help solve a real market need.
There's also trapped collateral that's just sitting around the world, where institutions and corporates just keep pockets of liquidity in different places just in case they need it at a moment's notice. There’s a cost to that while it sits idle. But tokenization can allow for just more just-in-time movement of money, say with tokenized deposits, tokenized money funds, or stable coins.
And another use case is around investors outside the U.S. that may not have as easy access to U.S. markets. But tokenization can help lower barriers, reduce frictions, and allow for greater access to U.S. market exposure. Private markets get a lot of attention, but we think that's maybe a little bit further out.
So, to put some numbers around this, today there's around [$]40 billion of tokenized real-world assets. So, think tokenized stocks, bonds, funds. In our base case, we could see that growing to about [$]2.3 trillion by 2030, with a vast majority tied to these collateral mobility and reserve and treasury management use cases.
Betsy Graseck: Pulling up a notch, we are expecting assets under management to reach about [$]247 trillion by 2030. But revenue growth is expected to lag asset growth. Mike, what really separates the firms that can grow above market trends you expect?
Michael Cyprys: Yeah. So, as you said, most of the growth is going to be driven by market beta, right? So, we have expectation for about 9 percent growth annually in assets under management for about $160 trillion globally today to about $250 trillion by 2030. We expect about three-quarters of that growth rate comes from market beta, which leaves you around 2.5 percent for organic asset growth.
So, growing just AUM with the market is not going to really be enough to differentiate. And so, as we think about, you know, how one can differentiate? First, I think it comes down to where one is positioned across the industry. We do see flows concentrating in passive solutions and selected private markets, and the economics can be pretty different there as well.
Another way to differentiate is through distribution. Wealth, retirement, model portfolios, customized solutions, all of those channels are becoming much more important. And so, you want to be closer to where that asset allocation decision is actually getting made.
And another point of differentiation is around operating leverage, and that's where AI comes in, which I'm sure is a topic we're going to get to in a little bit. That we think can help allow money managers to expand research coverage, can allow salespeople to cover more clients, allow for adding more products and customization without adding necessarily a lot more people and cost at the same rate.
So, look, bottom line, I'd say, we think above market growth from having the right products, the right distribution, getting them in front of the right clients, and the technology to scale that just a lot more efficiently.
Betsy Graseck: And how important is that AI tool going to be, in your opinion, for separating yourself from the pack? And is it more top-line generative or cost efficiency generative?
Michael Cyprys: I think it's critical. It's both. I think it changes the competitive game because a lot of the economics are very different across the businesses, right? Take passive and index investing, for example, that continues to take share.
It's a low-fee business, so there scale really matters. In solutions and private markets, the revenue opportunity is better, but you need more capabilities and distribution reach. And in private markets, origination is also key, as well as distribution, right?
You can have private credit or an infrastructure product out there in the marketplace. But if you can't get it into a wealth or retirement or insurance channels, then you're leaving a lot of growth on the table.
And then with traditional active, performance still matters, but the wrapper is key. Distribution matters more so than ever, and active ETFs are a great example of that.
Betsy Graseck: And one question on AI is: How far along do you think it is in your coverage embedded already in the workflow and the processes across your group, your asset managers?
Michael Cyprys: So, we're pretty early days here. A lot of firms, already have AI tools today: RFP tools, sales tools, tools within the operational and distribution side.
But saving someone, you know, 10 minutes on a task doesn't necessarily show up in the P&L, right? You need to start removing entire steps from workflows. And then using that time savings to cover more clients, to launch more products, do more research, and ultimately slow the pace of hiring.
And that's where we think the industry needs to move towards, away from these, sort of, point solutions into an enterprise workflow. And that is tools that connect across the entire organization, underpinned by the same data and the same controls. And our work suggests that this could be pretty meaningful over time, perhaps up to as much as 15 points worth of operating margin improvement – for the leaders over time. But we don't assume that all falls to the bottom line.
We expect it to – you know, a lot of that's going to get reinvested, and a portion probably also gets competed away. And when we look at our forecasts for the money managers we cover, I'd say we have modest improvement in operating margins over the next couple of years.
And, to your point, on cost versus revenue, we may actually see it on the revenue side first, as it can help allow for more client touches, broader coverage, and faster product development.
Betsy Graseck: Okay. So, or as you mentioned, early days.
How do you see AI and tokenization impacting either the leverage opportunities, the operating leverage opportunities, or the revenue growth opportunities? Let's start with AI.
Michael Cyprys: We think that the potential here is to really improve the capacity to serve clients. As you think about today, the time that advisors spend actually not talking to clients, right? When you think about time that they're spending on meeting prep or research, notes, follow-ups, onboarding.
And that's a lot of administrative work that is wrapped up, in terms of the advisor’s relationship there. And our work suggests that call it about half of that advisor time could be freed up.
Then advisor capacity could increase upwards of 30 to 40 percent on our numbers, and that can also increase the quality and the experience that the clients receive.
We also see a broader opportunity beyond just the advisor. As you look across the advisor team and the organization, we see an overall cost to serve to come down quite materially.
And I know this is a question you didn't ask it, but that's out there. We don't see AI replacing financial advisors, particularly at the higher end, just given the importance of that trusted relationship. And if anything, the value of that advisor probably goes up, particularly just given there's so much change happening around the world every which way you look. And then you overlay that with the aging demographic trends.
We actually think there could be a bull market for advice as we look ahead. And AI could be that tool to enable the industry to execute on that market opportunity set and also help expand the TAM in terms of the ability of the industry to capture that opportunity set and bring advice to more people than was ever possible before.
Betsy Graseck: And this would be incremental to your growth outlook that you indicated earlier of 7 percent?
Michael Cyprys: This could be incremental…
Betsy Graseck: Okay!
Michael Cyprys: ... to that opportunity potentially over time.
Betsy Graseck: Anything on tokenization that is an opportunity for wealth managers?
Michael Cyprys: Oh, absolutely. And I think that we're really, really early days; just scratching the surface on this in tokenization and wealth.
You know, I think one way to frame tokenization and wealth is it could just make the client balance sheet that much more productive.
And this creates some risk as we talk about in the report for the traditional wealth model with respect to sweep cash and the monetization of that, right? If clients hold less idle cash, that could put some pressure on deposit and sweep economics. But that could also be offset by new lending opportunities at the same time.
So, wealth firms need to be able to support tokenized assets and lending capabilities without losing that client relationship to someone else's platform. And that's why longer term, the wallet or the client interface becomes pretty important – because that's where the investments, cash borrowing, payments, all of that comes together.
Betsy Graseck: And all of this happening right ahead of Nasdaq and NYSE's December 6th, a big event.
Michael Cyprys: That's right. U.S. equity markets are going 23/5 on December 6th.
Betsy Graseck: Meaning that the only hours they will be closed every day are between...
Michael Cyprys: 8 and 9pm.
Betsy Graseck: And that's on a pathway to 24/7 ultimately, you believe?
Michael Cyprys: That's our expectation, as you have other disruptors around the world that are looking to provide retail with access to 24/7 markets.
Betsy Graseck: Exciting times, Mike. As you indicated in the beginning, we have 79 percent growth with AI and tokenization potentially amping that up ahead of a pathway to a 24/7 market.
Michael Cyprys: Indeed.
Betsy Graseck: Thank you so much for joining us here on Thoughts on the Market, Mike.
Michael Cyprys: It's been great speaking with you, Betsy.
Betsy Graseck: And thank you for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen, and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.
As investors look toward the U.S. midterm elections, the biggest question is what could change. Our Head of U.S. Public Policy Research Ariana Salvatore outlines the signals worth watching.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of U.S. Public Policy Research at Morgan Stanley.
Today, I'll be talking about the upcoming 2026 midterm elections.
It's Wednesday, September 30th, at 10am in New York.
As the elections inch closer, investors are increasingly asking about potential ramifications. We just put out a deep dive covering our expectations, and we arrive at four key takeaways.
The first, midterms are unlikely to change the core executive-led policy agenda. As we've been noting for some time, a lot of the policy uncertainty that markets have dealt with since the beginning of 2025 has actually come from the executive branch rather than Congress.
Tariffs, trade policy, deregulation, immigration, and export controls are all variables that are going to remain within the White House's authority. So even if control of Congress changes, we don't think investors should assume that those parts of the policy agenda simply go away. Where Congress actually matters more is on fiscal policy. But even there, the range of outcomes is relatively narrow.
The main differences revolve around the timing of scheduled SNAP and Medicaid cuts, defense spending, and how future government funding and debt limit negotiations evolve.
So, that's our first takeaway. Midterms can change the mechanics of governing, but probably not the broader direction of the executive agenda. That means policy uncertainty, at least across those vectors I mentioned, is likely to stay high.
Takeaway number two, we'd be careful about treating the midterms as a direct signal for the 2028 presidential election. Historically, what we see is the issues that dominate a midterm don't necessarily translate to the next presidential race.
Looking at the six midterm-to-presidential cycles since 1994, the top-ranked issue changed in five of them. And the issue that ultimately proved decisive in the presidential election was actually already visible at the midterm in only two of the six cases. What elections can tell us, however, is where some of the policy fault lines are beginning to form.
We're watching four debates in particular in that context: the fiscal and Social Security debate, individual tax landscape, restrictions on data center development, and healthcare. In our view, across those variables, the useful signal isn't simply which party wins more seats. It's which versions of these policies are beginning to gain traction with voters and within the parties themselves.
That actually brings us to takeaway number three. AI is one area where the midterms could matter, but mainly through data center policy rather than broad AI regulation.
We think it's important to separate those two issues. So first, on data centers, we do see midterms as a catalyst. And that's because many of the most important policy levers sit at the state and local level: permitting, siting, grid interconnection, large load electricity rates, and tax incentives. So that means that the governorships, utility commissions, and state legislatures can actually have a much more immediate effect on the pace and the location of the build-out than Congress itself.
In that vein, our base case remains a conditional build-out, meaning the expected level of AI CapEx can continue. But likely it's going to increasingly concentrate in locations where developers can address concerns around things like electricity costs, infrastructure, water, and community impacts.
Broader AI safety regulation is different. Here, we think government configuration actually matters less, and that's because we see comprehensive federal legislation as pretty unlikely in the near term, absent a high salience event or incident. So congressional control is not necessarily the key driver.
And finally, takeaway number four: for markets, we see more micro implications than macro ones. For equities, the composition and cohesion of the congressional majority can matter for individual sectors. Congress that's able to negotiate changes to scheduled SNAP or Medicaid cuts, for example, could have implications for consumer and healthcare companies.
AI related sectors could also respond to changes in expectations and sentiment pertaining to data center restrictions. For rates, the key question is whether the election produces fiscal outcomes that materially change expected deficits.
United Republican control would be the only outcome preserving reconciliation as a potential vehicle. Divided government, conversely, would narrow the scope for new legislation and put more emphasis on funding and debt limit negotiations. And for the dollar, our strategists see the transmission mechanism running primarily through U.S. yields and the growth outlook rather than the election itself.
So, bottom line, we don't think the 2026 midterms are likely to produce a wholesale change in the policy or macro backdrop. But there will be important lessons to pick up along the way.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen. And share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
Our China Industrials Analyst Sheng Zhong explains how AI, robotics and a major investment cycle could transform China’s manufacturing base and its role in global supply chains.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Sheng Zhong: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Sheng Zhong, Morgan Stanley’s China Industrials analyst.
Today – how AI and automation are transforming China’s factories, and what that could mean for global manufacturing.
It’s Tuesday, September 29th, at 3 PM in Hong Kong.
For decades, Made in China has been shorthand for scale, speed, and low-cost manufacturing. Now the story is shifting toward something more ambitious: using technology, productivity, and industrial know-how to shape not just what gets made, but how it gets made.
We call this transition Industry 5.0. Industry 4.0 was about connecting machines and digitizing production. Industry 5.0 goes a step further, using AI to improve how factories schedule production, manage quality, and maintain equipment.
China is starting from a position of enormous scale. It represents roughly 28 percent of global manufacturing value-added and covers all 666 industrial subcategories defined by the United Nations. There are already more than 30,000 basic-level smart factories and more than 100 million connected industrial devices.
That industrial base also gives China a strong platform for robotics. Traditional industrial robots generally perform fixed tasks. Embodied AI could make machines more flexible, allowing them to gain new capabilities through software and updated models. That could effectively turn some physical labor into software-upgradable capital.
And the numbers give you a sense of how quickly this could scale. China could go from selling about 8 million robots a year in 2025 to 29 million in 2030, and 76 million by 2035. That’s roughly a ninefold increase in annual sales in just a decade.
Scaling robotics and AI across such a large manufacturing base will require a lot of capital. We estimate Industry 5.0 could generate about $12 trillion USD of incremental industrial investment in China from 2026 through 2035. Around $5.5 trillion USD would go toward factory upgrades, including robotics, smart equipment, and software, while roughly $6 trillion USD would support new industrial capacity.
But that investment cycle is likely to build gradually. We expect industrial capex growth of about 4 to 5 percent annually in 2026 and 2027, before accelerating toward 6 to 7 percent from 2028 as excess capacity is absorbed, technology bottlenecks ease, and AI adoption broadens across factories.
If that investment translates into higher productivity, the economic impact could be meaningful. By 2035, China’s industrial profit margin could rise to 8 percent from roughly 5 today. Industry 5.0 could lift China’s potential GDP level by around 3.5 percent, helping cushion some of the drag from an aging population. And China’s share of global manufacturing value-added could increase from about 28 percent to 30 percent.
And those changes would not stop at China’s borders. Final assembly can shift to new locations, but the supplier networks, machinery and production know-how behind it are much harder to replicate. We estimate only around 40 percent of China-to-U.S. exports can be readily substituted.
That means China’s role may increasingly extend beyond exporting finished goods to supplying the equipment, components and industrial systems used to make them elsewhere. That is the move from Made in China toward Made by China.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
Fewer companies have been driving equity market gains in 2026. Our CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist Mike Wilson looks at what investors should make of the narrowing rally as the year enters its final stretch.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Mike Wilson: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist.
Today on the podcast I’ll be discussing the Market’s Bad Breadth.
It's Monday, September 28th at 11:30 am in New York.
So, let’s get after it.
The market is up this year. That's the good news. But over the last six weeks, I've been watching something that’s giving me pause. This rally has been carried by a shrinking group of stocks.
More than half of the Russell 3000 is at least 20 percent below its June highs and the S&P 500 forward multiple has fallen to 19 times, close to a new low for the year. Meanwhile, earnings growth is still running in the mid-teens for the median stock and revisions breadth is approaching cycle highs for the S&P 500.
That is not complacency. It is a market that has already done a lot of work to price higher energy costs, a tighter Fed, AI disruption, questions around returns on capital, and geopolitical risk.
Last week on the podcast, I noted that this is classic mid-cycle behavior. Earnings are absorbing lower valuations, and quality is taking the baton from the early-cycle winners. Groups that have led powerfully from the rolling-recession trough have been among the weakest areas recently: Autos, Semis, and short-cycle Industrials.
That is what tends to happen when the cycle matures and the Fed turns less friendly. The market stops paying for high beta. And starts rewarding free cash flow, stable margins, operating efficiency, and earnings that are still being revised higher. That is why I continue to favor large-cap quality, particularly asset-light, services-oriented, and fee-based businesses.
Having said that, there is still one problem to resolve. Breadth improved through most of the summer even as crude and yields moved higher. The deterioration came after Jackson Hole. That’s when markets began discounting a more hawkish Fed reaction function. The percentage of S&P 500 stocks above their 200-day moving average fell from roughly 75 percent to below 50 percent, while the index held up much better.
That divergence cannot persist forever. Either breadth catches up to price, or the index comes down to meet breadth. If bond volatility does not settle down soon, it could spill over into equity vol and we would see the S&P 500 price come down about 5 or 10 percent.
Frankly, I would welcome it. A final index-level correction is often how a multi-month correction beneath the surface ends.
There has been a lot of focus on the Fed’s recent pivot to rate hikes. However, the two-year yield is already above the level implied by the Fed’s projections. To me this suggests the bond market has been leaning too hawkish in the near term.
The bigger uncertainty is how the new Fed Chairman approaches liquidity and the balance sheet. He is more of a monetarist than his predecessors, and markets are still trying to understand what that means in practice.
My expectation is that the Fed ultimately provides liquidity if financial conditions tighten too far. But markets may test that resolve first. Bond volatility, funding stress, and whether equity volatility follows are the key signals. If those pressures ease, breadth can catch up and drive the market higher. If they do not, the index probably has more correcting to do.
There is also a new, constructive story developing for investors: AI adoption is moving from promise to practice. Companies with higher AI adoption are seeing stronger margins and earnings trends, but consensus still assumes many of those benefits fade in the out-years.
We think that’s too conservative. Productivity gains tend to compound, not immediately disappear. Earnings momentum is broadening from enablers to adopters, while adopter valuations have reset to more attractive levels. That supports a barbell approach – own select enablers where earnings durability justifies the premium, but increasingly own adopters where improving fundamentals are not yet fully reflected in expectations.
Bottom line, the market is not ignoring risk. It has priced the risks through lower valuations, weaker breadth, and major leadership rotations. What remains unresolved is the gap between a resilient index and a much weaker average stock.
The answer is that we probably see breadth improve and the index level come in before a surge to new all time highs. That’s why, I still want to overweight large-cap quality, but use October weakness to add to riskier stocks.
The market may need one more uncomfortable adjustment. But that may be exactly what sets up a stronger finish to the year. I will be here to guide you.
Thanks for tuning in; I hope you found it informative and useful. Let us know what you think by leaving us a review. And if you find Thoughts on the Market worthwhile, tell a friend or colleague to try it out!
Morgan Stanley Research analysts Michelle Weaver, Ravi Shanker and Dave Arcaro discuss two industrial inflection points: how long it will be before autonomous trucking becomes a reality and why power infrastructure is racing to keep up with AI-driven demand.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Michelle Weaver: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michelle Weaver, Morgan Stanley's U.S. Thematic and Equity Strategist.
Ravi Shanker: I'm Ravi Shanker, Morgan Stanley's U.S. trade transportation analyst
Dave Arcaro: And I'm Dave Arcaro, Morgan Stanley's Utilities, Power & Clean Energy analyst.
Michelle Weaver: Today, what we learned at Morgan Stanley's Industrials Conference about the changing economics of autonomous trucking and the increasingly tight power market supporting the AI build-out.
It's Friday, September 25th at 10am in New York.
Now, I know we're all on the road taking meetings post-conference, so the audio might sound a little bit different, but we wanted to bring you the latest from our annual Industrials Conference that recently concluded in Laguna Beach, where two themes really stuck out. The growing physical infrastructure demands behind AI, particularly power, and the shift in autonomous trucking from proving the viability of the technology to commercializing it at scale.
Ravi, after roughly a decade of development, you've said autonomous trucking is entering a critical 12 to 18-month period ahead of serial commercial production.
What's changed, and why is the debate shifting from whether the technology works to whether it can be commercialized at scale?
Ravi Shanker: I think for 10 years the industry has been focused on making the technology work. but with players like Aurora now putting up almost half a million miles of fully driverless revenue-generating operations, on public highways in the U.S., day and night, rain and shine, for different customers. With people like Kodiak, also running, several trucks, in revenue-generating service, for customers like Atlas, I don't think there is much debate on the technology itself.
And so, I think the debate is now moving from does this work to can this work for me? Where the next steps are going to be dotting i's and crossing t's on the path to actually pressing these trucks into commercial service rather than having to prove that it works in the first place.
Michelle Weaver: Your research suggests that autonomous trucking can deliver roughly a 20 percent lower cost per mile, while higher utilization could be an even bigger source of value. What are the key assumptions behind that math? And what still needs to happen operationally for fleets to capture those benefits?
Ravi Shanker: Yeah, so we recently updated our TCO math, on autonomous trucks and published a North American insight, where we revised and revisited our views on autonomous trucking with a lot of proprietary data, in there as well. And part of that new TCO math, again, I think revisited some of the changes in the split of operating costs of trucking over the last several years.
First of all, I'll kind of throw a huge disclaimer out there that your mileage may vary, right? Because, depending on who you are as a trucker, if you're public or private, small or large, dry van or reefer, heavy or asset light, long haul or short haul, your split of costs are going to be slightly different.
But we started out, by looking at the ATRI's national average. And labor accounts for 35 to 40 percent of the P&L of the average trucker. So, when you take the driver out and substitute that with an autonomous driver, if you will. Even after paying the autonomous technology company roughly 85 cents a mile, for the autonomous operation, you will still save a significant amount of money. Versus the 40 percent of the roughly $3 per mile that it costs for labor today.
In addition to that, fuel is another third of your cost structure. And there, an autonomous truck should be anywhere from 13 to 22 percent more fuel efficient. We have taken the low end of the scale to be conservative. And then you layer on insurance savings, maintenance savings on top of that. Even if you add some incremental costs, either for human drayage at both ends or for the truck itself being more expensive – we believe you will save about 20 percent per mile versus a human driver today.
And I'll point out that the unit economic savings are only about a-third of the total savings with the utilization benefit driving another two-third savings on top of that.
Michelle Weaver: But there, there still seems to be a notable disconnect between how much freight carriers and shippers think can be automated and how much of the network may actually be suitable to be automated. What's the industry potentially underestimating?
Ravi Shanker: Yeah. We have seen this in our conversations. Again, part of our report was conducting detailed surveys and in-depth interviews with a lot of our coverage companies. And I will say that there still needs to be a lot of education, of how these trucks work, where they work, what the unit economics are going to be out there.
There's still a lot of misinformation. For instance, there's this big perception that you still need human drivers at both ends of an autonomous truck move because these trucks can only operate on a highway. And here's where our AlphaWise analysis, comes in. I think it's the first of its kind analysis where we use geolocation data to pinpoint 10,000 plus of the largest commercial facilities belonging to the hundred largest commercial shippers in the U.S.
And we found out that the average [00:05:00] commercial facility is less than two miles away from the nearest ramp point. And these trucks can comfortably do seven to 10 miles, if not longer, off a highway on main roads to get to their end destinations. So, I think you just need a lot of education in the industry.
And that is part of the dotting of i's and crossing of t's that we think the industry needs to do in the next 12 months before we see the start of serial commercial production next year.
Weaver: Thanks, Ravi. I want to bring Dave into the conversation here, and that question of turning demand into real world capacity brings us naturally to power, where the challenge is also increasingly about physical infrastructure and execution.
Dave, coming out of Laguna, you describe management commentary across power equipment as notably positive. What surprised you most about what you heard on demand bookings and project activity?
Arcaro: Yeah, absolutely. What surprised me most was probably how consistent the commentary was across companies, across large frame turbine providers and the smaller, on-site power equipment players, the new entrants and the more mature companies in the market. Very consistent feedback. All very positive.
And I would say also what surprised me too was the lack of disruption across the board. You know, we all see the headlines about data center moratoriums, political pushback, community challenges that really, it seemed, to increase the risk of data center execution and delays out in the market.
But at least with the power equipment companies, they're just not seeing it. You know, in terms of the feedback that we heard from management teams across the board at Laguna, they review project timelines actively with their customers, and that's all still intact. We haven't seen any changes in bookings or slot reservations for equipment deliveries.
Still seems to be a very stable and very strong backdrop across the board.
Weaver: One of the broader conference themes was the availability of power is becoming a bottleneck for AI infrastructure. How are equipment shortages, longer wait times, and customers planning further ahead affecting pricing? And how far ahead can the industry see?
Arcaro: Yeah, we are seeing equipment companies booking out orders farther and farther. The large frame gas turbines, to give you a couple examples, from companies like GE Vernova, they're now in conversations to contract turbines for 2031 and 2032. Smaller equipment companies like INNIO, who make, smaller scale engines for data centers, they're in conversations with customers and taking reservations into 2029 and 2030.
So, what we heard from the conference as well was that utilities, which is a big customer for this equipment, they're looking out farther and farther now into the 2030s. That's new and that's a surprisingly long time in terms of how far they're looking out. And we're also hearing data centers looking out toward the end of the decade, you know, late 2020s in terms of trying to secure their power equipment in advance.
We would still consider it very much a seller's market. Pricing has been rising, and companies at the conference gave further indications that it's likely to keep rising, what looks like into the 2030s from here. We just haven't seen any signs of softening yet, really regardless of the company or the equipment type that they're selling into the market.
So still farther and farther out that we're seeing visibility into the order flow, and with that is also coming firm and even rising prices into the 2030s.
Weaver: Investors often frame the power debate as electricity from the grid versus smaller power sources built on-site at data centers. Based on what you heard at Laguna, how should investors think about the balance between those two approaches?
Arcaro: Yeah, it's an interesting dynamic. When you talk to utilities and some of the large frame turbine companies, they all say that all this data center demand is going to the grid. Eventually, it's all going to go to the grid. When you talk to the smaller equipment manufacturers and the power as a service providers, they say nobody wants the grid.
They see long-term opportunities to sell, on-site power equipment and contract it with their end customers for 15 to 20 years, and we're seeing evidence of that. So, I think, it'll stay It's an ongoing debate among, investors as well. On our end, we think the on-site power market is going to be an extremely large market as we get toward 2030, given limitations in how much power is likely to be accessible from the grid over time for the data center industry.
But I would say, my takeaway and my observation from the conference that I would highlight is that it's a really favorable market and favorable backdrop for both sides.
Michelle Weaver: From autonomous freight to the power needed to support AI, one message from Laguna was clear. The next phase of technology adoption increasingly depends on what the physical economy can actually build and scale.
Ravi and Dave, thanks for taking the time to talk.
Shanker: Thanks, Michelle.
Arcaro: Thanks for having me.
Weaver: And to our listeners, thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen to the show and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.
Diesel is at the center of an international supply squeeze, with prices rising to historic highs. Andrew Sheets and Martijn Rats unpack why this industrial fuel matters far beyond the pump.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley.
Martijn Rats: And I'm Martijn Rats, Head of Commodity Research at Morgan Stanley.
Andrew Sheets: Today, the secret life of diesel and why there's so much attention on it.
It's Thursday, September 24th at 2pm in London.
Diesel is a fuel that I think a lot of investors may be aware of but not familiar with, so to speak. It's often the other price that you see when you're driving down the road.
But Martijn, it's incredibly important for the industrial side of the economy and unusually disrupted by current geopolitical events. And so, I'd like to really start at the top, or technically the middle of the barrel, so to speak.
What is diesel and what makes it so special?
Martijn Rats: Yeah. When people talk about diesel at the moment, they really talk about sort of three things combined. They talk about outright diesel, as well as jet fuel and also heating oil.
These are effectively part of the same pool of molecules coming out of the refinery. And so, when you look at that sort of pool of molecules, you talk about the things that fuel trucks, trains, ships, tractors in agriculture, excavators, generators, home heating. It is a molecule that has a tremendously broad range of applications.
It's really the fuel of the industrial economy.
One of the characteristics of diesel is that it has very high energy density. In contrast to, say, gasoline, electrifying the uses of diesel is harder because it carries so much punch.
Andrew Sheets: And why has there been so much on diesel recently, given the current energy disruption in these geopolitical events?
Martijn Rats: Yeah. So, the global refining system normally processes about 85 million barrels a day of crude oil and from that, it makes a range of products. Diesel is at the heart of it. But it's only one of many.
At the moment, we are short in terms of refinery runs, i.e., the amount of crude that refineries process to the extent of about somewhere between 4 to 5 million barrels a day. So, 4 to 5 million barrels a day on a base of 85, you're talking about 5 to 6 percent. That may not sound like a lot, but in the world of commodities, where prices really depend on relatively small changes, that is actually a very large amount.
That sort of 4 or 5 million barrels a day of refineries that are currently not running, they are fifty-fifty, either in the Middle East or in Russia. In the Middle East, it is a story of the Strait of Hormuz and refineries locked behind the strait, and they can't export their products. Some of them are also damaged, although information on that is hard to find.
And then the other half that is out is in Russia, where they are effectively taken out by Ukrainian drone attacks.
In total, that's sort of 4 to 5 million barrels a day of refining capacity that is not running. 40 percent of their output would typically be diesel, so we are missing something like 1.5 million barrels a day of global diesel supply, all into the seaborne market.
Now, I mentioned the seaborne market because the seaborne market is the traded market where traders buy and sell cargoes to each other. And that is where, from a physical market perspective, price formation takes place.
The global seaborne diesel market is an 8 million barrel a day market. And so given that all of the supply we're missing is also into the seaborne market, the comparison to make is to say that we're missing about, sort of, close to 1.5 million barrels out of an 8 million barrel a day traded…
Andrew Sheets: A pretty large percentage, yeah.
Martijn Rats: Absolutely. That is very, very large, and that is hard to offset. Every other refinery around the world that can run is running flat out. The margins are all-time highs. So, there's a lot of incentive to run very hard.
But nevertheless, it's left the market very, very tight.
Andrew Sheets: So, that tightness in the market shows up via price. And just talk us through a little bit about what has happened to the price of diesel and its related fuels. You know, I think a lot of listeners are probably more familiar with the price of gasoline. They're more familiar with the barrel of oil that's often the quoted benchmark in the market.
But what has been happening to these diesel prices?
Martijn Rats: Yeah. So, the way to really tell that story is to look at what we call the crack spread. So, making a barrel of refined product, including diesel, of course, you start with crude oil. So, the price of crude oil impacts the price of the refined product. So, quite often we focus more on the uplift from the price of crude to get to the price of the refined product, and we call that the crack spread.
Under normal conditions, say a year ago, crude was $70, and then the price of diesel was another $20 on top of that. And so, you got to diesel being 70 plus 20 is $90 per barrel. At the moment, crude is higher. Crude is about $100 per barrel. Crude has rallied. But the increment on top of it has spiked.
So, a couple of days ago we got to all-time high nominal term diesel prices over $200 per barrel. So, we're now having a situation that is [$]100 for crude plus another [$]100 to get to the diesel price. So, the crack spread is something that normally lives in a range of, like when the diesel market is weak, maybe sort of $8, $9, $10. When the market is normal, close to $20. If it's very strong, $25 to $30.
Now, that incremental crack spread is $100 per barrel, and that is something that we've not seen before. It is stronger than it was in 2022, when we also had a moment of a severe diesel crisis. Didn't last very long in 2022, but the crack spread got to sort of $60, $70 per barrel. So, that highlights the extent to which the price of diesel has rallied.
Andrew Sheets: So, Martijn, you mentioned this crack spread. You know, I think if we all go back to our organic chemistry, this is the refineries literally cracking a barrel of oil down into constituent distillates and other pieces.
But given those very high prices for diesel, why don't the refiners just refine more? Why aren't the incentives increasing production? What's getting in the way of that?
Martijn Rats: Yeah. That's just a matter of like the physical reality of the system.
So, when you build a refinery, you often quite think about two things. What crudes are available to me. So, if you're in the United States, you have U.S. shale crudes, or you have crude from Mexico, Canada. And based on those, you then also think about, you know, what is my consumption, where I am likely to be.
And based on that, you build a certain configuration – that converts the crudes that you can buy into the products that your specific customer set might need.
You fix the configuration of the refinery at the time you build it. And once it's built, there is a little bit of flexibility to say, "Oh, well, maybe at the moment I make a little bit more diesel and a little bit less gasoline," and change the – what we call the yield of these products. Like a little bit within, you know, a few percentage points range.
But that flexibility is small, so the only thing you can do to make more diesel is to run the refinery at 100 percent utilization. That is currently where we are. That has already happened. And then you put in the crude that you buy, you get the products for which your refinery is then designed, and that's it.
There are no other…
Andrew Sheets: You can’t just turn a big dial that says more diesel.
Martijn Rats: No. You can't say, "Oh, well, I don't like my naphtha output this week, so let's not make any naphtha for the chemical industry. Let's only make diesel." It's not contained in the barrel of crude and the kits that you have – takes many years to rebuild and probably very expensive.
So you're kind of then stuck. I mean, it is what it is.
Andrew Sheets: So Martijn, where is this leaving the global story? You know, if we think about just the relative price of this. Again, you mentioned it's an incredibly important fuel for agriculture, for industry… What's it looking like kind of across the major regions?
Martijn Rats: Yeah. Look, it leaves a very tight market at the moment. I mean, it's relatively straightforward.
The price of diesel depends very heavily on how the geopolitics of the Middle East and Russia sort of play out. So, in terms of the traded price that you see on the screen every day, it swings around very heavily with how the market foresees the future with regards to these two conflicts.
So, one week things flare up, the price of diesel rallies. The following week the market feels a bit more optimistic maybe around a deal, so then things sort of sell off. So, we have to live with that sort of geopolitical sort of reality. But other than that, those who can afford it pay a high price to effectively erode demand amongst sets of consumers who cannot afford these higher prices.
You see a substitution, for example, what I thought was very interesting last week. Some of the train companies in the United States were talking about a truck-to-train substitution of very high levels of cargo loads on trains because simply the diesel on trucks is too expensive.
So, you see those behavioral changes come through.
Andrew Sheets: But that point about demand destruction is really important because, you know, a point that you've made over many years is this idea that the solution to higher prices is higher prices. That that reduces the demand for the fuel, that helps these markets recorrect.
And yet, you know, we're hitting prices in diesel that are near all-time highs, and we've yet to see that demand really pull back a lot. A lot of economic indicators are still pretty good. What does that tell you maybe about where the demand destruction price really is?
Martijn Rats: Making estimates of the demand destruction price sort of bottom up in a sort of modeling sense, going sort of end use by end use, has turned out on many occasions to be very, very challenging analysis.
But we can sort of look at the market and say under certain conditions, prices have spiked and what were these conditions? And we can sort of try to learn something from that. We had a very severe diesel crisis in 2022 when the Russia-Ukraine conflict started, and effectively Russian diesel had to be significantly rerouted around the world. We got to $200 per barrel.
Andrew Sheets: Right about where we are now…
Martijn Rats: Right about where we are. That didn't last very long. Big spike to [$]200, and it sold off. In March-April, we got to [$]200, and it sold off. And now, a couple of days ago, we reached that again. And so, in the trading behavior of the market, it does look like what happens at [$]200 – there either is demand destruction. Or there may not be demand destruction in the fullness of time, but buyers just take a pause.
And this makes it quite difficult to kind of really unearth this issue in the sense that in the end, a lot of customers also have inventories of their own. Like airlines have tanks with jet fuel. In Europe, you have a lot of households that use heating oil for home heating if they're not connected to the gas grid. And they have tanks in their gardens.
And so, there are a lot of tertiary inventories, as we call them, where people can effectively afford to stop buying for a little bit and see how things pan out, and then they buy later. And so, the actual data points that we have on demand destruction, even at this price, they're actually not that convincing.
There seems to be some... There clearly is in China. In China, we have seen signs of demand destruction at these very high prices. But in the rest of the world, either there are subsidies in place, or people draw on their own inventories for a bit. Or they just absorb it because it's an indisplaceable fuel in the short run.
Actually, it's not all that convincing that there is a lot of demand destruction even at these prices.
Andrew Sheets: So, Martijn, the last thing I want to ask you about is – this is a fuel that is central to a lot of key industrial processes, as we've discussed, agriculture, trucking. What is the risk that the countries that have more of this refining capacity stop exporting it to the rest of the world. Try to keep more of it to themselves in order to cushion the domestic price impact?
Martijn Rats: That risk is very real. We've already seen some of this earlier on in the Hormuz crisis in March and April. For example, China at some point announced an export ban on all refined products. In retrospect, that wasn't quite as forcefully implemented as it was announced. But nevertheless, the Chinese government did announce that, and we saw a initially large decline.
The government of South Korea at some point banned refined product exports. In the United States, there are voices that say that this might be something that the government should consider. I would say, though, about the U.S. diesel export ban, there is a good reason why this has not happened yet.
Because the United States is broadly balanced in gasoline, domestic production of gasoline by the refiners. It broadly equals to domestic consumption. And there is a tiny little bit of exports. But in the overall scheme of things, it's not much.
In diesel, it has a very large surplus, which is exported. But if there were to be an export ban and that diesel cannot leave the country – for a little bit, you can store it. But you'd fill up those tanks very, very quickly. When those tanks are full, you then need to slow down the refineries because otherwise you simply have diesel that you cannot get rid of.
If you slow down the refineries, and this is how we come back to the start of the discussion, the mix of products that you produce is broadly fixed. So, if you slow down the refineries, you make less gasoline. And so, in the United States, you can get the counterintuitive outcome that a diesel export ban could lead to higher gasoline prices.
So, a lot of these things have unintended consequences, and there are good reasons why they haven't happened yet.
Andrew Sheets: I think that's a fascinating and counterintuitive way to think about it. Thank you, Martijn, as always, for taking the time.
Martijn Rats: My pleasure.
Andrew Sheets: And thank you for listening. If you find Thoughts on the Market useful, let us know by leaving a review wherever you hear us. And also tell a friend or colleague about us today.
Tighter AI safety requirements could reshape the pace of AI investment. Ariana Salvatore and Michael Zezas dig into why the spending may shift toward more compute, not less.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
----- Transcript -----
Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of U.S. Public Policy Research at Morgan Stanley.
Michael Zezas: And I'm Michael Zezas, Deputy Global Head of Research at Morgan Stanley.
Ariana Salvatore: Today, we'll be talking about AI safety and regulation.
It's Wednesday, September 23rd, at 10am in New York.
We put out a note last week on AI frontier capability gain and the associated safety risks.
Those have been in focus in recent weeks, and as a result, we've gotten a number of questions about the path forward for government regulation.
So today, Mike and I are going to get into some of the newest developments, where we think things are headed, and how the midterms could shape that path.
Michael Zezas: Yeah, and this is pretty important because the concern is that if AI safety scrutiny increases, it's going to slow everything down. You might have less CapEx, fewer model releases, and there's all sorts of downstream effects for the pace of U.S. growth and investment strategy in equities and throughout the AI investment theme.
But Ariana, you and the team landed in a bit of a different place and are arguing that a bigger focus on AI safety could end up being a tailwind to compute spend rather than a brake on it. Can you break that down for us?
Ariana Salvatore: Sure. So, the way we see this playing out, is there are five potential states of the world. Some include industry self-policing; some include the prospects for heavier government intervention. Across all of them, as you mentioned, we actually think this is a pretty big tailwind to compute spend and CapEx more broadly.
That's because as the labs integrate greater safety monitoring infrastructure, we think that spend is only going to accelerate, especially as LLM capabilities increases at a nonlinear rate. Similarly, on the regulation front, we think there are a few things that prevent something like a large comprehensive AI regulation bill from coming to fruition.
We think there's really three, kind of, key obstacles to something like that happening.
The first is the politics. So, the president himself has said he's against some sort of large-scale regulation. The second is the procedure. So mechanically speaking, there would need to be a legislative vehicle for this sort of thing to ride on. That's hard to see emerging in the very near term. And the third is precedent.
So, historical precedent here tells you that usually regulation is catalyzed by some sort of high salience event. That's why our framework for government reaction here hinges on two components: incident salience, as I just mentioned, and instrument availability. Instrument availability basically reflects the extent to which the government already has a tool that it can pull in this direction.
So, that's how we think about it going forward. That doesn't mean all policy action is off the table, but that supports our expectation for higher CapEx, higher compute spend over the coming years.
Michael Zezas: Right. So, the idea is that the spending continues and the things that would otherwise limit that spending, you don't see as real plausible policy options at the moment. And can you break this down a little bit more? Because I know there's a lot of different proposals floating around Washington, D.C. from policymakers right now.
What are you paying attention to?
Ariana Salvatore: We don't expect an overarching AI regulatory authority in the near term. Now, importantly, we also don't expect sweeping open weight model regulation. The reason for that is threefold. First of all, we think the U.S. is keen on maintaining this managed stability relationship with China.
We've written about the expectations around the U.S.-China summit. That's kind of a delicate balance that we think is likely to persist. So, overly restricting open weights models might throw a little bit of a wrench into that equilibrium that we see. So that's the first reason.
The second reason is diffusion. We think the U.S. administration wants to see the proliferation of open weights models. We know that companies are using some sort of hybrid of open and closed weight. So, to the extent that, you know, banning these models would slow adoption, we don't think that's in the interest of the administration.
And the third reason is purely mechanical. It's really hard to enforce these sorts of restrictions. Once a model weight is published online, it can be really hard to clamp down exactly who and where it's going to.
Obviously, companies can download them, customize them, et cetera. So, the enforcement picture here is also really challenging. That being said, we do think that the executive can continue to lean in and, sort of, make some incremental adjustments or changes on the regulatory front. But we think it's likely less severe than some of the proposals you're seeing in Congress right now. Things like the Kill Switch Act, for example, which basically mandate that companies can maintain an ability to shut down models at a moment's notice, right? If a certain threshold is crossed.
So, that's something that we see as less likely to come to fruition. But again, setting safety standards, guardrails, all of that from the administration we think is possible in the near term.
Michael Zezas: What about some of the pushback that would at least appear to be rising at the state and local level around construction of data centers?
Is that something that you think might materially slow the industrial build-out and the CapEx levels around AI?
Ariana Salvatore: So far, what we've seen is that AI safety risks are not the top of the priority list when it comes to data center pushback, right? So, things like environmental concerns, affordability – those tend to be the main vectors of the opposition.
That being said, we've gotten the question, right, to your point, of does this, sort of, risk focus mean that the data center backlash is likely to grow? We think that it could, but at the same time, we think this is a highly idiosyncratic issue, meaning that this is something to pay attention to on a very granular level.
Certain states and localities will be the ones to really administer these restrictions, and we think in the aggregate, hyperscalers are going to be able to continue to mitigate. We've already seen these mitigation measures employed. We're still constructive on AI CapEx this year and next, because overall, we see the build-out really becoming more of a conditional build-out.
So, that means contingent upon some of these concessions, maybe it's more expensive in certain areas. But overall, we don't think that the concerns around safety are going to derail that story.
Michael Zezas: So, then when it comes to data centers, the conditions that might be being put on their construction at the state and local level, for the most part – those building out the data centers have been willing to make those concessions, so it hasn't slowed that much. Is that fair?
Ariana Salvatore: That's right, and it really depends on where the pushback is coming from, right? So, in some cases, you're seeing communities push back on things like water usage, right? And we're seeing the hyperscalers come out and respond and say explicitly, you know, how much water they're using in some of these operations. Google is proposing a regulatory framework, so that's something that they're mitigating through that lens.
In another example, you've got local communities pushing back on just, sort of, disruptions to quality of life, and you're seeing companies like Meta announce a fund to engage more locally there.
So, it really is different. There's no one-size-fits-all solution here. But yes, I agree with you that overall, we don't think this is going to meaningfully constrain the build-out.
Michael Zezas: Got it. So, it seems like the idea here is that the secular trend around AI development is going to continue in your view. Is there any way that you think the midterm elections or the outcome around that might change your thinking?
Ariana Salvatore: So, I think the midterms will be important for sentiment, but when it comes to the actual policy path, we don't think they're the main driver, and there's two key reasons for that.
The first is obviously the president is not changing until 2029. So, the fact that President Trump still has to be involved in any capacity – if we were to see a bill emerge from Congress to us gives a little bit of clarity on what that bill could actually look like. And so ultimately, whatever comes to fruition will have to be a product of collaboration between Democrats, Republicans in Congress, and the president. So, that's a pretty much a constant.
The second reason I would say is because, as I kind of alluded to earlier, you tend to see government response when there's a high salience event. And in that case, it doesn't really matter what the government configuration is if it's reactionary.
When you think back to things like the pandemic, we saw the CARES Act. In 2008-2009, you saw the ARRA. Those are all efforts that were produced in a divided government. And so, in that vein, we basically think that you need to see some sort of event catalyze a response.
The key driver is not going to be government configuration. It's going to be the salience of that event specifically.
Michael Zezas: Okay, got it. So, the guidance to investors on the back of all of this is what?
Ariana Salvatore: So, the thematic recommendations from our team are intact, right? So, what we were talking about is basically we see these all converging towards a tailwind to CapEx and a tailwind to compute supply.
So, in that vein, we still think that you should own inference compute bottlenecks because of that excess demand relative to supply. We think that's going to persist regardless of most of the policy scenarios.
We also think own leaders in cybersecurity, as we mentioned. This should drive increased spend, especially as open weight models become much more capable. And then in the third piece, we think you should own AI adopters. AI models are already pretty capable to drive significant productivity. We think that that's just going to continue to unlock.
The last thing I would mention, we didn't really get into it in this podcast, but in this conversation we typically also talk about AI sovereignty and the U.S.-China restrictions here.
So, in that context, we would avoid negative exposure to rising U.S.-China technology transfer restrictions. We think that's an increasing probability because we do see the governments taking more of an active role, which we think drives bifurcation of the global market.
Michael Zezas: Well, Ariana, thanks for breaking it down. Appreciate talking to you today.
Ariana Salvatore: Always great speaking with you, Mike. And thank you for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
Central banks are turning more hawkish as inflation risks increase. Our Global Chief Economist and Head of Macro Research Seth Carpenter explains what that means for the Fed, ECB and Bank of Japan.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Seth Carpenter: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Seth Carpenter, Morgan Stanley’s Global Chief Economist and Head of Macro Research. Today, I’m going to talk about all the movement we’ve seen in central banks and how it’s changing our forecasts.
It’s Tuesday, September 22, at 10 a.m. in New York.
Over the past two weeks, our economists here at Morgan Stanley have revised their outlooks for the Fed, the ECB, and the Bank of Japan to include more rate hikes.
Each economy faces different challenges, but all three central banks have arrived at roughly the same conclusion: growth has remained remarkably resilient despite all of the shocks hitting the global economy. And renewed energy-price pressures have increased the risk that inflation proves more persistent than they had previously expected.
The clearest example—and our biggest revision here—is the Fed.
Now for much of this year, we had actually thought the Fed might avoid hiking interest rates altogether. But in addition to this increase that we just saw at the September FOMC meeting, we now expect two additional rate hikes—in December and in March that will bring the terminal rate up to 4.25 to 4.5 percent.
While Chair Warsh has highlighted the inflationary implications of higher energy and commodity prices, for me, the more important signal was the assessment that policy is not sufficiently restrictive.
So in our view, the Fed appears to be reassessing not just the inflation outlook, but the amount of restraint that is required to bring inflation sustainably back to target.
But even with all of that said, we’re still looking at this shift as more of a recalibration of policy for the Fed rather than a fundamental shift in policy. And so the market may have—just may have—overestimated how much hiking is left.
But the shift does have clear and important market implications.
Our rate strategists expect investors to pull forward additional tightening expectations in the near term, while increasingly questioning how long policy can remain at restrictive levels before growth starts to slow.
But more broadly, the Fed now appears a bit more sensitive to energy-driven inflation pressures, and that strengthens the case for a firmer dollar.
Over recent months, rising energy prices have supported the euro because investors have seen the ECB respond more aggressively than the Fed. That maybe former asymmetry could be changing.
Our foreign-exchange strategists therefore continue to favor dollar strength, particularly against the yen.
Now Europe does face a similar inflation challenge to the Fed, though through a different mechanism.
The renewed rise in natural-gas and other energy prices has led our economists to revise up their inflation forecast materially and, therefore, to add in another ECB rate hike in December.
But we have got to keep in mind that it is not energy prices all by themselves that have changed the outlook.
Economic activity in the euro area has also proven to be much more resilient than we had anticipated. And that reduces concerns that an additional modest tightening of policy would derail growth.
And so if you take it all together, the ECB is increasingly focused on preventing higher energy costs from feeding into broader inflationary dynamics.
Now Japan might seem different, but the underlying story is really surprisingly similar.
For decades, the BoJ’s challenge was generating inflation. But now policymakers are now increasingly concerned about the possibility that inflation will overshoot its target.
After the BoJ’s hike last week, we expect it to raise rates to 1.5 percent in December and then raise rates further, to about 1.75 percent, in March.
Like the Fed and the ECB, the BoJ faces an economy that has absorbed tighter financial conditions much better than had been expected.
And yet, unlike the Fed and the ECB, our strategists believe that markets have become too aggressive in pricing the eventual destination of rates. And that creates scope for expectations to be revised lower over time.
As a result, while Japanese rates may continue to rise gradually, our foreign-exchange strategists still expect a broader trend of yen weakness to emerge once temporary positioning effects fade.
So the common thread across all three of these central banks that I’ve discussed is that, while the energy shock has changed the inflation conversation, the resilience in growth has further changed the policy conversation.
And so for investors, next year is probably going to be characterized by higher policy rates and a stronger dollar than markets expected at the beginning of the year.
Well, thanks for listening. And If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
Our CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist Mike Wilson discusses why quality stocks, strong earnings and price momentum support his view that the bull market remains intact.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist.
Today on the podcast I’ll be discussing the ongoing mid-cycle transition.
It's Monday, September 21st at 11:30 am in New York.
So, let’s get after it.
The S&P 500 is near record highs. That’s despite rising energy prices, two wars running in parallel and AI safety concerns back in the headlines. Meanwhile central banks are tightening. On paper, that's a lot of reasons to be nervous. So are investors just being complacent? I don't think so.
More than 40 percent of the Russell 3000 has fallen at least 20 percent since June, while the S&P 500’s forward price earnings multiple has fallen back to 19 times, which is almost 20 percent lower than a year ago. At the same time, median stock earnings growth is running around 15 percent, and revisions breadth is back near cycle highs. Falling valuations alongside strong earnings growth is not complacency. It is the definition of a classic mid-cycle transition.
That distinction matters because mid-cycle markets tend to frustrate almost everyone. The index can remain resilient while much of the market corrects. Earnings can stay strong while multiples fall. And leadership can change without the bull market ending.
Last week’s Fed meeting fits squarely into that framework. The 25-basis-point hike was largely priced, so the real information was Chair Warsh’s willingness to follow through on his commitment to fight inflation. Recent core inflation data were firmer than expected, but the details were not uniformly hot.
Some of the upside was concentrated in a handful of categories, shelter remained soft, and tariff pass-through appears to be fading. That gave the Fed room to act without forcing investors to assume we are heading into another 2022-style tightening campaign.
In my view, the hike can enhance credibility. If investors believe the Fed is acting early enough to contain inflation, a higher policy rate can reduce uncertainty and term premium rather than automatically driving long-term financing costs higher.
But the rate hike is not my concern. A few additional hikes over the next year are unlikely to end this bull market if earnings remain strong. The bigger unknown is how a Warsh-led Fed approaches the balance sheet, money supply, and credit growth. His philosophy has historically leaned more monetarist than prior Fed chairs. However, we still don’t know how aggressively he will apply it – or how much influence he will have over the rest of the committee. That matters because the private economy is using more capital, and an overly restrictive approach to liquidity could become more consequential than the policy rate itself.
This is one reason I continue to favor large-cap quality. High free-cash-flow yield, low accruals, and operating-efficiency factors are leading, while the high-sales-per-employee factor has been one of the strongest recent performers. That also aligns closely with our preference for AI adopters rather than the enablers.
Price momentum is not disappearing. But its composition is changing toward quality, services-oriented, asset-light, and fee-based businesses. That is exactly what should happen during a mid-cycle transition.
The near-term swing factor remains energy prices. Another meaningful rise in crude or refined products would put upward pressure on the expected policy path, long-end yields, and bond volatility in an unhealthy way. It would also arrive during a period when midterm-election seasonality often produces a 5 to 10 percent index correction.
In a worst-case near-term scenario, the S&P 500 could trade near 7100, but I would view that as a tactical correction within the bull market – not a change in our fundamental views. Either way, I remain convicted in our 8,000 year-end price target.
The bottom line is that this market is behaving exactly like a mid-cycle market should: valuations are compressing, earnings are carrying the load, and leadership is moving toward quality. The index may look calm, but plenty of concern has already been priced at the stock level.
The mistake would be confusing resiliency with complacency—and missing the rotation taking place in plain sight.
Thanks for tuning in; I hope you found it informative and useful. Let us know what you think by leaving us a review. And if you find Thoughts on the Market worthwhile, tell a friend or colleague to try it out!
As President Xi heads to Washington, trade, rare earths and AI are set to dominate the agenda. Our Head of U.S. Public Policy Research Ariana Salvatore unpacks what the meeting could mean for supply chains, tech stocks and the broader market.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of U.S. Public Policy Research at Morgan Stanley.
Today, I'll be talking about next week's U.S.-China summit, specifically the bilateral trade relationship, what we can expect on critical minerals and rare earths, AI dialogues, and what it all means for markets.
It's Friday, September 18th at 10am in New York.
President Xi is scheduled to visit the White House on September 24th for his second meeting with President Trump this year, and his first White House visit in roughly a decade.
The meeting follows President Trump's visit to Beijing in May, where the two sides established a framework for what they call a more constructive relationship of strategic stability. That meeting also produced new trade and investment dialogues, commitments around agricultural purchases and aircraft, and an agreement to begin a dialogue on artificial intelligence.
But next week's summit comes at an important moment because several of the temporary arrangements that helped stabilize the economic relationship are due to expire later this fall.
We think there are three areas to focus on.
The first is trade. The current U.S.-China tariff truce is scheduled to expire in November. Now, public reporting suggests that the two governments are discussing an extension alongside potential announcements on agriculture, non-tariff barriers, and a relatively narrow set of goods that could see lower tariffs.
The question for markets, therefore, is less whether next week produces a comprehensive new trade agreement and more so on whether the two sides can extend the current period of stability and prevent another significant increase in tariffs.
The second area is critical minerals. This is probably one of the clearest examples of the leverage that each side has over the other.
Washington, we think, wants more predictable Chinese exports of rare earths and other critical materials used across semiconductors, autos, aerospace, and defense. Beijing, meanwhile, has been pushing back against U.S. restrictions on Chinese companies' access to advanced technology.
Public reporting suggests that both of these issues are part of the negotiations heading into the summit, and the timing here is really important. November 10th is an upcoming cliff affecting China's rare earth restrictions and U.S. technology controls, followed later that month by another deadline covering certain minerals. So what happens next week could determine whether those restrictions remain suspended or begin to snap back.
The third area is technology, and increasingly artificial intelligence. The two leaders agreed in May to establish an AI dialogue, and President Trump has specifically said AI will be discussed next week.
Reporting also shows that shared AI risks could be one area for discussion, although the broader competitive relationship makes a comprehensive agreement difficult, we think. From a policy perspective, the most important point is that technology restrictions are moving beyond advanced chips. The debate includes cloud and compute access, model distribution, procurement, and potentially the use of certain foreign AI models themselves.
In other words, we think that while the summit could produce something like an agreement to keep talking on AI, the underlying shift matters more. AI sovereignty pushes both the U.S. and China toward more restrictions or heavier government involvement even over a longer period of time.
We expect that a middle path is the more plausible U.S. approach. So think targeted restrictions on specific Chinese developers rather than a blanket prohibition on Chinese open weight models. But even that would reinforce what we've called the two worlds thesis, increasingly distinct U.S. and Chinese tech ecosystems with separate infrastructure, supply chains, standards, and distribution channels.
There could also be a host of other issues on the agenda, specifically the U.S.-Iran conflict, which we see as a tail risk into the talks.
So what does all this mean for investors?
Even a constructive summit is unlikely to reverse the structural push toward technology and supply chain diversification. In fact, we argue that greater U.S.-China bifurcation will actually reinforce investment in parallel ecosystems, semiconductor capacity, data centers, cloud infrastructure, power, and critical mineral supply chains.
In that sense, actually less geopolitical friction next week could reduce near-term market volatility, but without necessarily changing the underlying investment cycle.
So, the key question coming out of the summit is not simply whether the relations are improving or deteriorating. It's whether the two sides can preserve enough stability to manage their competition while the longer-term process of de-risking continues underneath.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today
After raising interest rates for the first time in more than three years, the Fed still doesn’t see policy as restrictive. Our Global Head of Fixed Income Research Andrew Sheets breaks down what that could mean for the monetary policy path.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley.
Today, why the Federal Reserve may have raised interest rates and yet still thinks that monetary policy is providing support.
It's Thursday, September 17th at 2pm in London.
Yesterday, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates by a quarter of a percent. That part was widely expected. What was more notable was how Chair Warsh described it.
At the press conference following the action, he said that the Fed had removed "a dose of accommodation," and he said that both he and many of his colleagues were hard-pressed to describe broader financial conditions as restrictive.
That's an important distinction that now moves to the heart of the market debate.
If monetary policy is already restrictive, another rate hike means that the Fed is pressing harder on the proverbial brakes on the economy. But if policy is still accommodative, a hike is more like easing off the gas. It means the Fed is simply providing a little less support. And if that is how the committee sees the world, it suggests that there could be further to go.
Following yesterday's meeting, Morgan Stanley's economists now expect two additional quarter point rate hikes in December and March, taking the Fed's target rate range from 4.25 to 4.5 percent; and we then expect those rates to remain there through the rest of 2027.
Three things are driving this updated view.
First is exactly that language around accommodation. The interest rates that keep the economy in balance are always a mystery when viewed in real time. But given booming earnings growth, loan growth, and corporate activity, it's not obvious that the current level of interest rates are holding back activity for the economy as a whole. The Fed may believe that as well, making higher rates a little more palpable.
Second is inflation. Chair Warsh repeatedly emphasized that trends matter here more than individual data points, and on that basis, inflation still looks too high. Too many categories are still running above 3 percent. The Fed simply does not sound convinced that inflation is moving sustainably back towards its 2 percent target as fast as it would like.
Third is geopolitics. Chair Warsh explicitly cited geopolitical developments as one of the things that had changed since their meeting in July. He also made it clear that the Fed is watching not just high oil prices, but so-called second-round effects. And whether higher prices for fuel translate into higher prices for things that require a lot of fuel.
Airline tickets, for example, are one of the areas of the economy where prices are going up the fastest. Higher oil prices are a key reason why. And so with energy markets still severely disrupted, this remains a wild card.
There is, maybe, one other wrinkle. The committee also raised its estimate of the so-called long-run neutral interest rate – the rate that it thinks we'll ultimately end up at over the long term that will keep the economy in balance. And it raised this to about 3.25 percent.
This is an uncertain estimate, and Chair Warsh himself downplayed its importance. But directionally, a view that the interest rate that keeps things in balance is higher means that any given interest rate that we see today is less restrictive on economic growth.
It's less elevated relative to that neutral rate than we previously thought. That, too, leans towards the case for more tightening and more rate increases rather than less.
None of this is set in stone. If energy prices fall, geopolitical tensions ease, or inflation improves more quickly, the Fed could stop earlier. But for now, we think the important message from this week's meeting was not simply that the Fed raised rates.
It was that even after doing so, it still doesn't think that policy is especially tight. And if that's right, there may be still more to do.
Thank you, as always, for your time. If you find Thoughts the Market useful, let us know by leaving a review wherever you listen. And also tell a friend or colleague about us today.
Our Global Head of Macro Strategy Matthew Hornbach joins our Chief U.S. Economist Michael Gapen to discuss the Fed’s potential next moves and how energy prices are influencing market expectations.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Matthew Hornbach: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Matthew Hornbach, Global Head of Macro Strategy at Morgan Stanley.
Michael Gapen: And I'm Michael Gapen, Morgan Stanley's Chief U.S. Economist.
Matthew Hornbach: Today, what the Federal Reserve decided at its September meeting and what it could mean for rates through the end of the year.
It's Wednesday, September 16th at 4pm in New York.
So, Mike, the Fed raised rates by 25 basis points at this week's meeting. What stood out to you the most in the decision? And when it comes to inflation, how do you think this 25-basis point rate hike is actually going to affect the inflation outlook?
Michael Gapen: Yeah, so certainly the decision was in line with expectations. You know, obviously what we've learned in the very broad sense is that inflation isn't moving fast enough in the direction that the Fed wants. So, it's responding by tighter monetary policy. And that does set up a very interesting question which you just asked, which is: Well, is it going to work? Is this the right response to the inflation that we're seeing?
So, if you do go back and reread that Jackson Hole speech, there's not a lot in there about the drivers of inflation, what's causing higher inflation. But it's clear the only response to above target inflation from the point of view of the chair was tighter monetary policy. So, the Fed is in a bit of a pickle.
Most of us believe the majority of the inflation we're seeing is supply side driven from tariffs, from energy. At least in the past, let's call it supply chain disruptions, a de-globalization narrative. Some of it is demand side driven through AI. But I think we're all looking at that thinking modestly tighter rates isn't necessarily going to bring down that AI-related inflation.
So, we're left to conclude that the Fed's in this uncomfortable position of saying, "Well, a lot of the inflation that we're seeing is supply side driven and from the structural AI story that we're not convinced higher rates can maybe address."
So I think the answer would be, if inflation's going to come down, then higher rates will be weighing on the parts of the economy that are more interest rate sensitive and generally soft already.
Matthew Hornbach: Is this a one and done? Or do you think that when the Fed actually goes ahead and hikes rates after a long pause, they are thinking about delivering more than just one rate hike?
Michael Gapen: Yeah, I strongly believe the committee as a whole is thinking in terms of more than one move. Monetary policy doesn't, say, hyper-react. It reacts with a bit of a delay. So, to your point, they've been on hold for a while. When they think about changing policy, then they're thinking about a series of moves.
So, I think in their mind, if they're raising rates, there's a strong probability that they will do at least one more or two more. They're never going to think that a 25-basis-point move in the funds rate will fundamentally change the macro-outlook. So, I don't think they'd ever walk into this thinking one and done.
Now, it is possible we get an ex-post one and done. So, how could that come about? If it is true indeed that we're right that a lot of this inflation is supply-side driven. It is coming down. It's clear that the three- and six-month annualized rates are pointing to disinflation into year-end. We can debate whether it's fast enough or not.
But if disinflation continues to happen, then the Fed will have hiked, expect to maybe do another one. But by the time we get there, inflation has improved enough, and they end up not doing it.
So, they would sound like, "Oh, we're still ready. We still think we've got more work to do." But in the moment, the data just arrives in a way that they stay where they are. So you would look back and say it was a one and done, but I don't think they go into this thinking one rate hike is going to fundamentally change the story.
Matthew Hornbach: Now, of course, the data that we'll get between today and the December meeting will likely have an impact on their decision-making – as well as any revisions that we end up getting.
And I think one of the stories that investors have been talking about are some of the methodological changes that the Bureau of Economic Analysis is implementing into the PCE inflation data. Do you see any scope for those types of revisions to lend itself to a one and done type of a policy for this year?
Michael Gapen: It is possible. There's uncertainty about what actually those revisions are going to bring. But quality adjustments to software, for example, will over time likely bring inflation lower. Some of the revisions to the other categories. So, we do think it will on average lower year-on-year rate of inflation by about 1/10 or so, maybe a little more.
So, it could show up on the high side. And then you've got what looks to be a different path.
So yes, I think one of the reasons to maybe go slower, think about perhaps a quarterly pace of hikes, as opposed to, "Oh, we're just going to ramp up three, four meetings in a row," is to let some of this play out. See what those revisions look like.
So yes, it could contribute to a world where revisions plus softness in the incoming data mean they hike, say, in September, don't do another one after that. Or those revisions are part of the reason why they think a slower-moving cycle rather than a more aggressive one is appropriate.
Matthew Hornbach: Does the labor market play any role today in monetary policy?
Michael Gapen: I think it's certainly secondary, if not tertiary. I don't want to say that the committee as a whole sees the labor market just fine and we don't have any concerns there.
What's super helpful from the rate hike perspective is labor income, wage income out of the labor market is still decelerating and pretty modest. It doesn't suggest that the economy's overheating and the labor market is a source of upward pressure on inflation. So, I think that's beneficial in terms of thinking of the rate hike cycle.
In the other direction, I'd say we've had a number of months now of, kind of, you know, let's call it 50,000 to 70,000 jobs a month on average if you kind of smooth through some of the volatility. That's not amazing, but it's not awful either.
So Matt, I'd like to turn it back to you. This is of course the economist's perspective. When we translate this into the rates market; rates market clients may have a very different view. But I would be interested to hear your thoughts on how you think the rates market is dealing with the inflation. I don't want to say impulse, but let's call it the sticky disinflation we're getting, the sources of that inflation, and how it sees monetary policy reacting.
How is the rates market digesting all of this?
Matthew Hornbach: So, I think actually investors are reasonably nonplussed about what's happening in the underlying rate of inflation in the country. But what has inserted itself into the conversation is the price of energy and how impulsively energy prices have risen over recent months.
When we look at how market prices evolve with respect to the path for monetary policy, what we observe empirically is that if energy prices are going up in a given week or in a given month, the market reprices to a more hawkish path for Fed policy. And if energy prices come down in a given week or a given month, and we see the market pricing towards a less hawkish path for monetary policy.
So, the primary driver of how the markets are pricing the future of Fed policy is, in fact, the changes in the price of energy commodities. So, Brent crude oil, WTI crude oil, gasoline prices. And so, this is something that we just can't get away from.
There are, of course, other things that do influence the level of Treasury yields, but I would suggest that they are more secondary or tertiary themselves in terms of… Similar to the labor market. I would say they have less of an impact on the overall level of yields.
So, with a market-implied hiking cycle from the Fed at about three hikes or so from here, given that the Fed just delivered one rate hike, you know, the 10-year treasury yield is around 5 percent. It was much lower earlier this year, and we were pricing in two rate cuts at that point in time.
So, you get the sense that if the market's moving from pricing in two rate cuts to pricing in four rate hikes, and the 10-year yield goes from 4.25 percent to 5 percent, obviously there's a relationship there.
One factor that investors are certainly interested in is – how does the debt stock play a role in the level of yields? And one of the things that I've been telling people to consider is that it's not the level of the debt, the amount of debt in the economy that matters most for the level of interest rates – as odd as that may be to hear for listeners. It's how quickly that debt stock grows.
So, if the debt stock is going up at a certain pace, and that pace is within the bounds of investor expectations, then it typically doesn't have that big of an impact on the bond market. So, one of the factoids that may surprise people is: about four years ago, the news media was very interested in the fact that the amount of debt in the United States had breached $31 trillion. And, the 10-year treasury yield at that time had peaked at about 4.25 percent, somewhere around there.
Well, earlier this year, before the conflict in Iran began, the 10-year treasury yield was also around 4.25 percent. But this is four years later, and over these four years, the U.S. has added $9 trillion to the debt.
So, here again, this is a good example, I think, of this idea that you can have a dramatic expansion in the debt from [$]31 trillion to [$]40 trillion, and yet the 10-year treasury yield itself is broadly unchanged.
And so that just, I think, should tell investors that it's not the size of the debt that matters per se. Lots of other factors can influence the level of treasury yields. And how the market thinks about the Fed is certainly among the more important of those.
So, Mike, just want to say thanks again for taking the time to talk after another FOMC meeting.
Michael Gapen: Great speaking with you, Matt.
Matthew Hornbach: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.
Our CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist Mike Wilson breaks down how the market is transitioning to a mid-cycle environment, with leadership shifting toward higher-quality, asset-light companies with durable earnings.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Mike Wilson: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist.
Today on the podcast I’ll be discussing why inflation should not be a concern for equity investors.
It's Tuesday, September 15th at 9 am in New York. So, let’s get after it.
The markets have spent the past few months doing far more work than what most casual observers might think. Since early June, the S&P 500 has chopped sideways, but underneath the surface leadership has changed materially. The early-cycle, capital-intensive winners are giving way to higher-quality companies with stronger free cash flow, better margins with more asset-light businesses. Software, Financial Services, Insurance, and Healthcare Services are beginning to show the earnings revision strength that Semiconductors and other cyclicals enjoyed earlier this year. To me, that is the market confirming an economy moving from early to mid-cycle.
While many investors are debating yesterday’s news, the market is already moving to new leadership. A good example of this is the inflation data that was released last week. The results were a bit higher than expected and elicited quite a reaction from the media and Fed watchers. However, the probability of a September interest rate hike has been rising for months and was close to 70% before the data were released. Now it’s 95%. Equities have de-rated alongside that repricing in the bond market. In short, the inflation data may have been news to some, but it wasn’t to Mr. Market.
While some may view this as the Fed being behind the curve, the bond market has been expecting it for months and essentially doing the tightening for the Fed. Equity markets are well aware of this dynamic which is why valuations have fallen and the index has gone nowhere for the past few months. This is also classic mid cycle transition behavior—strong earnings growth is offset by falling valuations as the Fed starts to focus on its inflation mandate. In other words, the first hike does not mean “risk off.” However, it does reinforce the quality rotation and overall narrative we have been highlighting since June. And earnings are the reason. To remind regular listeners, the median Russell 3000 company is growing earnings in the mid-teens, the fastest since 2021; and revisions remain strong. That is the mid-cycle playbook to a T—earnings are doing the heavy lifting and the market is becoming more selective, not necessarily less constructive. More specifically, the market is demanding better cash conversion, stronger margins, and more durable growth.
This is why the momentum unwind earlier this summer has been misunderstood. Some investors see it as nothing more than leverage coming out of crowded positions, but that really misses the bigger message. Semiconductors are a classic early cycle sector and it reached an extreme in earnings revisions breadth back in June. That was the fundamental trigger for the unwind, and the leverage just magnified it. The price momentum factor can recover, but the stocks and sectors that lead may look very different. That is usually how a healthy market adjusts: the baton gets passed before everyone realizes the race has changed.
With regard to interest rates, I also think the mainstream explanation is incomplete. Many investors assume higher yields are simply a referendum on debt and deficits. I see stronger nominal growth as the more important driver. Nominal GDP is running close to 7% on a five-year average basis and has reaccelerated on capex incentives, compute demand, and higher velocity real economy. Equities are an inflation hedge when inflation reflects stronger revenue and earnings growth. Deflation—not inflation—is the real kryptonite for stocks.
This does not mean we are completely out of the woods on the mid cycle transition that began in June. If oil continues to rise sharply from here, it will likely push interest rates higher and put pressure on growth, an unhealthy combination for stocks. This would likely lead to a 5-10% drawdown in the S&P 500 before the bull market can resume in earnest. The other risk is the midterm elections which historically have been a headwind for equities in the September and October time frame.
Bottom line, the inflation data is old news. The rotation is not. We are transitioning to a mid-cycle market where earnings durability, free cash flow, operational efficiency, and quality matter more. Investors waiting for complete clarity from the Fed may miss the message already coming from the market: leadership has moved to higher quality, asset light companies. Don’t fight it; embrace it.
Thanks for tuning in; I hope you found it informative and useful. Let us know what you think by leaving us a review. And if you find Thoughts on the Market worthwhile, tell a friend or colleague to try it out.
Healthcare companies are rethinking their business models as patients gain more control over how they access care and purchase medicine. Our analysts Erin Wright and Terence Flynn unpack this shift and the emerging opportunities.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Erin Wright: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Erin Wright, US Healthcare Services Analyst at Morgan Stanley.
Terence Flynn: And I'm Terence Flynn, Morgan Stanley's US BioPharma Analyst.
Erin Wright: Today, how the consumer is moving into the driver's seat across healthcare.
It's Monday, September 14th at 7:00 AM
We're recording in New York City, where Morgan Stanley's twenty-fourth Annual Healthcare Conference is happening this week. One of the biggest shifts we're seeing across the industry is patients gaining more choice, transparency, and control over how they access care and medicine. You can already see it in everyday behavior. In our AlphaWise survey earlier this year, thirty-four percent of US consumers said that they'd chosen to take a voluntary wellness lab test in the past three years, and roughly two-thirds already own a wearable or plan to buy one.
And now we're seeing the same trend reshaping how people buy medicine and choose care. So Terence, let's start with biopharma. For years, direct-to-consumer pharma meant advertising and nudging people to ask your doctor about what particular treatment is best for them. What's different this time around? And what's different in this next wave of direct access?
Terence Flynn: Yeah, absolutely. Thanks, Erin. So for most of the industry's history, the patient sat at the end of the value chain and had really limited control over the product, the price, or the route through which the drug was obtained.
Manufacturers marketed to doctors and consumers, but the transaction was itself intermediated. So we think that's starting to change here. It's no longer simply about more consumer advertising or another cash pay discount. There's a parallel access infrastructure that's building here where the patient can increasingly start the initiation of the treatment journey themselves, obtain a prescription, often digitally through a telehealth provider, and then fill this prescription through other non-traditional channels.
And so there really is a shift in the model that we're starting to see here. But again, we're not talking about replacing insurance here; we're talking about areas where friction is high and where a cash pay price is viable.
Erin Wright: So Obesity has been the clearest proof point, as we are seeing patients asking providers about GLP-1s. Where else are we seeing this?
Terence Flynn: Yeah. So manufacturers are actually already selling over twenty-five branded drugs directly to patients at cash prices. Now, the common features of these drug classes are that they're self-administered, so essentially the patient can start and stay on treatment, and where there's limited in-person infrastructure that's needed, and where, as I mentioned, you have a lower price point or a coverage gap, meaning traditional insurance coverage doesn't exist.
Now, we're seeing this in large chronic categories. You mentioned obesity. Another one is, migraine headaches. There are also other areas that are amenable to telehealth, so think oral PCSK9 therapies, topical dermatology, non-opioid pain. So again, we think as more self-administered products launch, you're gonna see the addressable DTC pool expand.
Erin Wright: And ultimately what does this reveal about patient demand and gaps in reimbursement?
Terence Flynn: Yeah, I think GLP-1s, as you mentioned, Erin, provided the first proof point here that this new DTC model could actually be viable. And really the reason for that is that, the US employer coverage base right now, only about fifty percent cover these obesity medications.
And so for the other fifty percent, you have a gap in coverage. And that's really why people are seeking other channels for coverage. And so again, that really created this opening here for this new model. And so again, that's another consideration when you think about other medicines that could go through these channels is you have to think about the insurance coverage situation. And so for some areas like oncology, for example, insurance coverage is gonna be very high, and so those wouldn't be amenable to a DTC approach.
Erin Wright: So Terence, your analysis points to roughly twenty-six billion peak US opportunity. What makes a certain therapeutic well-suited for direct-to-consumer, and where is the opportunity most concentrated?
Terence Flynn: Yeah. So there are really four variables that we considered. The first is self-administration. So as I mentioned, you have to be able to administer the medicine yourself, meaning you don't have to go into the physician or hospital for an injection, for example. The second is that the diagnosis doesn't need an in-person confirmation. So think of something like a biopsy or something. So you'd have to be able to diagnose, as I said, over a remote telehealth channel. The third would be something that is a lower price point. Obviously, there are, like we mentioned, the GLP-1 medicines are at a different price point versus oncology medicines.
And then the last one would be any kind of legal restrictions. So sometimes FDA has a lot of restrictions around who can prescribe a medicine. These are called REMS. And so any medicine that had restrictions like that obviously would not be amenable to DTC. So again, we think through those different variables, and then we ultimately built up this twenty-six billion dollar TAM that represents about three percent of total branded pharmaceutical spend. Of that, about half is driven by the obesity or GLP-1 medications.
So Erin, that's a good bridge to healthcare services because consumerism isn't just about paying cash. What does greater consumer control actually look like?
Erin Wright: You're right. It's not just about paying out of pocket for healthcare. With now consumers becoming more proactive with their healthcare and preventative care, we are seeing a whole healthcare ecosystem shift, from health insurers now offering lifestyle savings accounts empowering patients with more choice on that front, health systems and hospitals are creating a digital front door and delivery of care twenty-four/seven on that front. And also, we're seeing more direct-to-consumer pharmacies and transparent pharmacies that are gaining traction.
Terence Flynn: And what does the Alpha Wise survey data tell us about consumers' willingness to pay out of pocket for care?
Erin Wright: So based on our AlphaWise consumer survey, twenty-five percent of consumers report paying entirely out of pocket for at least one healthcare service over the past year. That was actually higher than what we were expecting. Most commonly, this was attributable to behavioral and mental health services, about eight percent of the cohort.
Annual spend was about nine hundred and eight dollars, but maximum willingness to spend was about double that. So this suggests consumers are using out-of-pocket services and medications and are willing to spend to do so.
Terence Flynn: That's very interesting. How important are digital tools, wearables, and testing in actually accelerating this shift?
Erin Wright: So wearables are certainly a piece of the puzzle. What is new though here is that we're seeing wearable data align with actual biological data, where, for example, clinical laboratories are now partnering with these wearable companies and other direct-to-consumer healthcare platforms to offer subscription-based biomarker panels and other testing services. This is where this type of technology becomes more actionable from a healthcare perspective and really, frankly, empowers patients to take matters into their own hands.
Terence Flynn: So as consumers take more control, as you discussed, what types of healthcare service models are best positioned to benefit?
Erin Wright: There are certainly a host of companies across healthcare that are attacking this from several different angles.
But if we think about who in the industry has the most touch points into the consumer, into the patient, it would be your diversified managed care companies and vertically integrated managed care companies where we view that many of these larger insurers are best able to adapt to consumerism in healthcare. We're already starting to see that happen with stepped-up technology investments helping to facilitate greater transparency and access, whether it's across insurance, provider arms, technology, or, um, or pharmacy assets as well.
To sum it up, in biopharma, we're seeing a parallel access channel emerge alongside traditional reimbursement. And in healthcare services, consumers are gaining more control over how they choose access and pay for their care. Consumers aren't stepping outside of the healthcare system. They're taking a more proactive and more active role in how they navigate it.
Terrence, thank you for taking the time to talk.
Terence Flynn: Great speaking with you Erin.
Erin Wright: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or a colleague today.
Heather Berger of the U.S. Economics Team hosts Wealth Management Senior Economist and Strategist Sarah Wolfe to discuss what it takes to define the middle class in America today. They break down how factors like rising essential costs and the development of AI are reshaping consumer balance sheets and financial security.
Sarah Wolfe is a member of Morgan Stanley's Wealth Management Division and is not a member of Morgan Stanley’s Research Department. Unless otherwise indicated, her views are her own and may differ from the views of the Morgan Stanley Research Department and from the views of others within Morgan Stanley.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Heather Berger: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Heather Berger from Morgan Stanley's U.S. Economics Team.
Sarah Wolfe: And I'm Sarah Wolfe, Senior Economist and Strategist on Morgan Stanley's Thematic and Macro Investing team in the Global Investment Office.
Heather Berger: Today, the K-shaped economy, the middle class, and how AI could reshape both.
It's Friday, September 11th, at 10a.m. in New York.
The K-shaped economy has been a major theme this year. At its core, it describes an economy where households are experiencing very different circumstances. Those with more assets have benefited from rising wealth, while those with less wealth remain more dependent on income and more exposed to increases in essential costs. But that top versus bottom framing can miss an important part of the story: the middle class. Sarah, you recently wrote about what it takes to make it to the middle class in America. How would you define the middle class today, and how does that differ from the way that households define it themselves?
Sarah Wolfe: I think the important thing here is that economists and households define the middle class very differently from each other, and, and I'll get into why that's the case.
So if you're an economist, the middle class is roughly defined as two-thirds to twice the median household income, which today means if you're making around fifty-five thousand dollars a year to a hundred and sixty-eight thousand dollars a year, depending on where you live in the country, that is roughly the middle class. And that's where about half of Americans sit today.
We've actually seen that number decline, so sixty-one percent of Americans in the 1970s were in that middle class definition by economist terms. Now it's about fifty percent, so we have seen it shrunk. But even though it's shrunk, fewer and fewer households feel like they're in the middle class, and they don't define it by necessarily income or a specific number, but they really define it by milestones, I would say.
So do you own a home? Have you been able to build a family, and can you pay for childcare? Have you saved enough for retirement? Do you have an emergency fund? Are you constantly stressed about your bills? That feeling is really what the middle class is about today, and I would say that less than fifty percent of Americans actually feel like they're in the middle class once you start to put that definition around it.
Heather Berger: What are the key factors that actually make a household feel financially secure?
Sarah Wolfe: I think there's four things that determine household security and stability. The first, of course, is income, stable income. Do you have a job, and do you think you're going to continue to have a job six months from now? We love the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment survey that asks consumers this.
Do you have affordable fixed costs, like housing, childcare, healthcare, and transportation? Do you own assets? This is critically important because if we look at where gains have come from from the last five years, it hasn't really been that much through the labor income channel. It's been through the asset channel, like home equity, retirement savings, are you invested in the stock market, et cetera.
And then the last one is this emergency fund and a manageable debt. What is your debt load? Is it fixed rate, or is it revolving? The more of these pillars that a household has, the more financially fulfilled and comfortable they are, and the more likely they are to feel like they've made it to the middle class, but the reality is, is that fewer and fewer households are meeting these four boxes that define the middle class by historical terms.
Heather Berger: And what has made that security harder to achieve? Which of those costs that you mentioned have moved the furthest out of reach?
Sarah Wolfe: I think these numbers are going to maybe surprise our listeners, but in some ways feel very real to them as well. So if we look at how much inflation has risen since the 1970s, shelter, the cost of housing, has risen 6.6 times more than the overall inflation basket. Childcare costs have risen by 14 times more than the overall inflation basket, and healthcare costs have risen 10 times more.
And if we dig more into childcare, we now like to call it the second mortgage. And we're not being sarcastic or anything. The reality is that to send two children to childcare in America costs more than a mortgage in 45 states, and costs more than rent in 49 states.
So it's really, this reality has gotten a lot more expensive, and these baskets, these individual things like childcare, healthcare, shelter, that define the middle class, have risen more than the overall inflation basket, and certainly have risen more than income growth over this period as well.
Heather Berger: Right. So the overall inflation measure can kind of understate the increases in some of these essential costs. And when people talk about a K-shaped economy, the middle class itself isn't necessarily moving as one group. You mentioned homeownership a lot. How much do homeownership, age, and geography determine who is moving up and who is getting squeezed?
Sarah Wolfe: Homeownership is always incredibly important, right? Because it's this large asset that is more equally distributed across the income distribution, as opposed to if we think about equities, and you've done a lot of great work on this. That is the most highly concentrated asset across the income distribution, right? Where the top 20% is sitting on 70%, at least, of equities. So homeownership remains the best channel towards wealth accumulation. Obviously, though, timing of homeownership matters a lot. If we were all so lucky to have bought a home in 2019 and 2020, we got a low fixed-rate mortgage, and we would've benefited from the tremendous run-up in home prices over the last five years, right, over 50% home price appreciation over this entire period. So that's been really important. Also, geography, where you bought a home, did that benefit from the COVID home price appreciation? And then the geography also matters because someone living in New York versus someone living in the Midwest is living with really different fixed costs, realities of fixed costs, and that's also gonna help define do they feel financially secure, and do they feel like they're in the middle class?
The other component I don't wanna leave out, though, equities is really important. And we did some work looking at the Fed's distributional financial accounts, and if you look seven years ago, Gen X was doing way better than Gen Y or the millennials were at that same age 15 years ago. But then, because the millennials were sitting on so much equity wealth because they've built up their 401Ks, they really couldn't get as successfully into homeownership, so they had more stored away in equities. They have now surpassed Gen X at this age, two and a half times. It is a tremendous reversal in wealth and in who's doing well, and it's because of what's happened in the stock market. And it's not because they were better savers. It was just a lot of timing and luck. So I would say that our fate is not prewritten, as we also think about Gen Z entering the workforce and becoming wealth builders.
I want to dig in, though, to a really important part of the K-shaped economy, though, and that's AI. We can't talk about anything without talking about AI, for better or for worse. And that the common view is that white collar, high-income workers are the most exposed to displacement, and we're seeing that in some of the job numbers recently, right, where tech and financial services are shedding jobs. But your work, I think, is really unique, and it's the only thing I've seen on this that argues that that's only part of the story. So what are we missing about how AI is going to affect high-income households in the K-shaped economy?
Heather Berger: Yes. Yeah, I think it's hard to talk about the economic outlook, the consumer outlook these days without thinking about AI. And as you mentioned, I think really the main focus so far has been potential white collar job loss, and this, of course, is an important channel. Labor income is really the main driver of consumer spending. But there are also several other transmission channels through which AI will affect consumer balance sheets.
And so ultimately, you were just talking about equity wealth, AI will also affect asset markets, which we've already started to see. It will affect consumer prices and policy decisions, and each of these will flow through to consumer spending and consumer credit performance. And so since different subgroups of consumers differ in the types of goods and services they buy and the composition of their balance sheets, the effects will not be uniform across the spectrum.
As we've seen with past innovation waves, AI has the ability to potentially widen income and wealth inequality, or it could help to close the gaps.
Sarah Wolfe: Can you dig a little bit more into some of these other channels outside of the labor market? So what is the wealth channel, and how does it filter through to high-income households? And then what also is the inflation channel that we should be looking at?
Heather Berger: Sure. So the wealth channel is really important for high income consumers because they have equity wealth that is very elevated relative to their labor income. So for that top twenty percent cohort, their equity wealth is around six times their annual labor income. Whereas for the lower income groups, they're about in line with each other.
And so even if the marginal propensity to consume out of income is higher than that out of wealth, for this high income group, asset markets are still a really important driver of spending. Now, for lower income groups and really across the spectrum, of course, inflation will be important as well and will really help determine purchasing power.
When we think about the price channel, we're really thinking in two phases. The first is that in the near term, AI could potentially create price pressures. So if we look at areas like electricity and software, we've already started to see that the demand from AI has led to increases in these prices. But over the longer term, we are expecting that eventually AI will lead to productivity gains, and therefore could lead to disinflation.
Sarah Wolfe: In which categories are we expected to see disinflation, and who does that benefit?
Heather Berger: So we're really first expecting to see it in the industries that have higher adoption rates. And so far those have been industries like financial services, tech. And so if we think about these services categories of spending, they really make up larger shares for the high income group, the older group. And so we do think they will benefit first from that disinflation channel.
Sarah Wolfe: I think if I sum up some of the key takeaways, it seems that the balance sheet is more important than income, and it's going to continue to be so. If you look at the top 1% wealth percentile, they're holding 70 times more wealth than the median wealth group, and that used to be 33 times in 1963, right? So that gap between those in the middle versus those at the top has widened, and this dynamic with AI is only probably going to continue to widen that gap, making people feel less and less secure about their finances, making it feel harder to be in the middle class, and in particular, making it feel unattainable to reach the next class, right, because that gap is so large. And so we'll be watching as a lot of these dynamics play out.
Heather Berger: Right. So asset markets will be just as important as labor markets in figuring out how the K-shape economy will evolve.
Sarah, thanks for taking the time to talk.
Sarah Wolfe: Great speaking with you, Heather.
Heather Berger: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy "Thoughts on the Market," please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.
Our Global Head of Fixed Income Research Andrew Sheets discusses when markets may not adequately compensate investors for uncertainty around themes like Fed policy, AI financing and energy supply.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley. Today, what American football can teach us about the value of ambiguity.
It's Thursday, September 10th at 2p.m. in London.
I really like this time of year. It's a little cooler outside. There's the excitement in the air of a start of a million new school years. And of course, it's finally American football season. Of the top one hundred US television telecasts in 2025, ninety were football games. In an increasingly divided world with an increasingly fragmented ecosystem for content, this unanimity is stunning. And while many factors explain football's popularity, one that I've come to appreciate more with time is its strategic complexity, especially the value of ambiguity.
Not tipping whether the play is a run or a pass, disguising whether and where you're going to blitz. Coaches work hard to keep their options open until the last possible moment. And as we enter September, this strategy is not just confined to football.
Take the Fed. Markets are pricing a roughly two-thirds chance of a rate hike next week, about the same chance that an NFL team passes on second and seven. Part of that uncertainty comes from exactly how you parse Fed Chair Warsh's comments at Jackson Hole. Chair Warsh said the Fed needs to be confident that underlying inflation is moving towards its objective, “clearly and at sufficient speed.” Otherwise, it has, "work to do." This was generally interpreted as a move closer to raising rates. But was it? What is sufficient speed? What counts as underlying inflation? And what does “work to do” actually mean? After all, if inflation is better in the second half of the year, as our economists expect, this framing could just as easily justify no action. We forecast the Fed to stay on hold next week. It is admittedly a close call.
Then there's ambiguity in AI financing. The numbers here are enormous. Morgan Stanley analysts forecast more than 1.3 trillion dollars of spending among the six largest hyperscalers in 2027, a sixty percent increase from the record-setting levels of this year. But how all this gets financed, that's less certain. There's an increasingly rich menu of options for financing across public and private markets, from investment-grade bonds to asset-backed securities, from direct financing to guarantees. The spending seems likely, but what form it takes and how much it impacts other markets is more ambiguous. My colleagues Matthew Hornbach and Vichy Tirupattur discussed some of these ambiguities and their potential effect on Treasury yields earlier this week.
Finally, ambiguity clouds the energy market. Some analysts are optimistic that oil flows are finally normalizing in the Strait of Hormuz. We are not. Coupled with major disruptions to Russian refining capacity, we've now raised our fourth quarter forecast to one hundred dollars per barrel for Brent oil and eighty-eight euros per megawatt hour for European natural gas.
Across these three themes, some of this ambiguity is intentional. Some simply reflects a wide range of possible outcomes. In football and in markets, keeping your options open can be valuable when you're calling the plays, but it's less attractive when you're being asked to price them. And that, for us, is the issue. There is plenty of uncertainty. We're not sure investors are being paid enough for it. A close call September Fed meeting, adverse seasonality, and very low levels of expected volatility leave us positioned for higher volatility across macro markets and cautious on mortgage-backed securities.
In credit, we think all of this issuance is a question of price, not capacity. We continue to expect record investment-grade supply this year with wider spreads as a release valve and prefer collateral-backed assets over unsecured corporates. And with oil a risk to both stocks and bonds, our US equity strategists think that energy equities offer an attractive hedge.
Ambiguity has value, but when the range of outcomes is wide and the price of uncertainty is low, we think investors should demand more compensation for it.
Thank you, as always, for your time. If you find Thoughts on the Market useful, let us know by leaving a review wherever you listen. And also tell a friend or colleague about us today.
Big Tech is pouring more than $1.4 trillion into AI, prompting investors to ask: Is it worth it? Our U.S. Internet analyst Brian Nowak looks at three business models that could earn 25 to 50 percent returns for Gen-AI-enabled technologies.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Brian Nowak: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Brian Nowak, Morgan Stanley's U.S. Internet analyst.
Today, can the enormous investment behind Gen AI actually pay off?
It's Wednesday, September 9th, at 9am in New York.
AI has moved quickly into everyday life. It helps people write software, research purchases, automate work, find information, among myriad[s] of other use cases.
But we need an infrastructure build-out of extraordinary scale to support all of this activity and more activity to come.
In all, we estimate that the major cloud providers are going to spend more than $1.4 trillion on this AI build-out next year alone. But compute capacity is potentially going to quadruple from 2025 to 2028, reaching roughly 120 gigawatts.
But all of the spending has raised a lot of questions for investors. One of the most common questions is: What kind of return on invested capital can these companies earn from all of these trillions of dollars of data center infrastructure investment?
Well, our bottom-up work points to encouraging answers to this question.
We see paths to roughly 25 to 50 percent return on invested capital, or ROIC, across three emerging AI business models. Now, ROIC is a useful way of measuring whether investments pay off. Think of it as how much after-tax operating profit can be generated relative to the capital required in the first place.
The first business model we've analyzed is renting compute power. This is the infrastructure layer of the AI economy. Cloud providers build data centers filled with advanced graphics processing units, or GPUs, and rent that compute capacity to customers. In our base case, a large next-generation data center can generate a return on invested capital of roughly 30 percent simply renting AI compute power.
And even if rental prices move around, our scenarios still produce returns ranging from low 20s percent to nearly 40 percent. So, despite the enormous cost of building and capital being deployed for these facilities, we think the economics here are quite attractive.
The second business model we've analyzed is where an AI lab has their own model, and they also own their own infrastructure. They give access to their model through an API to consumers and enterprises who then build upon it, they utilize the model. In some cases, they build applications using that model that can be future sources of productivity or efficiency for the economy.
In this scenario, we think the economics can be even stronger. When the model developer owns their own underlying infrastructure, our base case generates a roughly 75 percent incremental operating margin and a return on invested capital of 40 percent plus.
These returns on invested capital are impressive, but what determines whether these returns can actually materialize?
Well, two things matter a lot. The first is the price the developers are able to charge for tokens, which are the units of information that AI models process. The second factor that matters considerably is how efficient[ly] can this infrastructure process these tokens.
This is why continued improvements in chips and software to drive higher token throughput – or more tokens per GPU per second – are critical to the long-term unit economics across this AI ecosystem.
The third model we've analyzed is when the AI developers rent their compute infrastructure rather than owning it. So, effectively, they are paying someone else for the data centers and the GPUs that they need. While this lowers their returns on invested capital because another provider takes a piece of the unit economics, our base case still produces roughly a 30 percent incremental operating margin and 25 percent post-tax return potential.
So, while the AI build-out requires enormous investment, the size of the spending alone doesn't tell the whole story about whether or not there are economic returns to come.
What ultimately matters is the revenue and profit that the infrastructure can generate. And as more of the infrastructure shifts from training AI models to serving customers through emerging products and inference, we think we're going to get a much clearer answer to this question investors are asking today.
Was all this spending worth it? Our research suggests: Yes.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
U.S. Treasurys are the foundation of the bond market. But our strategists Matthew Hornbach and Vishy Tirupattur explain the growing impact of corporate credit as AI financing accelerates.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.
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Matthew Hornbach: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Matthew Hornbach, Global Head of Macro Strategy at Morgan Stanley.
Vishy Tirupattur: I am Vishy Tirupattur, Chief Fixed Income Strategist.
Matthew Hornbach: Today, the interplay between the U.S. Treasury market and the corporate bond market.
It's Tuesday, September 8th at 10am in New York.
So, Vishy, what I'd like to do is start by asking you what's going on in the corporate bond market? What's coming to market? How much duration does it have? Talk to us about the theme of AI in corporate bonds.
Vishy Tirupattur: So, this is what is happening. Hyperscalers have enormous CapEx needs, and they'll see opportunity for realizing return on invested capital; and in anticipation of that, the CapEx requirements for the AI infrastructure are enormous.
And the key motivation that underlies is that the demand for compute vastly exceeds the supply of compute. And that as long as that demand-supply imbalance is there, there is a continuing need for CapEx, and that CapEx needs to be financed.
And credit markets across the board, not just the unsecured market. You know, credit markets in public space, private, investment grade, unsecured, secured, high yield, below investment grade, leveraged loans, private credit – all of these channels of the credit markets are going to be deployed to enable that financing.
Matthew Hornbach: Now, Vishy, you've written about this extensively over the course of the past year and have really been on the forefront of expecting a lot of supply. But have you even been surprised at the scale of the supply that we've gotten from these hyperscalers?
Vishy Tirupattur: We are surprised, not so much by the scale of the issuance, but certainly by the breadth and the depth of these markets. And also, the ability of the markets to deal with complexity associated with this issuance. So, you know, about a year ago, we were expecting that much of this would be investment grade only; much of this would be only U.S. dollar denominated. We were wrong.
We have seen issuance in seven currencies, and we have seen issuance substantially happen in investment grade, but also in high yield and in leverage loans. And a lot more in structured private investment grade credit and in securitized credit. We have been surprised by the ability of the markets to be both in their depth and the breadth and complexity; clearly been surprised.
Matthew Hornbach: And one of the features of some of the issuance that may have been the most impactful on other markets has been the duration of unsecured AI-related financing. Talk to us a little bit about what's going on there.
Vishy Tirupattur: So, if you look at the AI infrastructure, you can think of it in many different forms. One way of thinking about is the data centers building – the fab, the LAN, the chips and the servers. If you took the whole data centers, their expected life is something north of 20 years. And there is a lot of CapEx requirements.
So initially, when you're financing the entire data center as one package, there has been issuance that went well beyond the 20-year point in the term. And keep in mind that the CapEx requirements are kind of across the board.
So, it's not just been 20-plus year bonds. There have been bonds issued of various tenors, including a substantial supply of 20-plus year of duration.
Now what is happening is that the focus of some of that is changing towards more shorter-term component of it. So, we've gone from financing the entire data structure, moving towards financing components, and in particular chips.
The chips have a technological obsolescence factor associated with them. So, the chips need to be refinanced in about five years. So, the structures that are now increasingly emerging are towards amortizing structures that are more five-year duration, five-year maturity loans.
Matthew Hornbach: So, this sounds like an interesting shift from much longer duration, longer maturity issuance to something in what the U.S. Treasury would call the belly of the curve. Kind of in the two to five-year maturity sector. Is that right?
Vishy Tirupattur: So yes and no, and I'm hedging only for the following reason: Because a lot of this issuance, these issuers are relatively new in their size of these issuance, so they have not established a certain cadence of issuance.
It is not that they have given up on the longer maturity, but the focus is shifting. We expect more to the five-year point of the curve.
Another important thing is there has been a significant political pushback on the data centers. We have seen moratoria in the state of New York. It's a very live issue in much of the midterm elections. And opposition to data center is bipartisan, and it's very much alive.
So, because of this, we may have some slowdown in the buildup of data centers, therefore slowdown in the long-term CapEx. But then near term, you know, the chips that were bought a few years ago need to be replenished and new chips need to be deployed.
So, that financing focus might shift from a longer term to a shorter term. But that said, they're not going to let go entirely of the longer-term financing. Just the focus will shift towards the mid five-year term.
Matthew Hornbach: That's very interesting because in the U.S. Treasury market, the focus has not been on the five-year sector. It has been further out the yield curve, where 30-year Treasury yields have been making highs for; that we haven't seen for a couple of decades now. And it hasn't been just in the nominal yield component of Treasuries; it's been in the real yield as well.
And, in fact, the difference between the nominal and the real yield, the so-called break-even inflation rate, has actually been very stable throughout this move higher in overall bond yields.
Vishy Tirupattur: So, Matt, let me ask you this question. For the last several weeks, we have seen long-end rates, particularly 20-plus year rates being persistently high. What is in your mind driving this persistently high yield in the 20-plus year category?
Matthew Hornbach: So, this is something that Treasury Secretary Bessent alluded to in his recent interview on CNBC – that the month of August tends to be a month of lower transaction volumes in the U.S. Treasury market. And in particular, the middle of the month tends to be the lowest transaction volume period within any given month.
And so, what we think might be going on is that investors who have been investing in these corporate bonds that you've talked about – may be preparing their own balance sheets for the issuance that most people tend to expect to come in September.
Now, if that was the case, then it would be reasonable to assume that those investors tried to sell some of the bonds that they had. Or perhaps just stop buying any bonds in preparation for the supply that they would expect to come in September. If that was the case and the dealer community had to absorb that duration risk onto their balance sheets, they probably would want to recycle that back into the market.
And the most liquid way of doing that is to sell treasuries. And so, we do think that there was very likely some selling of treasuries by the dealer community, as they were absorbing corporate bonds from the investor base.
Vishy Tirupattur: So that makes sense, Matt. You know, if you think about the dealer community as well as investors, their anticipation of future; corporate bond issuance could drive their actions today.
But the only point I would make is that because these are new issuers, and because they have not established a cadence, there could be substantial variability in their frequency. And periodicity that will come to the market. And in what tenor.
You know, there's this change I talked about – longer term for financing needs versus component financing needs. There are all these degrees of freedom these issuers have that they can use that degrees of freedom. And the investors and the dealers don't have a lot of sense of what that might be.
Matthew Hornbach: It sounds like there's going to be a lot of uncertainty, which might mean that there's going to be a lot of volatility.
So, with that Vishy, thanks for sitting down and talking about the bond market with me.
Vishy Tirupattur: Great to hang out with you, Matt.
Matthew Hornbach: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen. And share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.